THEOPOETIC EDUCATION:

INTERRELIGIOUS LEARNING AND MULTIPLICITY

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this dissertation is to critically review the current studies of interreligious education and propose an alternative model with a perspective of *multiplicity*. I first present the emergence of interreligious education as a response to the paradigm shift in religion characterized by the resistance against essentialism and totalitarianism. Interreligious education is suggested as a model that entails two simultaneous effects: deepening one's religious identity (particularity) and growing one's understanding of the other (pluralism). My argument is that this model is weakened when associated with an essentialist approach that highlights returning to the fixed essence of the religion, or "the logic of the One," and a constructivist approach that asserts utter difference and separation between things, or "the logic of the Many." I argue that these associations generate a discrepancy between the aims of the education (teaching "living together") and its achievements (a particular, separate identity). I propose to engage with "the logic of Multiplicity" to overcome this problem. Acknowledging a participant as a multiplicity that is not a dead subordinator of a religion but a living organism that constructs a religion and even goes beyond a religion, I contend that interreligious education is *an education between religious persons* rather than an education between religions. Interreligious education is also an experiential education wherein the participants experience and embody "living together" through interrelating processes, rather than a training education that equips one with necessary skills. In this education, religious freedom matters; one who is religious but whose religiousness is not confined within one's own religion is still encouraged to continue one's religious journey—a quest for truth and transcendence. This

education is *theopoetic,* in which one experiences "living together" not only among the I and the You but also with "God as poet of the world" (Whitehead) who accompanies and endures our interconnecting and bifurcating processes. I name this model "Education for the We (multiplicity)" or "theopoetic education," and provide its pedagogical visions and guidelines for practice. This model provides a way to reduce micro essentialism and totalitarianism remaining in earlier models and help the participants embody "living together" internally (in one's identity formation and transformation), externally (in participants' interactive processes with one another), and spiritually (in divine love of multiplicity—polyphilia).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

PREFACE

Multiplicity is a central concept of this dissertation. I often define multiplicity with this sentence: *The many become another many*. When the many become another many, it is not only the quantity but also the quality of the members of the many that vary. The philosophy of multiplicity denies that the world is originated from the one or ends with the one. It rather affirms that the world begins with the many, and is in a continuous movement of becoming *another many.*

I believe that multiplicity is a natural phenomenon of the world and one of the concepts that best explains our experiences of the world. I also dare to say that this concept is deeply embedded in the Christian Bible. For instance, the book of Genesis tells us that the world begins with *the many* (i.e. chaos in the very beginning and every kind of plants and animals in God's creation), is designed by *the many* (i.e. Elohim – the plural form of "El")*,* and is asked to become *the more many* (i.e. "be fruitful and multiply"). The world occasionally becomes the *less many* (i.e. the Deluge), but it has never been asked to be one. The only case that I can think of is the Tower of the Babel, the time that people had one language, which led such an unfavorable result and eventually became the many.

Multiplicity is an expression of divine love which is not only patient, kind, humble, and peaceful, but also *bears*, *believes*, *hopes*, and *endures* all things (1 Corinthians 13:4-7, NRSV). As this divine love never ends (v.8), multiplicity keeps moving as it *enfolds* and *unfolds* itself. It is, thus, an inadequate attempt to reflect and construct our practice based on the mere manyness (plurality or diversity) of the world. Such manyness is a mere slice of multiplicity, and such an understanding cannot provide us with the best way to abide by divine love. It is possible only when we are concerned with multiplicity as a normativity, for divine love is *polyphilia* — the love for multiplicity.

The main task of this dissertation is to review and reconstruct our practice (interreligious learning and education) with this perspective of divine polyphilia. My hope is that the model of learning and education that we will get to see in this research, which is *the theopoetic model,* may provide ways in which people can actively experience and participate in divine love. This is a challenging task, but certainly a worthwhile work, if we are concerned at all with what the true divine love is.

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1

Introduction to Theopoetic Education

Interreligious education should be liberated from essentialism, totalitarianism, and dogmatism. In doing so, this education can successfully facilitate participants to embody the life of "living together." The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to this idea—namely, *theopoetic education*, or the education for the We— as well as the entire dissertation. In what follows, I provide some necessary elements of the study, including the context, history, previous studies, problems, methodology, and suggestions. I also include how I operationalize the terms such as "interreligious," "multireligious," "ecumenical," and "interfaith," which are frequently used in this kind of study but in many different ways. I hope this introduction to serve as an invitation to the world of interreligious education and its theopoetic beauty.

Living Together

"Living together" is imperative. As long as we live on the planet, we are asked to share the resources and spaces with the other, or we may violate the other. The deaths of millions of people in the early twentieth century in Europe are an example of the rejection of "living together," which alerts us to the fact that the opposite of "living together" is not "living separately," but "living alone" that involves denial and eradication of the other. "Living together" is not a matter of choice. It is a matter of justice, peace, love, and survival.

For "living together," the global society has attempted many efforts in different dimensions. Those include the dimensions of politics, economy, culture, and arts. Such an effort is also necessary in the dimension of religion. Hans Küng's phrase, "No peace among the nations

without peace among the religions," has been often cited to urge the need of an effort of religion for "living together." [1] It has been so because many cases of conflict in the world involved the issues of religion. Many scholars including David R. Smock and Eboo Patel have also affirmatively claimed that religion should and can contribute to peacemaking.[2]

One of the most common practices for "living together" in the dimension of religion is *interreligious dialogue*. Interreligious dialogue has helped religions be more informed about and positively open to other religions. Since the twentieth century, the representatives of the religions have begun to meet one another and exchange their thoughts on various occasions. The Parliament of the World's Religions in 1893 was a significant event that opened both discourses and practices of interreligious dialogue, and many more dialogues—especially among Abrahamic religions—have been attempted after the approval of *Nostra Aetate*, or the Declaration on the Relation of the Church with Non-Christian Religions, in the Second Vatican Council in 1965.

The change recently observed in the practice of interreligious dialogue is that interreligious dialogue is no longer a practice of religious elites alone. Interreligious dialogue now invites the ordinary people who adhere to a religion(s) and are surrounded by and live with people from different religions to the dialogue. Rebecca Kratz Mays calls such a model "interfaith

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[1] Hans Küng, *Islam: Past, Present and Future* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), xxiii. This quote appears in multiple places. He first addressed this idea in the interreligious conference at Temple University in 1984, and mentioned it in his books and other occasions.

[2] Eboo Patel, *Acts of Faith: The Story of an American Muslim, the Struggle for the Soul of a Generation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 166–67; David R Smock, *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), 3; David R. Smock, ed., *Religious Contributions to Peacemaking* (Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2010), xv–xx.

dialogue at the grass roots."[3] It is not a rare case today that a local Muslim community and a Christian community hold an interreligious dialogue event, for example, without inviting any representatives from higher governing bodies of their religions. The motivation for this change is closely related to the change of the lived experiences of people who live in this religiously pluralistic society today. Understanding of religious others is no longer a distant matter to ordinary members of religions. It is common for contemporaries to encounter and interact with religious others both in public and private spaces, and therefore, it is necessary and inevitable to learn and prepare for living with religious others. Living together religiously requires living together interreligiously, and this is a kind of life needed by all, for which interreligious dialogue at the grass roots has begun.

Dialogue and Education

Leonard Swidler defines the range of interreligious dialogue quite broadly. He articulates that there are four dimensions in interreligious dialogue: the dialogues of the Head, Hands, Heart, and (W)holiness.[4] These four dimensions correspond to Medieval Philosophy's "four aspects of *Being,*" which are *intellectual, ethical, aesthetic,* and *integrative.*[5] According to these four dimensions, not only dialogues of verbal exchange, but also most interreligious cooperation including collaboration for the common good or even an art event is a type of interreligious

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[3] Rebecca Kratz Mays, ed., *Interfaith Dialogue at the Grass Roots* (Philadelphia, PA: Ecumenical Press, 2008), xii.

[4] Leonard Swidler, "Understanding Dialogue," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 43, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 10–11.

[5] Ibid.

dialogue. Swidler claims that the general goal of these activities is, however, common: "to learn and to change."[6] Swidler's claim, then, leads us to another claim: *interreligious dialogue is an education.* It is so because "to learn and to change" is what education aims to do. According to Swidler's range of interreligious dialogue, interreligious cooperative and collaborative activities that cause learning and transformation are also an education as far as they yield learning and transformation to participants.

Scholars and practitioners of religious education knew the effects of learning in interreligious dialogue, and made their own approach to interreligious dialogue and engagement in general particularly from a perspective of education. Karl Ernst Nipkow states that educationists' interests in interreligious dialogue and interreligious education have arisen almost together. He describes the beginning of interreligious dialogue and education in a Christian world as follows:

> Under the influence of the ecumenical movement and in particular since the 5th Assembly of the World Council of Churches 1975 in Nairobi, Kenya, the concept of '*ecumenical education*' has been brought to the fore. In addition to this, both the slow, but steady changes towards multi-cultural societies and influences from Eastern religious traditions have led to the educational goal of promoting '*inter-religious education*' and '*inter-religious dialogue*'.[7]

His statement implies that interreligious dialogue and interreligious education are not mutually exclusive and interreligious dialogue was the interest of educationists from the beginning. Thus, by nature, and by origin, interreligious dialogue and interreligious education are closely related. When interreligious dialogue is defined at its broadest as Swidler offers, the practice of dialogue

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[6] Ibid., 13.

[7] Karl Ernst Nipkow, "Ecumenical and Inter-Religious Education: Observations and Reflections from a West German Perspective," *Journal of Empirical Theology* 3, no. 2 (1990): 6.

and that of education—so the matter of *what activity* people are doing for dialogue and education—are indistinguishable. The difference may be only that those who study and practice interreligious dialogue primarily focus on theory and practice of *dialogue,* while those who study and practice interreligious education focus on theory and practice of *teaching* and *learning*.

Previous Studies

Interreligious education, or interfaith education, is now widely known by the scholars such as Mary C. Boys, Sheryl A. Kujawa-Holbrook, Judith Berling, and Eboo Patel. Their main question is well encapsulated in Patel's question: "In a world that is increasingly religiously diverse, and increasingly fraught with a 'clash of civilizations' narrative, what is the imperative on Religious Education to tell a different story?"[8] He raised this question a few years ago, but the history of this question is much longer.

One of the unsung forefathers/mothers of interreligious education is Henry E. Kagan. He was a Jewish Rabbi and psychologist, who brought an interreligious education to Christian youth in the 1950s. The crucial point of his research is that he uses the term and concept of interreligious education—he says "Interfaith Education"—almost for the first time. Using quantitative methods, his research deals with the correlation between educational methods in interfaith education and their effectiveness for learning, which is still much needed today.

In the field of religious education, preceding research explored religious education in a religiously and socially pluralistic society. Adelaide Teague Case and Norma H. Thompson were

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[8] Eboo Patel and Cassie Meyer, "Religious Education for Interfaith Leadership," *Religious Education* 105, no. 1 (January 2010): 17.

the "pioneers" of such studies during the 1930s and 1940s.[9] Thompson especially made a significant contribution to imagining the possibilities in her book *Religious Pluralism and Religious Education* (1988). European scholars such as Karl E. Nipkow (Germany) and Marius C. Felderhof (England) have also conducted research on religious education with religious pluralism, and envisioned interreligious education as a future model.[10] Their studies were mainly concerned with religious education in public education because this was the context in which they worked. Religious educationists have also dealt with the issue of teaching particularity in the midst of pluralism.[11]

The paper published in the Journal of Religious Education by Mary C. Boys and Sara S. Lee is groundbreaking for interreligious education. In their co-authored article, "The Catholic-Jewish Colloquium" (1996), Boys and Lee report their experimental practice of interreligious education that they had done for two years and eight months. As they report the transformational power of the education, they suggest interreligious education as a key to overcome intolerant fundamentalism and indifferent individualism, both of which are, they argue, the unhealthiest responses to religious diversity in America. For those who begin to study interreligious education,

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[9] Sheryl A Kujawa-Holbrook, *God beyond Borders: Interreligious Learning among Faith Communities* (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 6. Case was a professor at Teachers College, Columbia University, and Thompson was a professor at New York University.

[10] Nipkow, "Ecumenical and Inter-Religious Education"; Marius C. Felderhof, ed., *Religious Education in a Pluralistic Society: Papers from a Consultation on Theology and Education Held at Westhill College, Selly Oak* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985).

[11] Mary Elizabeth Moore, "Teaching Christian Particularity in a Pluralistic World," *British Journal of Religious Education* 17, no. 2 (1995): 70–83; Edward Breuer, "Particularity and Pluralism: Judaism and the 'Other' in an Age of Dialogue," *Religious Education* 90, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 277–85; G. Skeie, "Plurality and Pluralism: A Challenge for Religious Education," *British Journal of Religious Education.* 17, no. 2 (1995): 84–91.

it is recommended beginning with the whole issue of the *Journal of Religious Education* Fall

1996 (Volume 91, Issue 4) which also includes Boys and Lee's article.

After Boys and Lee, other literature regarding interreligious learning and education has

continued to be published. The following list includes some of the major publications. In his book

Interreligious Learning (2001), Carl Sterkens introduces a framework developed by Hans-Georg

Ziebertz and Johannes A. van der Ven, which helps us to understand the models of interreligious

education.[12] Judith A. Berling, a professor at Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley, published

Understanding Other Religious Worlds (2004), where she provided a thorough explanation of the

process of interreligious learning.[13] Boys and Lee also added their co-authored book, *Christians*

and Jews in Dialogue (2006), to the literature, where they expanded their theories observed from

their practice.[14] Didier Pollefeyt, a Belgian Catholic theologian, edited a book *Interreligious*

Learning (2007), which includes ten articles that address the most challenging contemporary

issues in that field.[15] Michael S. J. Barnes argued from a Christian perspective that interreligious

learning is "essential to the proper articulation of Christian faith."[16] Sheryl Kujawa-Holbrook, the

dean of Claremont School of Theology, wrote *God Beyond Borders* (2014), which suggests a rich

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[12] Carl Sterkens, *Interreligious Learning: The Problem of Interreligious Dialogue in Primary Education* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

[13] Judith A Berling, *Understanding Other Religious Worlds: A Guide for Interreligious Education* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004).

[14] Mary C. Boys and Sara S. Lee, *Christians and Jews in Dialogue: Learning in the Presence of the Other* (Woodstock: SkyLight Paths Publishing, 2006).

[15] Didier Pollefeyt, ed., *Interreligious Learning* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007).

[16] Michael Barnes, *Interreligious Learning: Dialogue, Spirituality and the Christian Imagination* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), x.

map of practice and study of interreligious learning and education.[17] Lastly, Kristin Johnston

Largen, Mary E. Hess, and Christy Lohr Sapp co-authored *Interreligious Learning and Teaching*

(2014) to advocate for a Christian rationale for interreligious learning.[18] I would like to remind

readers that this list is not exhaustive, but believe provides a helpful guide for those who start

studying the subject.

Problems

What is at stake? On top of the list of these intellectual "dances" among scholars, the problem I

would like to raise is the tendency of essentialism, which is somewhat embedded in previous

researches but never intensely explored in depth. Stephan Fuchs, a sociologist, defines

essentialism as a view that "searches for the intrinsic 'nature' of things as they are, in and of

themselves."[19] He goes on to say,

> In analytical philosophy, essences are called "natural kinds."
> Natural kinds are those to which terms and classifications refer
> when they are true and constant in all possible worlds (van Brakel
> 1992:255). These terms become what Kripke (1980:55) calls "rigid
> designators." Natural kinds are things-in-themselves, after they
> have reached their true state and unfolded their inherent potential.
> They cannot be imagined otherwise.[20]

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[17] Kujawa-Holbrook, *God beyond Borders*.

[18] Kristin Johnston Largen, Mary E Hess, and Christy Lohr, *Interreligious Learning and Teaching: A Christian Rationale for a Transformative Praxis* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014).

[19] Stephan Fuchs, *Against Essentialism: A Theory of Culture and Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 12.

[20] Ibid.

These "natural kinds" are "independent of relationships, context, time, or observer."[21] He further explains, "Essentialism is closure of a network to isolate and shelter its basic certainties and natural kinds."[22] Thus, essentialism is a perspective that seeks borders, which rejects relational knowledge, constructive identity, and radical transformation ("transmutation"). Classification and typology are terms of essentialism.[23] What is an "opposite strategy" to essentialism is "relationalism."[24] Fuchs articulates the metaphysics of relationalism when he says that "things are what they are because of their location and movement in a network or system of forces."[25] In this sense, change and relationship are terms of relationalism.

My argument in this dissertation is not simply to criticize that a particular study is grounded or promotes essentialist interreligious education. Rather, my point is that essentialism and relationalism, which are opposite to one another, are loosely mixed, or not sufficiently identified and distinguished, in theories of interreligious education. I claim that they need to be distinguished and interreligious education should be clearly identified with the philosophical and theological idea in which it is grounded. This task is important because essentialism and relationalism provide totally different assumptions on teaching, learning, religion, and religious persons. My ultimate argument is that interreligious education that seeks to educate "living together" should be established in the basis of relationalism. The core idea of essentialism, which

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[21] Ibid., 12–13.

[22] Ibid., 16–17.

[23] Ibid., 15.

[24] Ibid., 12.

[25] Ibid., 16.

is *standalone,* does not support "living together," which I understand not as co-living but as interdependent and interrelated living.

One of the most widely agreed understandings of interreligious education is what I call the *double effect*.[26] It is said that the primary effect of interreligious education is to deepen one's understanding of one's own religion and the other's religion. Interreligious education is often recognized as an education that helps us become "more" faithful to our own religion, while having "more" understanding of the other. I do not disagree with this double effect. However, my question is *how?* More precisely, *how can it happen with essentialist assumptions? Or, if essentialism is not the ideology of interreligious education, how can interreligious education explain the process and outcomes of the double effect? What does it really mean to be "more" faithful and to understand "more" of the other?* Boys and Lee affirm, "Interreligious learning offers a way of deepening one's particularity while simultaneously providing a ground for pluralism."[27] This statement can be a "double edged sword." It can be essentialist in one sense, and relational in the other sense. If one accepts this statement as arguing about learning religions by comparing and contrasting, it is an essentialist education, for the purpose of the education is to understand how religions are "essentially" different. If one accepts this statement as arguing transformation of religious identity from religious absolutism to religious pluralism, I think that such an attitude can avoid essentialist minds and open a possibility for relationalism. Thus, the question is *how do we understand this double effect?*

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[26] I intentionally use a singular form for the double effect, because these two effects are understood as happening together, inseparably.

[27] Mary C. Boys and Sara S. Lee, "The Catholic-Jewish Colloquium: An Experiment in Interrreligious Learning," *Religious Education* 91, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 455.

I claimed above that the issue of essentialism and relationalism is not sufficiently understood, and seems to remain loosely mixed. In other words, my argument is that there exists the "tendency of essentialism" in interreligious education. I would like to rephrase that tendency as "essentialist minds." I use the term "mind" because essentialism has never been explicitly identified, neither has relationalism. I sense these essentialist minds especially from the moments when one is excessively cautious about the "danger" of syncretism and identity (con)fusion.

There are many individuals and religious communities which still have fears, worries, and even objections to interreligious learning. Although many of them understand the necessity of interreligious engagement and peaceful coexistence, they do not have enough confidence and knowledge that can persuade them of the "safety" of their identity. Some people or groups are actively opposed to interreligious education, because they believe there is nothing to learn or no reason to learn from other religions. Rather, they warn of the dangers of interreligious education, the dangers of syncretism. Both those who are hesitant and those who are opposed to interreligious education are, in turn, concerned with the matter of essential identity of the self and the religion. The former group (the hesitant) is concerned with identity fusion as a backfire of interreligious education, and the latter group (the opposite) is concerned with identity fusion as its frontfire. What is interesting is that this essentialist concern is also found in some of the pro-interreligious education groups. This concern is often carelessly or carefully camouflaged in the group's proudest affirmation of the double effect: deepening particularity and pluralism. Not carefully distinguishing particularity from essence, some people emphasize, "Don't be worried. It will never hurt you!" In their assurance, I see a good possibility that particularity is misunderstood or equated with essence or unchanging identity. If that is the case, these three groups—(1) the pro-interreligious education group, (2) the hesitant group, and (3) the anti-

interreligious education group—would eventually share the same normative claim: It is crucial to keep the essence of the self and the religion. No matter if they promote interreligious education or not, all three groups would be in agreement that it is not advisable to engage in interreligious education if it affects their identities.

For those who are essentialist-minded, interreligious education is, if allowed, *an education between religions*,[28] because the essence of Christianity, for example, is fixed, invariable, and shared with all other Christians. Likewise, the essence of Buddhism is regarded as fixed, invariable, and shared with all other Buddhists. Thus, if an interreligious education is provided for these two groups, interreligious education is an education between Christianity and Buddhism. Also, this essentialist mind assumes that one's religious identity is categorical. By this assumption, the participants of the education are categorized into one of the participating religions. Interreligious education that presupposes an education between religions and invites the participants as subordinate members of a particular religion comes to emphasize the nature of interreligious education as informative and dialectical, because what the participant gains is correct knowledge about the representative ideas of the other religion and the ability to respond to that knowledge by representing one's own religion. If this essentially minded education speaks about transformation, it means correction to the essence. Such an interreligious education also justifies the rationale of interreligious education as ethical and politically correct, for it believes that past massive violence related to religion was caused by ill-knowledge of the other religion, including misunderstanding, prejudice, and indifference.

It is partly right that misunderstanding, prejudice, and indifference were the basis in many cases for religion-related violence. However, it is questionable whether interreligious education

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[28] Here I mean religion as a creed, a doctrine, or any form described as a "fixed body."

that helps the participants gain the "correct knowledge" of the other religion will reduce such violence. What if that "correctly understood" knowledge of Islam, for example, is accepted "incorrectly" by Hinduism? Will such an effort of interreligious education be a solution to violence? One can also ask what would be next once participants gain the full "correct knowledge" of the other religion? Will there be any more reason to meet, interact, and learn? Will the religions accomplish "living together" after all? If so, how? What will sustain that "living together"? Furthermore, if interreligious education assumes the participants as subcategories of religion, is it just to categorize Coptic Christians from Egypt and Christian Universalists from the United States into one group that shares the same essence for their religious identity? How about those who are "in-between" or "religious hybridity"? Even if two people come from the same religious tradition, are they the same in terms of their religious experiences and identities? Also, I raise a question whether interreligious education can be truly an education between religions. What is the essence of Christianity? What is the essence of Hinduism? Is an essence truly an essence? If interreligious education is an activity that helps each religion correct itself to the essence of itself, will this education truly be able to accomplish "living together" after all?

The tendency of essentialism in theories and practices of interreligious education is such an important and urgent issue that it cannot be overlooked. Without correctly answering those questions raised above, the practitioners will be unclear at some point of the education, the hesitant will be still hesitant, and the opponents will continue to oppose. As a strong proponent of interreligious education, I urge a different paradigm—namely, relationalism—that assists the practitioners to rest assured, the hesitant to move forward to the beauty of interreligious learning, and the opponents to question what they have been believing "right" for a long time.

Multiplicity and Theopoetic Education

Theopoetic education is an alternate model of interreligious education that I propose in this dissertation. This model denies essentialism and claims that interreligious education grounded in the perspective of multiplicity can successfully provide an education that helps the participants embody the life of "living together."

The concept of multiplicity is drawn from the studies of poststructuralism and process theology. I see that the core idea of multiplicity is epitomized in one of the famous quotes of Alfred North Whitehead, who has provided a major contribution to both schools: "The many become one, are increased by one."[29] According to this quote, one consists of the many. However, that is not the end. One that is a set of the many contributes to the many by adding another one to the many. This means that one becomes a source for another one. Thus, no one—a singularity— has a pure essence that is disconnected from and independent of the other. This theory of multiplicity explains that a multiplicity is not simply the many that are separate and stay static, but the multiple is a singularity of the many that dynamically interact one another. This one, or a multiplicity, is, therefore, organic, moving, and interconnected with the other internally and externally. Laurel Schneider articulates this characteristic of multiplicity in the following:

> The mode of thinking multiplicity cannot be some kind of equation *ad absurdam* that captures (or finishes off) "the multiple" or "multiplicity" per se. No, it is not "the many" that I am after when I invoke the term "multiplicity", but a mode, something more like a posture or even an idiomatic dialect that, in its very partiality, locality, and equivocity, alters the frequency of the One-Many divide in high philosophy, linearity, and objectivity.
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> It bears repeating here that "multiplicity" is not the same as "the many." It does not refer to a pile of many separable units, many "ones," and so it is not opposed to the One or to ones. "The multiple" (it is ironic how the English language seems to want to

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[29] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), 21.

make it into a singularity), or "multiplicity," results when things—ones—so constitute each another that they come to exist (in part, of course) *because* of one another."[30]

According to Schneider, a concept of multiplicity explains the nature of being, which is interdependent and interrelated. Multiplicity affirms the one and the many simultaneously as irreducible becomings that are intercreated and interconnected with one another. Thus, this logic of multiplicity is opposed to the essentialist way of thinking. In multiplicity, one cannot stand alone. Being is relational, or "is constituted by its becoming."[31]

I affirm this concept of multiplicity and use it as a tool to develop an educational model that embodies "living together." I do so because the logic of Multiplicity explains the nature of "living together," at least in two ways. First, in multiplicity, the many live together in one. This is what "the many become one" explains, or an internal "living together." Second, in the world of multiplicity, one lives together with the many and becomes a part of the other. This is what "the many… is increased by one" explains, which I call an external "living together." Roland Faber, a prominent Whiteheadian thinker, describes this as "becoming intermezzo," or "living in the middle."[32] These two descriptions should not be thought of separately. They together explain the reciprocity of multiplicity, and undermine the possibility of "living together" in the logic of essentialism.

Multiplicity, which I affirm as a mode of "living together," is possible without affirming totality. Rather, by becoming one that is adding another to the total, a multiplicity breaks totality.

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[30] Laurel C. Schneider, *Beyond Monotheism: A Theology of Multiplicity* (London: Routledge, 2008), 143.

[31] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 23.

[32] Roland Faber, "Becoming Intermezzo: Eco-Theopoetics after the Anthropic Principle," in *Theopoetic Folds: Philosophizing Multifariousness*, ed. Roland Faber and Jeremy Fackenthal (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 212–35.

In Whitehead's philosophy, totality is rejected in every actual entity and its mutual transcendental relationship with the world.[33] Whitehead explains this incompatible relationship between multiplicity and totality when he opposes the Cartesian understanding of particular and universal.[34] In Faber's interpretation of Whitehead, "[M]ultiplicities are always experiments, discordance in the moment of their aesthetic togetherness, and an issuing forth of new discordances for new experiments (cf. PR, 113)."[35] They are "intermezzos," that are irreducible and "stubborn." A multiplicity can be a multiplicity when it is not forced to subordinate to, or be explained in, the overarching concept or abstraction. In other words, "living together" is possible when one is not defined as a part of the whole.

An education that affirms each entity as a multiplicity and rejects understanding it from a perspective of totality has a hope of embodying an education for "living together." Theopoetic education propose such a way. Theopoetic education is an educational model that emphatically affirms multiplicity. In addition, the model integrates the particular concept of God that Whitehead suggests—namely, "the poet of the world," who is "persuasive," "patient," "luring," "saving," and accompanying.[36] Theopoetic education is about multiplicity, the love of multiplicity(*polyphilia*), and divine companionship. This model emphasizes what I call the *theopoetic trinity*, which means that interreligious learning for "living together" is possible in mutual formation and transformation with the I, the You, and the Divine together. These three

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[33] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 48–49.

[34] Ibid., 48.

[35] Roland Faber, "Theopoetic Justice: Towards an Ecology of Living Together," in *Beyond Superlatives: Regenerating Whitehead's Philosophy of Experience*, ed. Roland Faber, J. R Hustwit, and Hollis Phelps (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 165.

[36] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 342–52.

"participants" of the education are all multiplicities which reject to be identified with totality. For example, in theopoetic education, a Christian participant is not regarded as a part of Christianity. Christianity is a part of the participant, while the participant is more than Christianity; the participant is a multiplicity. The purpose of the education is not to make a Muslim participant "the Muslim," nor that individual's faith the only correct version of Islam, for it disagrees with the idea that each faith has only one form and each participant must fit completely into that form. God participates in this education not as an overpowering totality that leads the participants with force but as the "great companion" that "lures" us with vision and receives with love.[37]

Education for the We (Multiplicity)

Education for the We is another name for theopoetic education. If theopoetic education is given from a deductive process, Education for the We is given from an inductive process of research. Education for the We is opposed to the model of Education for Particularity and Pluralism. Education for Particularity and Pluralism is an abstract concept for the interreligious education that fosters essentialism. When an interreligious education becomes highly essentially minded, then the education becomes Education for Particularity and Pluralism. This model understands particularity as a part of universality. Thus, this is a model that understands an individual to be a part of a religion, and a religion to be a part of the world religions. In this model, the I and the You are essentially different, and thus separate. Although it cherishes Buber's I-Thou encounter, there is no vision for the We, or living together.

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[37] Ibid., 351.

The We conveys multiple meanings. First, the We basically means the generally understood plural form of the I. By calling this model Education for the We, I emphasize that this education is not for "me," objectifying the You as a means of "my" learning. The subjects of learning in this education must be surely both the I and the You. Second, still as a plural form of the I, I underscore that interreligious learning should take place not only individually but also collectively. This point criticizes the Education for Particularity and Pluralism which only emphasizes individual learning of all. The model of Education for the We affirms collective learning, and seeks transformation of the participants as a community. Third, the We represents multiplicity. The inclusion of multiplicity in parenthesis signifies that Education for the We is an educational model that is firmly grounded in the logic of Multiplicity. This point will also support the idea of communitive learning and transformation. Lastly, the We, as multiplicity, implies that this model sees not only the community but also the individual as a multiplicity. In other words, the I is also the We, also a multiplicity. The third point reveals that this model is concerned with external "living together," while the fourth point connotes that the model also hopes to educate and embody internal "living together." Through these multiple connotations, Education for the We (Multiplicity) reveals its strong passion for "living together."

Education for the We, or theopoetic education, suggests four pedagogical assumptions—I call them together the Pedagogy of the We— that need to be considered in developing an interreligious education that can teach "living together." The first assumption is that *this education occurs between human beings, not between religions*, because the true subjects of education and "living together" are human beings, not religions. The second assumption is that *the education should be able to provide real experiences of "living together" through the curriculum* because the best education is to teach by experience. As one can never learn a

language only with grammar, interreligious education should be able to give an "experience and practice" of the real "living together," rather than teaching the "grammar," or mere knowledge and skills of "living together." The third assumption is that *the education should deal with the participants as multiplicities*, who are more than their religious identities. No human can be correctly encountered and understood only as a part of a religion, or only with his or her religious identity. The fourth assumption is that *the education is asked to perceive interreligious learning as a sacred and religious activity,* for interreligious learning is a theopoetic journey, or a process, in which the I, the You, and the Divine mysteriously walk together.

The aims of Education for the We include liberating the participants from the fetters of the logic of the One and totality; assisting them to find various religious voices from within, which are different from their primary religious identity; helping them perceive the other as well as the other's religion as irreducible, incomprehensible, boundless, but interconnected; facilitating them to understand their "living together" as "living in the middle"; and encouraging them to enjoy this "living in the middle" as they hope for the uncharted, uncertain, and unknown future to come.

Terminology

Terms such as interreligious, interfaith, multireligious, education, and so forth, need to be carefully reviewed and operationalized before I further unpack this dissertation, for people use them with different meanings. Thus, I attempt to clarify my use of those words below so that readers do not fall into unnecessary pitfalls and the dissertation can be developed in a consistent and communicable manner.

Interreligious Learning vs. Interreligious Education

These two phrases have different meanings. *Interreligious learning* means a process or experience in which a religious individual or a religious community acquires knowledge, values, skills, or wisdom of/from/with the religious other. *Interreligious education* refers to any intentional guidance for interreligious learning of the individual or community. This difference is basically grounded in the difference between learning and education.

Learning is a process or an experience in which an individual acquires knowledge, values, skills, or wisdom. This process or experience may happen in a conscious or unconscious level, an expected or unexpected way, and in formal or informal, or non-formal, education. Teaching may be a help toward one's learning, but is not always necessary and prerequisite for it. Learning is a self-internal-activity, by which I mean that it happens within oneself. It, however, does not occur alone. Learning occurs as a learner encounters and interacts with external factors such as teaching, text, experience, environment, relationship, and so forth. Learning is a contingent yet subjective activity. It is a contingent activity because it is unpredictable, but it is still a subjective activity because learning includes both acceptance and rejection of external resources.

Education is, in its simplest form, an intentional facilitation of one's learning. Education provides guidance that encourages and assists a learner to acquire particular knowledge, values, skills, or wisdom. In part, education provides the learner with certain information, curriculum, experience, space, or relationship. This provision is, interestingly, never neutral. Education is, thus, a political activity which projects the vision and hope of the educating agency in what they provide. It does not mean that all learners would adopt all that is provided, since, as we have seen above, learning is a subjective activity. However, education still impacts the learner in a way that

an educating agency determines. For example, it impacts the learner as it makes the learner deal with what is given, like it or not. The point is that education is an intentional and political activity.

In this manner, interreligious education provides the participants with certain information, curriculum, experience, space, or relationship *with specific visions and hopes*. Interreligious education would help the learners gain particular knowledge, values, skills, or wisdom based on the educators' philosophy and theology. Therefore, there is nothing we can call "Interreligious Education" in general. Depending on the educator's theology and philosophy, the purposes, aims, curriculums, and methodologies vary. In other words, the ways in which the educator views values, meanings, and functions of interreligious learning determine the model of interreligious education. A particular understanding of interreligious learning brings forth a particular model of interreligious education.

Multireligious, Ecumenical, and Intrareligious

The three terms, *multireligious, ecumenical, and intrareligious,* are used differently. First, I use "multireligious" when I do not intend to articulate interaction between religions or religious people, but express the manyness of religion, or the plurality of religion. On the other hand, I use "interreligious" when I intend to highlight the nature of interaction between religions or religious people. For example, the society we live in I refer to as a multireligious society, because our society has plural religions but does not presuppose their interaction. I do not use the phrase multireligious dialogue, because dialogue itself is an act of interaction; thus, I say interreligious dialogue.

Second, I do not understand "ecumenical" exclusively as a Christian word that denotes "beyond denomination." Rather, I follow its etymological meaning, which is "universal."

"Ecumenical" comes from *oikouménē,* meaning "the inhabited earth" in Greek. Leonard Swidler, a prominent interreligious dialogue scholar, explains that "ecumenical" still carries this general meaning, while he understands that "ecumenism" has become an exclusively Christian word, which means an idea seeking Christian unity.[38] Kujawa-Holbrook offers both "ecumenical" and "ecumenism" not exclusively as Christian words.[39] However, it should be noted that the term "ecumenical" has been deeply associated with Christianity for a long time, referring to relating or seeking unity among Christian churches. For example, Christians call the first seven church councils as the Ecumenical Councils. Many Christians would call a dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church an ecumenical dialogue, while they would not call a dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and Tibetan Buddhism an ecumenical dialogue. Thus, although it is ethically and etymologically problematic to assume "ecumenical" or "ecumenism" is exclusively a Christian term, I avoid using "ecumenical" to avoid confusion. With the same reasoning, Norma H. Thompson suggests using "pluralism" rather than "ecumenism."[40]

"Intrareligious" is another recurring term in interreligious studies. The term is usually conceived as meaning "within the same religion," or "between/among different schools or traditions in the same religion." For example, one may call the Presbyterian-Methodist dialogue an intrareligious dialogue. One may also call the Sunni-Shia dialogue an intrareligious dialogue. However, "intrareligious" can be used differently. For example, Raimon Panikkar calls "an inner

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[38] Leonard Swidler, "Which Word(s) to Choose: Ecumenical, Interreligious, Interfaith...?," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 49, no. 1 (2014): 185.

[39] Kujawa-Holbrook, *God beyond Borders*, xxxvii.

[40] Norma H Thompson, *Religious Pluralism and Religious Education* (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1988), 12.

dialogue within myself" an "intrareligious dialogue." In my case, I argue that interreligious

education needs to be understood as inter-religious persons' education rather than inter-religions'

education. If interreligious education is understood as an education between religious persons, I

say that interreligious education is an intrareligious dialogue, or intra-religious persons'

education, or an education within religious persons. (See Chapters 4 and 5).

Interreligious vs. Interfaith

One of the most challenging terminological issues in interreligious studies is which word to use:

"interreligious" or "interfaith." I have already shown my bias as I say "interreligious studies," not

"interfaith studies." Let me explain how I have ended up with such a choice as I introduce four

groups that prefer different ideas.

1. **The "Interreligious" Group:** The first group is composed of those who prefer

   "interreligious" to "interfaith." Their most popular reason is that "interreligious" is more

   inclusive than "interfaith." Kujawa-Holbrook, in her definitions, articulates that

   "interfaith" may exclude certain religious groups such as Buddhism, because they do not

   identify themselves as "faith" groups.[41] For the same reason, Swidler prefers to use

   "interreligious." He says, "The one disadvantage that I see in using the term 'interfaith

   dialogue' is that, although it makes perfectly good sense within the Abrahamic religions,

   or 'faiths,' it does not have the same home in such religions as Buddhism, Taoism,

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[41] Kujawa-Holbrook, *God beyond Borders*, xxxvii.

Confucianism, or indeed, Hinduism."[42] For this group, "interreligious" even includes non-religious or areligious groups such as Humanists or Atheists.[43]

2. **The "Interfaith" Group:** The second group is those who prefer "interfaith" rather than "interreligious." This group includes scholars such as Eboo Patel and David R. Smock.[44] Compared to the "interreligious" group, it seems that this "interfaith" group is relatively less explicit in why they prefer "interfaith." They may not feel a necessity to explain, because they think that "interfaith" is a more popular word than "interreligious."[45] Swidler explains that "interfaith" has become more popular as the practice of dialogue moves into

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[42] Swidler, "Which Word(s) to Choose," 187.

[43] Kujawa-Holbrook, *God beyond Borders*, xxxvii.

[44] Eboo Patel and Patrice Brodeur, eds., *Building the Interfaith Youth Movement: Beyond Dialogue to Action* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 3–5; and, Smock, *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding*. Eboo Patel does not clearly state why he prefers "interfaith" to "interreligious," but he mentions that he finds "interfaith" more in Protestant circles, while he finds "interreligious" more in Catholic circles.

[45] To check popularity of "interfaith," I have done one simple research in Google and WorldCat. First, I typed "interfaith" in Google search (without quotation marks), and received about 8,940,000 results. This is about ten times more than the number of the results I received from "interreligious." When I typed "interreligious" (without quotation marks), I received only about 834,000 results. Second, I did the same experiment in WorldCat, which is the largest library catalog system. WorldCat also found 34,649 books when I typed "interfaith" (without quotation marks), while it found only 2,375 books when I typed "interreligious" (without quotation marks). This means that the number of books associated with "interfaith" is at least fourteen times bigger than that of the books that are associated with "interreligious." Some people may not accept this research as legitimate, but the results I have from Google and WorldCat clearly show how much "interfaith" is more popularly used than "interreligious." All searching experiments were made on August 15th of 2015.

the "grass roots level"; "interfaith" resonates better with that move than "interreligious," for faith emphasizes a personal quality.[46]

3. **The "Interchange" Group:** A common characteristic of the "interreligious" group and the "interfaith" group is that they claim their term replaces the other term. For example, the "interreligious" group argues that "interfaith" should be replaced by "interreligious." The "interfaith" group argues vice versa. However, the third group is composed of those who use "interreligious" and "interfaith" interchangeably. They use "interreligious" in one place, and use "interfaith" in another place without any substantive criteria. They make no specific distinction between these two words. See this example: "The Office of Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations (EIR) is one part of the structure through which the Episcopal Church is organized for ecumenism and interfaith relations."[47] The name of the office includes "interreligious," but it says that this office deals with "interfaith" relations.

4. **The "Distinction" group,** or the "Interreligious" *and* "interfaith" Group: The fourth group is composed of those who distinguish these as two different words, and use them differently according to context and their definition. Since they recognize differences between them, they either use them together in parallel or use them in different occasions.

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[46] Swidler, "Which Word(s) to Choose," 186–87.

[47] *The Episcopal Church*, accessed August 6, 2015, http://archive.episcopalchurch.org/eir/110055_42088_ENG_HTM.htm. This is part of introduction of the Office of Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations (EIR) in the Episcopal Church.

One of the good examples of the former case is the Interreligious and Interfaith Studies Group in American Academy of Religions (AAR). This study group always uses these two words in parallel. This approach results in some positive effects. For example, this use avoids unintentional exclusion. In other words, they can resolve the concern raised by the "interreligious" group. This group also recognizes the difference between religion and faith. In this way, this group can emphasize what the "interfaith" group wants to emphasize.

A good example of the latter case, in which one uses "interreligious" and "interfaith" in distinctive ways, is found from the names of the offices that are part of the official religious bodies such as the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) or the United Methodist Church. See the following names. The name of the office in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), which deals with its relations with other religions on a denominational level, is *the General Assembly Committee on Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations*. The United Methodist Church has *the Office of Christian Unity and Interreligious Relationships of the Council of Bishops*. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America houses *the office of Ecumenical and Inter-Religious Relations*. And, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops includes *a Committee on Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs*. All these offices use "interreligious" rather than "interfaith," which is not an accident. Each of these offices is part of the body that represents its particular religious tradition. By choosing to use "interreligious" they emphasize that their primary role is to create dialogues and learning opportunities as a representative of their denominations.

My position is close to the fourth group, but I do not see that these two words are mutually exclusive. "Interreligious" and "interfaith" have different emphases, but are inseparably related, as religion and faith are different but inseparably related. There is neither purely "interreligious" dialogue nor purely "interfaith" dialogue. Interreligious dialogue is in some sense interfaith dialogue, and interfaith dialogue is in some sense interreligious dialogue. Nevertheless, the reason why I use "interreligious" rather than "interfaith" is because, as mentioned above, I speak about education between religious persons and also see the exclusion that results from using "interfaith" is greater than that from using "interreligious."

Conclusion

With terminology operationalization, the point of the argument has become clearer: Theopoetic education, or Education for the We (Multiplicity), is a model of interreligious education that seeks to be "intrareligious education," or an education among religious persons and within each religious individual, both of which are multiplicities, or the We. Such an education will contribute to "living together religiously," which will eventually change the world to be less violent and more peaceful; less boring and more creative; and, less certain but more sacred. This change is possible when we interact with one another and ourselves as multiplicities. Interreligious education as theopoetic education, or Education for the We, provides guidance to such a mode of living. This education, which is neither for one unifying religion nor for secularizing our lives from religiousness, will disempower the logic of the One attached to one's religious identity and commitment, and empower one's theopoetic religious journey.

2

Paradigm Shift:

The Backgrounds of Interreligious Education

No word is free from its context. A word is born out of and affected by a particular context. The word is also accepted differently in different contexts. Although changes are usually too slight to recognize how differently the word is accepted in the same society over time, the changes are sometimes salient. The word "interreligious" is one of those latter cases. In Western society, "interreligious" had been negatively understood for a long time, but is now increasingly accepted as a word that carries one of the most positive and welcoming values. It is not my intention to argue that everyone in society accepts this word positively, but it is undeniable that "interreligious," or interaction and engagement among religions, is now accepted more positively than ever before in Western society. This changing attitude reflects a *paradigm shift* in regard to religion and *the other*. My purpose in this chapter is to track what has brought about this paradigm shift and discuss the implications that this shift holds for interreligious education. I explore multiple dimensions—historical, sociological, philosophical, and theological—to examine what caused the paradigm shift. This approach is necessary because this occurring shift has been influenced not only by pure intellectual development but also by human lived experiences and reflections on them. I find rejections of totalitarianism, violence, and indifference to human lived experiences and growing hopes for the restoration of humanity, liberty, and divinity as foundational foreground for the paradigm shift and eventually the causes of a changing attitude toward interreligious engagement and interaction. What follows in this chapter will contribute to contextualization of our subject matter—interreligious education—and provide

support to the main work of this dissertation—leaving essentialism and further focusing on developing a relational model of interreligious education.

Multireligious Society: A Historical Review

The paradigm shift within religion in Western society is inseparable from the change of the status of Christianity. Christendom was a dominant ideology when Christianity was the state religion. Craig A. Carter articulates Christendom as a "the concept of Western civilization as having a religious arm (the church) and a secular arm (civil government), both of which are united in their adherence to Christian faith, which is seen as the so-called soul of Europe or the West."[48] He goes on to express the idea that at its core, "Western civilization is Christian."[49] Thus, Christendom is an idea that basically harbors the logic of the One, which does not recognize any otherness in society as valuable or even existent. Only since the separation of church and state took place around the eighteenth century has such an ideology begun to be dismantled and the recognition of multiple religions in society become possible.

In Europe, the political rulers' strong tie with the church helped them control the state, and the well-controlled state provided the church with infrastructure to keep and expand its leverage. The latter was the case during the high Medieval Ages (roughly between c. 1050-1300). During this period, the power of Christianity was evidently stronger than the power of the states. The

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[48] Craig A. Carter, *Rethinking Christ and Culture: A Post-Christendom Perspective* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2006), 14.

[49] Ibid.

humiliation of Canossa (1077) was a symbolic event that manifested the rise of papal power.[50]

Even in the case that a region split into multiple states, the papacy was the power that unified

them, demanding loyalty from the states and people. Under this society that maintained the strong

relationship between church and state, religious difference was unacceptable. Those who claimed

different understandings of the Christian Bible were oppressed by religious leaders, which often

ended up with violence such as pogroms, expulsions, and the Inquisition.

The harbinger of secularization began during the sixteenth century when the strong states

arose, including England, France, the Iberian Peninsula, Sweden, Italy, Germany, and

Switzerland.[51] The rise of state power brought forth the separation between the state and the

papacy. It was not the separation between the state and Christianity or the separation between

state and religion. Those states sought independence from papal control, but not the abandonment

of Christianity. England was a good example. That country broke its relationship with Rome in

1530, but kept the unity of church and state by establishing its own state church. In Germany,

"*Cuius regio, eius religio,*" (meaning "Whose realm, his religion" in Latin) was chanted, which

still affirmed the unity of state and religion. The first attempt at the separation of church and state

appeared as the separation between the papacy and the state. However, this early separation was

the beginning of the post-Christendom society, or peoples' resistance against the religious logic of

the One.

The separation between papacy and state began to weaken the idea of Christendom. Two

factors accelerated the idea of dismantling Christendom in public and mind during the

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[50] Joseph H Lynch, *The Medieval Church: A Brief History* (London; New York: Longman, 1992), 158–59.

[51] Ibid., 343.

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One is the further division in Christianity by confession, and the other is the rise of the Enlightenment philosophy that prioritized human reason and humanist values. First, the church was further divided by confession, and the region was no longer able to be split by different confessions of faith. Thus, it became common that different confessions were found in the same region. This was the birth of a multi-confessional society. The mono-faith and the mono-confession society, at least in public, had ended. Second, the Enlightenment thinkers began to put reason before faith. John Locke (1632-1704), the father of liberalism, argued for the natural rights of a human being, and declared that religious freedom was one of the natural rights of a human being. He claimed that religious freedom could not be restricted by political power. His idea was widely accepted and became the foundation of the establishment of the secular states in continental Europe, ranging from France to Portugal and Russia.[52] Since this time, the paradigm that had been working in the thirteenth century was no longer accepted as valid. Christendom, in which the entire society could be controlled by the logic of the One religion, fell, and religion became decentralized in public society. The fall of Christendom—secularization and the separation of church and state—brought to Western Europe a transition from a monoreligious society to a multireligious society.

For the United States, it was the First Amendment to the United States Constitution that prevented the country from establishing a political unity with religion, leading, instead, to a multireligious society. The first immigrants were those who came from England where, unlike other Western countries, society had kept its monolithic religious form. Christopher Dawson and George Weigel describe secularization in English society as "less complete and far less

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[52] Christopher Dawson, *Understanding Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 32.

revolutionary than that of the Continent."[53] Since England had already separated itself from Rome

in the sixteenth century and established the Church of England as another state religion, the power

of Christianity was still strong. It was, therefore, those who refused the rigidity of the Church of

England—one may call them *puritans* or *dissenters*—who finally left their home, crossed the

ocean, and became founding members of a new society in a new land (or, an old land). These

people claimed free exercise of religion and separation of church and state, and became finally

independent of their mother country. As they established the new country, they legalized their

spirit of religious freedom and separation of church and state. That law is the First Amendment to

the United States Constitution, which has been a critical foundation on which the United States of

America has built its religious pluralism.

It took time for religious freedom to become the new paradigm of the society. The whole

process of legalization of religious freedom took about two hundred years. During those years, the

bloody history of religious violence based on intolerance was repeated. Lynn S. Neal and John

Corrigan describe it this way:

> Puritans arrived in the New World persecuted, and intolerant.
> Catholics, in New Spain and New France, brought their own brands
> of intolerance, not only of Protestants but of Indians and Jews.
> European Christians also brought with them to the Americas
> interpretations of the Bible that supported not only intolerance of
> non-Christian religions (and intolerance of brands of Christianity
> that differed from their own) but supplied guidance about how to
> deal with those who were different.[54]

This quote indicates that both the persecutors (Catholics) and the persecuted (Protestants) in

Europe became the perpetrators of religious intolerance and violence in Colonial America. It is

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[53] Ibid.

[54] John Corrigan and Lynn S Neal, eds., *Religious Intolerance in America: A Documentary History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 18.

striking that Protestants, mostly Puritans who adventured to achieve their religious freedom, did

not share their hard-won freedom with others. Because of them, in 1636, Roger Williams, who

was once a Puritan and later became a Baptist, had to leave Massachusetts. In 1651, John Clarke,

who was also a Baptist, was arrested, and, in 1659, 1660 and 1661, four Quakers, who are now

remembered as Boston Martyrs, were hung in public. Christians' intolerance and violence

targeted other people as well. Millions of Native Americans were forced to convert, intermarry,

move, or otherwise were killed. They were misnamed, misrepresented, and mistreated. It is

needless to say that Catholics and Jews became victims of Christian marginalization. Martin

Marty describes this "wipe-out" as a step of "clearing space" for the establishment of a Protestant

empire.[55] That is, the specter of the logic of the One religion still prevailed.

It was by the persecuted Christian minority that religious diversity was politically

accepted. Baptists and Anabaptist descendants founded Rhode Island colony with the hope to be a

community that is "hospitable to many faiths."[56] Quakers founded Pennsylvania colony "free for

people of many faiths."[57] Along with the colonies of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, the colonies

such as New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland tried to develop as communities with

"religious liberty, pluralism, and denominationalism."[58] Of course their practice of openness was

not complete in the sense that some leaders of these colonies still considered Native Americans as

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[55] Martin E Marty, *Protestantism in the United States: Righteous Empire*, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986), 13–20.

[56] Ibid., 12.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Robert T Handy, *A History of the Churches in the United States and Canada* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 57.

part of the Lost Tribe who needed to *come back* to Christianity.[59] Nevertheless, this movement against religious exclusivism and violence, or the logic of the One, was a crucial part of the momentum to legalize religious freedom and separation of church and state in the United States. The colony of Maryland first attempted to stipulate the freedom of religion in their law (1649),[60] and the colony of Pennsylvania carried the policy of religious freedom until the United States was established. All of these efforts finally culminated in the enactment of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (1791), which has become a significant standard of judgement and code of conduct whenever the United States confronts any issue of religious difference.

The changed context of Western Europe and the United States did not instantly bring about the paradigm that welcomes interreligious engagement. However, they laid the political foundations for a multireligious society and also for the paradigm shift toward a religiously pluralistic society where interreligious interactions are positively accepted and encouraged. Their legalization of the separation of church and state and religious freedom had at least changed the normativity of society from a religiously monolithic society to a religiously pluralistic society. The process was tough, but people were eager to achieve freedom from the power that had restricted their own rights as human beings.

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[59] Corrigan and Neal, *Religious Intolerance in America: A Documentary History*, 20–21. Some people believed that Native Americans were descended from one of the Lost Tribes of Israel after they were dispersed. This case is an example of religious intolerance in terms of which those leaders could not accept, therefore were *intolerant* of, viewing Native Americans as those who were utterly unrelated to their own religion.

[60] The colony of Maryland enacted the Maryland Toleration Act, which was the first law of religious freedom, but it was twice repealed by the Protestants.

Against Totalitarianism: A Contemporary Review

The paradigm shift toward the positive acceptance of interreligious interactions was accelerated as

the global society encountered and responded to religion-related massive violence in the twentieth

century. In the early twentieth century, the World Wars broke out and *Belle Époque* ended. People

realized that the real problem in the past lay not in a religion *per se* but a totalitarian ambition, or

the logic of the One, attached to a religion. Totalitarianism that once flourished within medieval

Christianity now changed its host to the secular states. The Holocaust was an outcome of the

meeting between remaining "embers" of Christian totalitarianism and the state totalitarianism

newly on fire. In other words, it was the "wedding" between Nazism and anti-Semitism that killed

millions of Jews and others.

After the Second World War, the global society responded to the two kinds of

totalitarianism: state and religious. To prevent state totalitarianism, the global society created

political regulatory systems such as the United Nations that could regulate state totalitarianism

with stronger power. For religious totalitarianism, Christian exclusivism was critically reviewed.

As a part of the result, the Second Vatican Council in 1965 approved *Nostra Aetate,* or the

Declaration on the Relation of the Church with Non-Christian Religions, which became a "flare"

signaling an inclusive theology of religions. The declaration acknowledged the legitimacy of

Hinduism and Buddhism, and emphasized the commonality with Islam and rejection of anti-

Semitism.[61] Most importantly, the declaration urged interreligious dialogue, which became a huge

turning point for Christianity. It states,

> The Church, therefore, exhorts her sons [and daughters], that
> through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other
> religions, carried out with prudence and love and in witness to the

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[61] "Nostra Aetate: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions," *La Santa Sede*, February 15, 2016, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_ council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html.

Christian faith and life, they recognize, preserve and promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the socio-cultural values found among these men.[62]

The impact of the Declaration went beyond the Catholic Church. It offered ecclesiastical and theological warrants to Protestant Christians who were wrestling with Christian exclusivism. It also invited people in other religions to the table of dialogue. Since the 1960s, a large number of Christian groups began dialogues with Jews first and extended the dialogues to Muslims in the late twentieth century. Those practices of dialogue have made the paradigm shift visible.

The paradigm shift is still ongoing in the twenty-first century, as the global society continues to experience the violence of totalitarianism. In this century, the violence of totalitarianism has increasingly appeared in the form of terrorism. In many cases, contemporary terrorism has been associated with religious extremism which is another name for totalitarianism. Contemporary intellectuals underscore the fact that current terrorism should not be understood as a sign of violence of a particular religion. It is, rather, another evidence of the violence of totalitarianism. Eboo Patel emphasizes below that it is not the conflict between religions but the conflict between totalitarians and pluralists that terrorism represents today:

> We have to redefine reality: pluralism versus extremism. We live in a world not of Christians versus Muslims, not of Hindus versus Buddhists. We live in a world of Jews, Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Secularists, Buddhists, Baha'is, who want to live in equal dignity and mutual loyalty with each other in a world in which extremists want to dominate all of us. We do not honor extremists by giving them the title 'Muslim,' 'Jewish,' 'Christian,' 'Secularists,' or 'Hindu.' We call them what they are: the extremists of all traditions belong to one tradition, the tradition of extremism.[63]

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[62] Ibid.

[63] Eboo Patel, "Acts of Faith: Interfaith Leadership in a Time of Religious Crisis," *Virginia Theological Seminary Journal* 32 (Fall 2009): 40.

According to Patel, all religions which disagree with extremism are one team. To fight against the tradition of extremism, interreligious solidarity is necessary. Patel's argument has received attention after the United States experienced the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack and its aftermath. Along with his argument, a large part of society has supported the idea that the current acts of terrorism are not a clash between particular religions, but a continuous attack from totalitarianism. This way of viewing contemporary terrorism has contributed to the paradigm shift from interreligious antagonism to interreligious openness.

Religious Diversity: A Sociological Review

Another aspect that has supported the paradigm shift in the Western world is their experience of increasing religious diversity *within the society* and the increasing awareness of religious diversity *in the world*. These are different kinds of religious diversity. As we have seen above, the separation of church and state has brought *secularization* and *de-Christianization* of the West, and it has provided a platform for religious diversity *within* a society. Now it is almost a norm of society that multiple religions construct the society, and I call this social phenomenon *micro religious diversity*. Also, globalization and the development of technology enable us to see the complexity of the world religions, which I call *macro religious diversity*. Christian-dominant Western society had been indifferent to both types of religious diversity. However, increasing micro religious diversity has changed peoples' lives qualitatively, and has urged people to change their attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors toward others. Also, globalization, and developed social science and technology, have revealed our prejudice and misunderstanding toward other religions, and helped us see the depth and complexities of other religions.

First of all, the increasing presence of religious diversity in Western society—that is, micro religious diversity—is a crucial factor that has drawn the attention of people to interreligious relations. In the above, we have touched on factors that influenced religious diversity in Western society, which included the separation of church and state, secularization, and constant religious diversification within or from Christianity. In addition to these factors, immigration has contributed in significant ways to contemporary religious diversity as immigrants come with their own religion. In the case of the United States, it is already well known that the Immigration and Naturalization Acts of 1965 transformed the religious landscape in America. As this law nullified the quota system, more Asians, Africans, and other non-Europeans, who came from religions other than Christianity, were allowed to migrate to the United States. According to Gallup, the Christian population (Catholics and Protestants together) in the U.S. in 1965 constituted 93% of the entire population.[64] This had never dropped below 91% before 1965. However, since 1965 the percentage has dropped markedly, reaching 70% in 2015. The Pew Research Center recently reports that the Christian population dropped from 78.4% to 70.6% between 2007 and 2014 with "significant diversity and fragmentation."[65] Some people correctly argue that Christianity is still a majority religion in the U.S., and its numeric population has never decreased. The U.S. population in 1960s was about 180 million, so the Christian population, which was the 90% of the entire population, was roughly 162 million. In 2010, the U.S. population was, say, 300 million, and the Christian population, which constitutes about 70% of

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[64] "Gallup Polls," accessed August 3, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1690 /religion.aspx.

[65] Pew Research Center, "Christians Decline as Share of U.S. Population; Other Faiths and the Unaffiliated Are Growing," accessed October 18, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12 /americas-changing-religious-landscape/pr_15-05-12_rls-00/.

the entire population, was then 270 million. So, the Christian population had increased 160%.

However, what concerns us here is not the number of Christians in the U.S., but the changing

composition of the society and the trend for the future. The U.S. has been and still is being *less*

Christian and *more religiously pluralistic.* This situation is not much different from that of

Western Europe.

This changing composition of the society is not merely a quantitative matter, but a

qualitative matter. Religious diversity is a reality that impacts peoples' daily lives. In his book

The Faith Next Door, Paul D. Numrich says,

> …the *quantitative* markers of America's new religious diversity are
> not confined to major metropolises like Chicago… Americans have
> experienced a *qualitative* shift in their self-perception as a nation
> and are increasingly seeing the United States as a multireligious
> society.[66]

All over the U.S., says Numrich, religious diversity is an inseparable reality of peoples' lives.

Judith Berling, an interreligious scholar in Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley, vividly

describes her experience of religious diversity at a qualitative level,

> The once "remote" religions of my student textbooks now surround
> me, not simply as institutions (temples, mosques, meditation
> centers, gurdwaras) but also as people with whom I meet and
> interact on a daily basis—in schools, in the marketplace, in
> hospitals, at work, and even in my church.[67]

Berling's articulation indicates to us that religious diversity requires a change in peoples'

attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors. She urges that we need new ways to see, understand, and

interact with these religious others. Thus, what we can know here is that micro religious diversity

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[66] Paul David Numrich, *The Faith next Door: American Christians and Their New Religious Neighbors* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 155.

[67] Berling, *Understanding Other Religious Worlds*, 6.

and its qualitative impact imply that "interreligious" is not just a fancy catch phrase, but an unavoidable challenge for full living in today's society.

Discovering the depth of macro religious diversity has also urged contemporaries to turn to interreligious interactions. Plurality of world religion is of course not a new situation of the world, but it is a recent awareness that other religions in the world have their own depth and complexities, which cannot be reduced to any single narrative. Discovering macro religious diversity in the twentieth century is not a numerical discovery, but a discovery of different perspectives and multiple centers. This discovery has taken place with the help of developed technology, social science, and globalization. The common contribution of that assistance is to enable us to see the other religions and their people from the other's perspective. Technology, social science, and globalization have also helped us hear the raw voices of the religious others. The most important part of the modern discovery of macro religious diversity is that the images shown and the voices heard have revealed the "thickness," or complexity, of the world religions. Religions were too "deep" and "wide" to be correctly measured. There was no religion that could be fully comprehended. Ways in which Buddhists live could not be reduced to one or two types, and ways in which Hindus experience deity are inexhaustible.

The qualitative discovery of macro religious diversity has led people to stop their hasty thoughts and actions toward the others. It has brought a question to interreligious antagonism which was based on generalization and oversimplification of the others. It has asked people whether they want to explore the depth and width of the others to further understand, or whether they want to remain as they were and keep the hatred and prejudice they have held in the past. The answer was simple, for people of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries already knew that the latter has always caused fragmentation and violence. The discovery of the thickness of the

world's religions has, therefore, pushed the paradigm of religion from *anti-interreligious* to *pro-interreligious*.

Philosophy of the Other: A Philosophical Review

In the paradigm shift on the relationship of religions, the role of philosophy was critical. The cumulative experiences of the separation of church and state, religious freedom and human rights, wars and terrors, and religious diversity in society and in the world have led the thinkers of the era to suggest a new understanding of the other—namely, the philosophy of the other—and suggest alternative ideas to be with the other—that is, pluralism; and their works have come back to increased openness toward and a willingness for interreligious interactions and engagements.

The philosophy of the other has made a critical contribution to the paradigm shift toward the positive acceptance of interreligious interactions. The key point of the philosophy of the other is a rejection of the traditional ontology that believes that the other can be understood and described by *our own language and reason.* Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995), a Jewish-French philosopher who experienced the World Wars at first hand, condemns this traditional ontological idea as "reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being," and rejects it due to its presupposition of totality that causes violence to the other.[68] Lévinas maintains that "infinity" lies and "transcendence" arises between the I and the other.[69] Thus, for him, the other is a transcendental entity. Neither one can abstract the other. That is violence. He claims that the philosophy of the other is to honor the "face of the

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[68] Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority.* (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 43.

[69] Ibid., 39.

other" that "resists [my] possession, resists my powers."[70] For Lévinas, the philosophy of the other is not the "love of wisdom" (*philo-sophia)* but the "wisdom of love."[71] The wisdom we need is how not to violate the infinite distance between the I and the other. He asserts that this philosophy of the other, or ethics, should be the "first philosophy."[72]

Other scholars in the twentieth century also highlighted the matter of alterity. Before Lévinas, was Buber.[73] Martin Buber (1878-1965), who was also of Jewish descent, drew attention to the relationship with the other. His renowned comparison between "I-It" and "I-Thou" alerted the Western intellectuals how two beings could meet either violently with objectification and instrumentalization *or* authentically with equality and symmetry.[74] Along with Lévinas, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), a German-born American political theorist who also witnessed the Holocaust at firsthand, stressed the ethics of the other. By using the Augustinian formula, "Amo: volo ut sis," or, "I love you: I want you to be," she articulated that the full recognition of the other's otherness is "love."[75] French poststructuralists such as Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze problematized the power of totality. For example, Foucault underscored injustice toward the other

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[70] Ibid., 194–97.

[71] Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being: Or, Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1981), 162.

[72] Emmanuel Lévinas, *The Lévinas Reader* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989), 75–87.

[73] Philosophically, before Lévinas, of course, was a tradition of phenomenology including Heidegger, Husserl, Pascal and Hegel.

[74] Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958).

[75] Stephan Kampowski, *Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning: The Action Theory and Moral Thought of Hannah Arendt in the Light of Her Dissertation on St. Augustine* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2008), 205–6.

by highlighting the problem of normalization. Postcolonial scholars, such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak, on the other hand, contextualized this conceptual discourse of the sameness and otherness, and revealed the violence of the Western-centered perspectives. In his groundbreaking book *Orientalism,* Edward Said, for example, uncovered how the self-centered thinking of the West historically, politically, and culturally has distorted the image of the other, denied the subjectivity of the other, and, thereby, dehumanized the other.[76]

Although the intellectuals above used different tools and lenses, what they did in common was to denounce the violence of the logic of the One and argue for the significance of difference, relativity, and alterity. This was a significant turn for philosophy, from *the love of wisdom* to *the wisdom of love*. The love of wisdom is self-oriented, speculative, and meta-physical (beyond body), but the wisdom of love is outward-looking, practical, and physical. In the enlightenment era, Western philosophy lost this love, or the practicality and ethics of philosophy. Rather it over-trusted human reason. Acknowledgement of the unknowableness and irreducibility of the other came from the criticism of this self-centeredness and self-assurance based in human reason. They have begun to move their eyes from "*Idea*" (the world beyond, or metaphysics) to "*Secular*" (the world here and now, or ethics).[77] This philosophy of the other has challenged religions as well, asking whether the religions have respected the transcendental and infinite space between *my religion* and *the other's religion* and whether they have treated the other justly and with love.

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[76] Edward W Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 1–28.

[77] Harvey Gallagher Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 15. According to Harvey Cox, *secular* comes from the Latin word *saeculum* which means "this present age." Thus, I use "secular" to mean the world we experience, as opposed to "Idea" that is mind or a thing(s) beyond the world we live.

The philosophy of the other opens up the discussion of pluralism. There are, by and large, two aspects of the pluralist discussion. One is to discuss the nature of plurality, and the other is to discuss the relation of plurality, or pluralism. The common topic in the first discussion is difference, which is supported by a constructive perspective. This discussion rejects sameness and essentialism, and attempts to prove utter difference among human beings. Psychologists such as Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey, and the scholars of feminism, gender studies, and cultural studies, who deal with those who have been silenced and ignored by socio-cultural elements, have all made important contributions to this discourse.[78]

The other side of the pluralist discussion—how to engage with plurality, or pluralism— has focused on the issue of communication, or dialogue. The proof of plurality has led to the rejection of totalitarianism, and it has drawn attention to the *communication among the many.* Jürgen Habermas, a German philosopher and sociologist, for example, argued for the "communicative action" as opposed to "purposive activity" by which he meant a self-centered activity based on Max Weber's rationalization.[79] Nicholas Rescher is another example who emphasized the significance of communication. Rescher is, however, different from Habermas, in terms of which Rescher distinguishes *communication* from *consensus* and clarifies that *consensus* is not a goal of communication, while Habermas argues in favor.[80] Rescher wrote, "In

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[78] Avigail I. Eisenberg, *Reconstructing Political Pluralism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), 27–53.

[79] Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Polity Press-1989, 1986), 1–111.

[80] Nicholas Rescher, *Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 153–54.

communication, it is not agreement but intelligibility that is the name of the game: what we both

hope for and expect is not *endorsement* but *information…* 'a mutual clarification of positions.'"[81]

Although they reach different conclusions, they believe in common that communication matters.

Theology of Religions: A Theological Review

In the midst of all of these vortexes, the theology, which affirms religious diversity and

engagement, has grown fast and gained more attention and acceptance than ever before. An

inclusive theology or a pluralistic theology is not a new product of the modern time. Such

theologies have existed since the early church era. They created tension within the exclusive

theology, but never took the lead. David R. Brockman and Ruben L. F. Habito well encapsulate

this tension between *openness* and *closedness* in theology in their book *The Gospel among

Religions*.[82] According to them, Justin Martyr, who wrote the earliest Christian text, was basically

open to the religious other. He thought that those who did not know Christ could not be without

Christ because Christ was "implanted in every race."[83] In contrast, Tertullian, born about fifty

years after Justin, strictly separated the insiders and the outsiders, so he had no "mercy" on the

religious other.[84] Cyprian, a bishop of Carthage in the third century, was famous for the phrase,

"Outside the church no salvation (*Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*)," and provided a foundation for

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[81] Ibid., 154.

[82] David R Brockman and Ruben L. F Habito, *The Gospel among Religions: Christian Ministry, Theology, and Spirituality in a Multifaith World* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 54–135; See also Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, *An Introduction to the Theology of Religions: Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003).

[83] Brockman and Habito, *The Gospel among Religions*, 54–55.

[84] Ibid., 62–63.

Christian exclusivism, while Augustine showed both exclusivism and inclusivism in his writings.[85] Thomas Aquinas, another great Christian thinker, was relatively more inclusive than Augustine. It is seen in his notion of "baptism of desire" which considers those who die before baptism or hearing the gospel.[86] Nicholas of Cusa, a philosopher in the 15th century, was almost a pluralist—more precisely, he was an essentialist who believed that the one truth existed beyond the religions. In modern time, Friedrich Schleiermacher and Karl Barth affirmed the superiority of Christianity over other religions, while Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Rahner moved toward pluralism and inclusivism, respectively.

It is more than a dualistic tension between openness and closedness that we see from the theologies mentioned above. It is a *theological range* between radical openness and radical closedness that the theologies of those people represent. Alan Race, in his seminal book *Christians and Religious Pluralism* (1983), divided this range into three distinct areas: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.[87] Later, Paul Knitter, professor at Union Theological Seminary, has reconstructed this tripartite typology into the quadripartite typology (replacement, fulfillment, mutuality, and acceptance) in his book *Introducing Theologies of Religions* (2002).[88] J. Abraham Velez de Cea compares the models of Race and Knitter as follows:

> [Knitter's] replacement model is similar to [Race's] exclusivism in that both tend to evaluate negatively other religions. Although moderate forms of exclusivism acknowledge that there is general revelation in other religions, only one's own religion provides

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[85] Ibid., 64–65.

[86] Ibid., 70–71.

[87] Alan Race, *Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions* (London: SCM Press, 1983), 10–105.

[88] Paul F. Knitter, *Introducing Theologies of Religions* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002).

salvation, and eventually it should replace all the other religions. The fulfillment model resembles inclusivism in that both tend to perceive truth and goodness in religions, though only one's own religion is destined to fulfill the others because its greater truth and value already includes the lesser truth and value found in others. The mutuality model is akin to pluralism for its tendency to view all religions as equals; this equality is not to be understood in a relativistic sense, but rather in the sense of having similar rights, legitimacy, and independent value.[89]

According to him, the three models in Race's typology and the first three models in Knitter's typology roughly match each other. The difference between Race's typology and Knitter's typology is that Knitter's model adds one more model: the acceptance model.[90] The uniqueness of this acceptance model is that it is grounded in the postmodern philosophy of difference and otherness that we have seen above, while Race's pluralism and Knitter's mutuality models assume an essentialist/idealist pluralism in which one posits the transcendental sameness beyond difference.

As pluralism in philosophy did, the religious pluralism in the acceptance model includes two narratives. One is about *religious diversity,* and the other is about *relations among religions*. Firstly, as the philosophy of the other and philosophical pluralism have argued for utter difference among entities, so religious pluralism in the acceptance model assures extreme differences among religions. Based on this pluralistic theology of religion, theologians disagreed with religious exclusivism and inclusivism. More importantly, people in this model rejected John Hick's religious pluralism which argues that religions may be different representations of one divinity.[91]

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[89] J. Abraham Vélez de Cea, *The Buddha and Religious Diversity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 28–29.

[90] Ibid., 29.

[91] Knitter, *Introducing Theologies of Religions*, 115.

Using Kantian epistemology of noumenon and phenomenon, Hick argued that one universal

reality (*the Real*) exists beyond the world, but no religion carries "the Real an sich" (the Real in

itself). He distinguished between "the Real *an sich* (in itself)" and "the Real as variously

experienced-thought by different human communities,"[92] and proposed to think that there is one

Real but many religions. However, Hick was criticized by many constructivist theologians.

Especially, S. Mark Heim criticized Hick for not being a true pluralist because what he spoke

about was only "one religious object" and "one religious end" although he seemed to speak about

multiple religions.[93] Heim concluded, "[T]he difference that Hick's hypothesis makes seems to be

zero."[94] Heim, conversely, argued that people of each religion started their walk from different

starting points and ended at different destinations. His model was called the model of

"soteriological equality."[95] John B. Cobb and Paul Knitter have made similar criticisms that

Hick's model focused on commonality (sameness) but not difference; so they argued that this

model was not adequate for dialogue (communication).[96] George Lindbeck, whose cultural-

linguistic model posited utter differences between religions, also disagreed with Hick's argument.

The point is that the theology of religions began to have a new, constructivist perspective on the

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[92] John Hick, *An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 236.

[93] S. Mark Heim, *Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995), 23.

[94] Ibid., 41.

[95] Marianne Moyaert, *Fragile Identities towards a Theology of Interreligious Hospitality*, trans. Henry Jansen (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2011), 83–84.

[96] Ibid., 85–120.

religious other in the twentieth century, as it was developed along with the philosophy of the other and pluralistic philosophy.

Secondly, as pluralism has emphasized the importance of communication, religious pluralism in the acceptance model has also highlighted communication—in this case, dialogue and interaction—among religions. Diana L. Eck, for example, claims, "Pluralism is not a given but must be created," which means that religious pluralism is not a state but an action.[97] According to her, "[P]*luralism* is not just another word for diversity. It goes beyond mere plurality or diversity to active engagement with that plurality."[98] Her understanding of pluralism has been most widely accepted by practical theologians and practitioners.[99] One reason is that her proposal has provided ways to pursue unity and diversity together and avoid the debates of truth claim. She unravels her idea of pluralism from the concept of *E Pluribus Unum*:

> One thing E pluribus unum clearly does not mean is "From many religions, one religion." Our oneness will not mean the blending of religions into a religious melting pot, all speaking a kind of religious Esperanto…. The unum will be civic –a oneness of commitment to the common covenants of our citizenship out of the manyness of religious ways and worlds. Creating and sustaining this civic oneness is a challenge for any nation and a new challenge for ours.[100]

Here, she integrates the idea of Habermas who argued for communication for unity, and that of Rescher who argued for communication for understanding difference. Using the concept of *E Pluribus Unum* (from many, one), she proposes the religious pluralism that seeks a "civic

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[97] Diana L. Eck, *A New Religious America: How a "Christian Country" Has Now Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse Nation* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), 70.

[98] Ibid.

[99] For example, see Boys and Lee, *Christians and Jews in Dialogue*, 8.

[100] Eck, *A New Religious America*, 31.

oneness" and "religious diversity" together.[101] For her, pluralism is both a "purposive activity" (Habermas) in terms of which it seeks civic unity and a "mutual clarification of positions" (Rescher) in terms of which it seeks an understanding of difference.

Eck's idea is resemblant to that of Lévinas who called for an ethical approach to diversity rather than an ontological approach. The philosophy of the other and the pluralism of diversity and communication are also present in her religious pluralism. Eck is not attempting to judge whether either religious teaching is right or wrong. She is not attempting to replace one with the other. She does not agree with the argument that one can *know completely* the other religion. Rather, she claims to actively engage each with the other to reduce prejudice and violence and create and sustain civic oneness. For her and also for many others who agree and follow this type of religious pluralism, "interreligious," or having interactions and engagements among religions, is not an option but a *must.* "Interreligious" is accepted not only as a welcoming value but also as a necessary practice to create a peaceful and harmonious society.

Conclusion

Thus far I have explored the five dimensions—historical, contemporary, sociological, philosophical, and theological—of Western society to find the backgrounds of the paradigm shift in regard to interreligious engagement. From each dimension, I have found some significant changes taking place, which constitute the context of the paradigm shift about interreligious engagement.

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[101] Ibid.

Historically, Western society has been transformed from a religiously monolithic society to a multireligious society. The separation of church and state, the legalization of religious freedom, and an intellectual declaration of the liberation of reason from religion were all contributing factors to this change. Contemporarily, the formidability of totalitarianism has impacted peoples' lives through wars and terrors, and called religious people to stand together against unjust violence. Sociologically, the degree of religious diversity has been increased both quantitatively and qualitatively, and changed peoples' lived experiences. Philosophically, major thinkers of the age began to argue for the philosophy of the other, which claimed justice for the irreducibility of the other. This postcolonial, poststructural, and postmodern way of thinking objected to the possibility of a single metanarrative and developed the discourse of pluralism. Theologically, the discourse of religious pluralism has expanded and deepened in academia and practice.

From these multiple narratives, I find a common pattern of movement: *from one to the many*. The separation of church and state, has led a movement from one unified system of church and state to many separate states and religions. The affirmation of a multireligious society has fostered a dialogue among multiple religions, leaving and resisting against religious and state totalitarianism. Major philosophical works today have begun to include the other into their intellectual concerns. Theology has begun to consider religious plurality and their multiple relationships with one another as the objects of its task. Both philosophical pluralism and religious pluralism have emerged in response to the violence of wars, terrors, and microaggressions that were caused by totalitarianism.

In the movement from one to the many lies resistance against totalitarianism and essentialism. Christendom was a totalitarian idea. Nazism and Fascism were totalitarian.

Religious absolutism and extremism are all based in totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is in one sense the practice of the logic of the One. It is the practice of the power that coerces one essence onto all. As such, totalitarianism is a violence of essentialism, it is a coercive essentialism. The movement from one to the many reflects the movement from essentialism to constructivism. Constructivism is a perspective that things are constructed by multiple elements, not by a single essence. From a constructivist perspective, the many have been always "there," but suppressed. The movement observed in those multiple dimensions includes manifestation, confrontation, and acknowledgement of the many, which is followed by affirmation of pluralism, or interactions among the many.

Such a movement in these multiple dimensions constitutes the context of the paradigm shift on interreligious engagement, and also becomes a foundational ground for our subject matter—interreligious education. The *positive, natural,* and even *normative* acceptance of interreligious engagement should be understood within this contextual analysis. "Interreligious" is *contextual.* In the word "interreligious," historical, contemporary, sociological, philosophical, and theological struggles against totalitarianism and essentialism are interwoven. In the word "interreligious," the tears from power and the hopes for love are intermingled. "Interreligious" is a *heavy word*. It carries a heavy emotional baggage. Found in this word are the wounds from wars and terrors, the scars from ignorance and indifference, and the fights against dogmatism and the texts of the logic of the One. Thus, the meaning of the word "interreligious" goes much beyond simply "between/among religions." Embedded in "interreligious" is the blood of the innocent who have enriched the world with difference, voices of the dead silenced by the logic of the One, and hopes of the honest who have confessed their sins and imperfections. The new paradigm of "interreligious," or the positive acceptance of interreligious engagement, is not an abstract

concept that has come out of mere logical speculation. It is a result that is rooted in the lived

experiences of the violence of power and the beauty of the other.

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Interreligious Education:

A Religious Educational Response

At the dawn of the third millennium, Gabriel Moran foresaw that religious education would be "international, interreligious, interinstitutional, and intergenerational."[102] He was right. The interreligious character of religious education has grown rapidly and become increasingly salient during the last decade. The practice and study of interreligious education has emerged in such a context. In this chapter, I introduce interreligious education as a religious educational alternative that responds to the paradigm shift addressed in the previous chapter. Witnessing the challenges of totalitarianism and essentialism, religious educators have responded that their objective should exceed simple transmission of one's own religion but include preparation for living with others. The bottom line is that religious education should be able to equip an individual with an ability to live harmoniously with others (pluralism), while strengthening one's own religious commitment (particularity). During the last thirty years, interreligious education has been suggested and practiced as a model that can effectively fulfill these dual objectives. Interreligious education provides an education that encourages people from different religions to participate together and have an opportunity to learn *of* the other, *with* the other, and *from* the other. In what follows, I introduce four studies that help us learn some important theories and practices of interreligious education, and present how two revolving themes, *particularity* and *pluralism*, are understood in

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[102] Gabriel Moran, "Building on the Past," in *Forging a Better Religious Education in the Third Millennium*, ed. James Michael Lee (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 2000), 147.

that context. My expectation for this work is to create a concrete understanding of the past and current studies of interreligious education, so that we can effectively review and move forward to another version.

Pluralistic Vision

Interreligious education has been introduced in the twentieth century as a response to interests in openness and otherness. In the past, religious education has too often omitted or limited teaching about the others—other religions and their adherents. That null education resulted in the perception of the other as negative and insignificant. When the other was taught, the other was often portrayed in an *intentionally negative* manner. In Medieval times, other religions were described as groups of false believers who needed correction and who were competitors to be defeated. Peter the Venerable, who was an early practitioner of interreligious education, went to Spain in the twelfth century and sought to learn Islam directly from Muslims in order to refute the teaching of Islam and prove it to be false.[103]

This antagonistic sentiment has lost its power in theology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as society has become more secularized and pluralistic. Marius C. Felderhof, a systematic theologian whose interest encompasses philosophy of education, wrote, "The long standing solutions are no longer appropriate in the realities of contemporary Western life."[104] The

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[103] Jacob Lassner, *Jews, Christians, and the Abode of Islam: Modern Scholarship, Medieval Realities* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 6; James Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 42–47.

[104] Marius C. Felderhof, "Introduction," in *Religious Education in a Pluralistic Society: Papers from a Consultation on Theology and Education Held at Westhill College, Selly Oak*, ed. Marius C. Felderhof (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 1.

long standing solutions that he meant included teaching and assisting people to apply Christian values and norms to problematic situations. Felderhof underlined that such a paradigm, however, would no longer fit the realities of contemporary Western life. Regarding this context, he proposed to "open the dialogue" with other religions and deal with "religious pluralism in an educational context."[105]

The call for transformation of religious education began to be argued by many other scholars. In 1978, Martin Marty, a prominent historian at the University of Chicago, also challenged religious educators who attended the annual conference of the Religious Education Association (REA). In his speech, he addressed three kinds of pluralism: pluralism as "empirical reality," pluralism as "political resolution," and "philosophical pluralism" which affirms that "reality is plural."[106] He suggested that the REA needed to work more with the third version of pluralism—a philosophical pluralism—because "religious pluralism may be against the will of God, but it is the human condition."[107] He went on to say, "So the need is certainly there… when we say 'This We Believe,' we are going to be talking about an enterprise, a vocation, and a profession in which the various constitutive groups are going to have to be content to propagate their values, beliefs, and the like, but where there may well be more overlap, coincidence, correlation, convergence and consensus."[108] Marty requested religious education that could affirm and relate to a lived pluralism. Since the mid-twentieth century, it has been an important issue in

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[105] Ibid., 2.

[106] Martin E Marty, "This We Can Believe: A Pluralistic Vision," *Religious Education* 75, no. 1 (January 1980): 37.

[107] Ibid., 37, 40.

[108] Ibid., 40.

religious education to teach and learn other religions *intentionally* and *without bias.*[109] Such a change involved a paradigm shift in religious education.

Religious educators including Norma H. Thompson began to refuse to reproduce the antagonistic attitude toward other religions. Especially, Thompson disagreed with the argument that religious education simply functioned as a tool to transmit an antagonistic view of other religions and to develop knowledge and skills in order to win a competition. Rather, she suggested a new paradigm of religious education that acknowledges the other—that is, religious diversity and other religions—as important realities and resources. Thompson criticizes religious educators who "have not faced" religious pluralism in earnest although aware of it as a part of cultural pluralism which they increasingly affirmed.[110] Setting up Martin Marty's pluralistic vision as a new goal of religious education, Thompson urged religious educators to re-form the foundations of religious education, which means to redefine its objectives, purposes, theology, philosophy, context, content, methodology, curriculum, worship and liturgy.[111] An increased concern for the reality of pluralism had given rise to a grand transformation in religious education.

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[109] See V. A McClelland, *Christian Education in a Pluralist Society* (London; New York: Routledge, 1988); Felderhof, *Religious Education*; Thompson, *Religious Pluralism and Religious Education*.

[110] Thompson, *Religious Pluralism and Religious Education*, 13–18.

[111] Ibid., 19.

Dual Objectives

Norma H. Thompson, in her preface to *Religious Pluralism and Religious Education,* includes her thoughts on objectives, theology, context, and content of religious education. Among these four, her re-work of the objectives of religious education is closely related to the development of interreligious education. Criticizing the objective of religious education as having been restricted to "transmitting the heritage of the particular religion," she proposes that the objective of religious education should also include educating how to understand and relate with the other.[112] With this, she claims that the end of religious education is an *education for absolute truth.* This change has many implications. One is that the objective of religious education becomes dual, and the other is that this approach locates one's religion among many others. Thus, this change implies that the primary concern of religious education has changed *from the religion per se to people and their lives,* or *oikoumene* (all those who inhabit the world).

Traditionally, affirming and educating about religious pluralism was regarded as contrary to the vision of many religions. This was especially the case for Christianity, and this is why Marty argued, "Religious pluralism may be against the will of God," at the REA gathering. However, Mary Elizabeth Moore, for example, contends that the rationale for the education for pluralism is found in Christian heritage.[113] She introduces the four impulses that are embedded in Christian heritage: the impulses toward love, the future, the world, and transformation of the world.[114] She argues that these impulses lead Christians "to be inclusive, to practice love and

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[112] Ibid., 19–21.

[113] Moore, "Teaching Christian Particularity in a Pluralistic World," 74.

[114] Ibid., 75–78.

justice toward our neighbor and to the whole creation"—that is, to pluralism.[115] For her, education for pluralism is more than an idea merely compatible with Christian teachings, which is what Christian tradition has actively taught and cherished. Sheryl Kujawa-Holbrook also finds the justification for education for pluralism from the stories of Jesus, such as a story of his exchanges with the Samaritans who belonged to "a different religious tradition."[116] Shedding light on Jesus who crosses religious boundaries, Kujawa-Holbrook concludes, "Openness to religious pluralism is a basic Christian value if we are to consider the example of Jesus."[117] Pluralism for these scholars is not complicated as some philosophers argue. Education for pluralism is to teach engagement and openness with which to live as one among the many, not as one over the many.

Religious education that was once exclusive and defensive has undergone a change in the twentieth century. A new vision for it is now educating people not only to be faithful to their own religion but also to understand other religions and contribute to peace and harmony in a larger society. My argument is that interreligious education is a methodological response to these double objectives. "How can we, or what kind of religious education would strengthen our faith and enlarge our understanding of the other?" is the main question that has given birth to interreligious education. The scholars introduced below show the examples of how people have tried to answer this question with a model of interreligious education.

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[115] Ibid., 78.

[116] Kujawa-Holbrook, *God beyond Borders*, xxiii.

[117] Ibid., xxii.

Henry Enoch Kagan

Henry Enoch Kagan (1906-1969), a Jewish rabbi and psychologist, served as a professor of pastoral psychology at the (Catholic) Graduate School of Pastoral Counseling in Iona College, trying to find effective ways to reduce anti-Semitism in the Christian community. As a part of his lifetime research, he taught Christian youth about Jews and Judaism under the heading "interfaith education," and used quantitative research to compare the effectiveness of his teaching methods. In particular, he compared the "Indirect Group method" and the "Direct Group method." His purpose was to see which method was more effective in changing Christians' attitude toward Jews. His definition of the Indirect Group method was a relatively traditional style of "learning the other" in which the representative of a religion visits the gathering of the other religious people and provides informational knowledge about one's own religion in a friendly manner. He understood that this method tended to focus on commonality between two religions, in which benignity is a common value.[118] In contrast, the Direct Group method basically provides the participants with an opportunity of a direct encounter with core controversies that they have with other religions, even allowing them to express their honest emotions. In his exercise, he offered Christian students a chance to address their emotions and understandings that they had toward Jews, even though those might sound aggressive and biased to Jews. After the Christian students expressed their thoughts and emotions honestly, they heard some explanations from the instructor. He found that this Direct Group method helped the participants reduce their antagonistic and

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[118] Henry Enoch Kagan, *Changing the Attitude of Christian toward Jew: A Psychological Experiment in Interreligious Education.* (New York: Central Conference of American Rabbis, 1950); Henry Enoch Kagan, *Changing the Attitude of Christian toward Jew: A Psychological Approach through Religion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 15–19. Regarding this project, he published a small booklet first in 1950 and a full version later in 1952.

prejudiced thoughts and emotions more effectively than the Indirect Group method. He termed

what the Direct Group students went through as a "verbal catharsis."[119]

Kagan conducted both methods in two different cases. The first case was in the Episcopal

Connecticut Seminar, and the other was in the Methodist West Virginia Seminar. In Connecticut,

he met two groups, numbering 49 and 48 high school students, and in West Virginia he met three

groups of 163, 149, and 116. For these five groups, he implemented both Direct and Indirect

methods, and additionally conducted what he called the "Focused Private Interview" with the

groups he met in the Methodist seminar. When using the Indirect Group method, he taught

histories and teachings of Judaism and focused on the commonality between Judaism and

Christianity; but, he never gave the students the chance to talk about how they thought and felt

toward Jews including their feelings of anti-Semitism. When using the Direct Group method, he,

contrarily, provided a chance for individuals to express their honest emotions toward Jews and

Judaism. During the Focused Private Interview, he spent thirty minutes with each student and

gave the students a chance to talk about their honest thoughts and feelings toward Jews and

Judaism more privately and personally.

This is from Kagan's conclusion:

> The Indirect Group method, which teaches the Jewish origins of
> contributions to Christianity and the religio-democratic values of
> the Bible shared by Christian and Jew alike, does *not* change the
> attitude of Christian toward the Jew. This method does *not* decrease
> the degree of prejudice toward the Jew. If it is any consolation, it
> may be noted that this popular interfaith technique does not
> *increase* anti-Jewish prejudice. . . A significant change in the
> attitude of Christian toward Jew *is* brought about by the Direct
> Group method….This Direct Group method stimulates group
> involvement in the Christian-Jewish problem; corrects
> misinformation about contemporary Jews; affords a group catharsis

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[119] Kagan, *Changing the Attitude of Christian toward Jew: A Psychological Approach through Religion*, 19–22.

> for hostility; and gives an opportunity for a reorientation of values
> in relation to the Jew….A more favorable attitude toward the Jew
> on the part of Christians results from a private interview which is
> focused on contemporary Christian-Jewish relations."[120]

According to him, the Indirect Group method was not effective in reducing the prejudice that Christian students had toward Jews and Judaism, while the Direct Group method and the Focused Private Interview method were highly effective. In other words, his conclusion implies that avoiding the real issues between religions, or the strategy of "say as little as possible about a specific conflict,"[121] would not be the best way to help people understand the other. In the case that one religious group is experiencing a deep misunderstanding or resentment toward another group, Kagan would argue that the education should be able to offer an opportunity for each individual to express directly their thoughts and emotions about the other, including negative ones. "Verbal catharsis" may not be the best method in the group versus group education, because negative expressions would offend the other and may deepen conflicts. Thus, one may be cautious about applying this method in group education. However, his finding is worthwhile that "verbal catharsis" helps one reflect on and change one's attitude toward the other.

Kagan's research provides an important insight and a warrant for the effectiveness of interreligious education that includes direct encounter as a core characteristic. First, his research provides an assurance of effectiveness in regard to the possibility of interreligious education. What education seeks is not a simple sharing of mere benignity and commonality. Education that includes honest encounters and interactions, he would argue, will be effective in leading to the transformation of the participants. Second, his research is meaningful in that it is one of the

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[120] Ibid., 133.

[121] Ibid., 137.

earliest contributions to literature that provides the modern concept of interreligious education

and empirical research on that subject. The term that Kagan used was "interfaith education,"

which makes sense in terms of his focus on the education between Christians and Jews. The

remarkable point is that he used *that term*, which had rarely been seen before 1990s.[122] It was not

a rare case that Jews were invited to teach Christians about Jews,[123] but it *was* a rare case that

such an activity was titled "interfaith education" or "interreligious education."

Hans-Georg Ziebertz and Johannes van der Ven

Hans-Georg Ziebertz, a professor of practical theology and religious education at the University

of Würtzburg in Germany, and Johannes van der Ven, a professor in empirical theology and

comparative empirical science of religion at Radboud University in The Netherlands, have

provided three ideal types of religious education that concern other religions. They are (1) the

monoreligious model, (2) the *multireligious* model, and (3) the *interreligious* model.

The first type is **the *monoreligious* model** as an educational representation of inclusivism.

This model is different from a representation of exclusivism or fundamentalism, because the

model "presupposes the existence of other religions and one's own as just one among many."[124]

In other words, this model has a positive attitude toward other religions and seeks interactions

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[122] See Introduction for how I view the relationship between "interfaith" and "interreligious."

[123] Kagan, *Changing the Attitude of Christian toward Jew: A Psychological Approach through Religion*, vii.

[124] Hans-Georg Ziebertz, "A Move to Multi?: Empirical Research Concerning the Attitudes of Youth Toward Pluralism and Religion's Claims of Truth," in *Interreligious Learning*, ed. Didier Pollefeyt (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007), 4; Johannes A. van der Ven, "Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue," *Religion & Theology* 1, no. 3 (1994): 247.

with them, unlike exclusivism which sees the other only negatively. Ziebertz and van der Ven

explain that this model corresponds to the ideas represented in "anonymous Christians" and

Nostra Aetate,[125] and Knitter's fulfillment model.[126] According to these sources, the problem of

this model is to see other religions only through the lens of "my" religion, and, therefore, the

education based on this model has been shaped by the dominant religion of the society.[127]

Ziebertz and van der Ven also point out that by its very nature this model entails reductionism.

Once this model is applied in education, reductionism occurs, because the other religion is

viewed, interpreted, and explained from one perspective (or using one religious language). The

complexity of the other religion is eradicated and oversimplified in the process. For this reason,

Ziebertz and van der Ven call this model an "I-perspective" model, because only "my"

perspective matters in this model; the other is objectified.[128]

The second type that Ziebertz and van der Ven suggest is **the *multireligious* model**. The

main characteristic of this model is to take an objective and neutral approach to religion, which is

an educational representation of comparative religion. The religious education that is grounded in

this model is to "clarify the content and manifestations of different religious traditions" and learn

them by comparing them equally and objectively; thus, this is an "It-perspective" education.[129] In

this model, the justice of equality is restored and religious diversity is appropriately valued in this

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[125] van der Ven, "Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue," 247–48.

[126] Sterkens, *Interreligious Learning*, 51.

[127] van der Ven, "Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue," 252–252.

[128] Ziebertz, "A Move to Multi?: Empirical Research Concerning the Attitudes of Youth Toward Pluralism and Religion's Claims of Truth," 6.

[129] Sterkens, *Interreligious Learning*, 55.

model, compared to the monoreligious model; but, it faces other criticisms. The first criticism is a

famous postmodern question: *Is neutrality possible?*[130] Furthermore, the model is criticized in that

it "risks reducing the religious dimension of human existence to another dimension."[131] It means

that the model fails to take into account the commitment and religious passion of the participants.

The model omits "the human's response to transcendence," which is the "very essence of

religion," not only of the other's religion but also of my religion.[132] The model regards such an

element as subjective, which hinders the participant from objective learning. This model reduces a

religion into written and organized *information,* or a fixed object. This is another type of

reductionism.

Lastly, Ziebertz and van der Ven introduce **the *interreligious* model**. This model is an

educational representation of pluralism, which Ziebertz and van der Ven call an "I- and You-

perspective" model that reminds us of Buber's I-Thou. The characteristic that differentiates this

model from the other two is its practice of "perspective exchange."[133] The monoreligious model

only counts the I-perspective, so there is no other perspective to exchange. The multireligious

model recognizes different perspectives but the exchange is impossible because no one is allowed

to contribute to the education the manifestation of their differing perspectives. In comparison with

these two models, the pedagogic aim of the interreligious model is neither to internalize one

religion into the others (the monoreligious model) nor to compare multiple religions to gain

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[130] van der Ven, "Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue," 253.

[131] Ibid., 252.

[132] Ibid., 252–53.

[133] Ibid., 253.

generalized information (the multireligious model); but to foster perspective exchange and learn from the other.

What is perspective exchange? The following is van der Ven's answer:

> It means that you are able to interpret your own religion not only from your own perspective but also from the perspective of the other religion with which you are in contact. So, it means that you are able to develop both the auto-interpretation and the allo-interpretation of your own religion. But this is only one side of the coin. Perspective exchange also means that you are able to interpret the other religion, not only from your own religious perspective, but also from the perspective of the other. In other words, the interreligious dialogue involves the double, reciprocal auto- and allo-interpretation of one's own and the other religion.[134]

Thus, perspective exchange presupposes mutual formation. Van der Ven goes on to say that this model is grounded in "late modernity" or "postmodernity," in which values such as "self-critical," "hermeneutical," and "constructive" are highlighted.[135] In this model, van der Ven asserts that transformation is possible.[136]

Ziebertz and van der Ven's best achievement is that they conceptualize these three models and empirically prove them. Based on their multiple empirical studies in Germany (Ziebertz) and the Netherlands (van der Ven), they find that people currently favor the multireligious model most and the monoreligious model least; the interreligious model is in between.[137] Nevertheless, Ziebertz and van der Ven's basic argument is that the interreligious model provides the most

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[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid., 254–55.

[136] Ibid., 255.

[137] Ziebertz, "A Move to Multi?: Empirical Research Concerning the Attitudes of Youth Toward Pluralism and Religion's Claims of Truth," 22; van der Ven, "Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue," 255.

effective platform for contemporary people who are living in a pluralistic society. Ziebertz argues, "[T]he greatest chance for individuals and the collective to reach a satisfactory working through of plurality (even pluralistically) exists in the active dispute with the different perspectives and in the changing."[138] Van der Ven says, "In modern times, in which the world is becoming a global village and modernity critically reflects on itself, there is no viable way other than the interreligious model for religions to interact with each other."[139]

Ziebertz and van der Ven's interreligious model is widely accepted by other scholars, such as Carl Sterkens and Didier Pollefeyt, as a model that can effectively fulfill the dual objectives of religious education in the twenty-first century. It also gives an important insight for justice in interreligious education. Avoiding reductionism that might take place in the monoreligious and multireligious models, this model affirms one religion as able to exchange equal perspectives with the other (equality). The model suggests a possibility for sustainable interreligious education through an ongoing perspective exchange as well (relationality). The model also seeks to enable emancipation from the confinement of the logic of one's own religion and recovers humanistic values and religious freedom.[140] The model enables the continuation of one's own religious question and quest within and beyond one's own religion.[141]

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[138] Ziebertz, "A Move to Multi?: Empirical Research Concerning the Attitudes of Youth Toward Pluralism and Religion's Claims of Truth," 23.

[139] van der Ven, "Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue," 257.

[140] Ibid., 253, 256.

[141] Ibid., 253.

Mary C. Boys and Sara S. Lee

Mary C. Boys and Sara S. Lee proved the possibility of the interreligious model by practice. Boys, a Catholic, is a practical theology professor at Union Theological Seminary, and Lee is an adjunct Professor Emeritus of Jewish Education at Hebrew Union College and Jewish Institute of Religion, and her religion is Judaism. Compared to Ziebertz and van der Ven, whose studies are primarily quantitative and theoretical, Boys and Lee's work is qualitative and experiential; together they conducted a research project on interreligious education and reported their observations with qualitative reflections. Their groundbreaking article, "The Catholic-Jewish Colloquium" (1996), is an outcome of interreligious education between Jews and Catholics. They received $142,375 from the Lilly Endowment for this project, and held six two-day intensive sessions, conducted over a period of almost three years.

They claim proof of the effectiveness and transformability of interreligious education based on the participants' interviews. One participant says, "I had no background in interfaith work and little contact with Jewish families. I experienced here a paradigm shift of major proportions, both for how I understand Jews and Judaism and my own faith."[142] Another participant describes the experience of the interreligious model as follows: "Having the two groups [Jews and Catholics] face-to-face, it was possible to check out what the other believed, not what you guess they believe. It is important to touch the faith embodied in a living, active, conscious individual, not just knowledge about something."[143] From the qualitative research reflections, Boys and Lee conclude, "Interreligious learning offers a way of deepening one's

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[142] Boys and Lee, "Catholic-Jewish Colloquium," 446.

[143] Ibid., 447.

particularity while simultaneously providing a ground for pluralism."[144] They further argue, "Interreligious learning has the potential to educate people of faith simultaneously to affirm religious pluralism and to deepen their religious particularity."[145] In other words, they uphold the possibility of interreligious education as a model of religious education that can fulfill the dual objectives of religious education.

In their co-authored book *Christians and Jews in Dialogue* (2006)*, they further develop the aim of interreligious education—or, what the learner would eventually learn—to be a "textured particularism." A textured particularism is, according to Boys and Lee, a "keen sense of the beliefs and practices of one's own religious tradition as well as the finitude of that tradition."[146] This is different from an "insular particularism" or an "adversarial particularism." An insular particularism is "synonymous with parochialism: superficial, provincial, and religion-centric, if relatively benign."[147] People in this particularism can be superficially nice to the other religions but do not deeply understand how they are different or what they believe. An adversarial particularism is an idea that "diminishes, caricatures, or even demonizes the other."[148] Apart from these particularisms, a textured particularism is an attitude that seeks an "engagement with the religious other" with the solid understanding of one's own religion and identity, including not only its strength but also its limitation and vulnerability. Boys and Lee argue for this particularism because they believe that those who correctly know who they are "best positioned to contribute to

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[144] Ibid., 455.

[145] Ibid., 456.

[146] Boys and Lee, *Christians and Jews in Dialogue*, 9.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid.

a religiously pluralistic society."[149] They underscore that those who have such self-knowledge are able to make space for others. This particularism is similar to, but goes beyond what Abraham Joshua Heschel asserts: "The first and most important *prerequisite of interfaith is faith.*"[150] It is so because what one is required to have for a textured particularism is not only one's faithful commitment to one's religious tradition but also one's critical and analytic understanding of the tradition's limitation —thus including self-reflectivity (Ziebertz & van der Ven)!

Boys and Lee's qualitative study proves and espouses Ziebertz and van der Ven's quantitative study in many ways. As Ziebertz and van der Ven argued, Boys and Lee assert that interreligious education leads to one's transformation and teaches one humility, hospitality, and self-reflectivity. It is impossible to know and understand all religions, but they emphasize that interreligious education can teach an attitude with which one "makes a space" for the other. For Boys and Lee, that attitude is described as a textured particularism, and for Ziebertz and van der Ven, that attitude is described as self-reflectivity through perspective exchange.

Carl Sterkens

Carl Sterkens, who is professor at Radboud University where van der Ven has also served for some years, focuses on the issue of identity. He suggests that one who lives in this religiously pluralistic society is required to have a "religious polyphonic identity," and religious education based in the interreligious platform is best for forming the religious polyphonic identity.

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[149] Ibid., 8.

[150] Abraham Joshua Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 21, no. 2 (January 1966): 123.

Sterkens first explains the religious polyphonic identity in two ways. One involves being dialogical, and the other involves the capacity for differentiation and integration. Firstly, he describes the polyphonic self as *a person in dialogue*. He argues that those who live in this pluralistic society, regardless of religion, are required to develop a polyphonic identity. It is so because the society in which we live is filled with multiple voices that are often in contrast with each other. For him, a person with a polyphonic identity is one who is aware of multiple voices outside and inside oneself, but is not fragmented by them; rather thrives by creating a beautiful harmony out of them. Likewise, Sterkens argues that one who lives today should also develop a *religious* polyphonic identity that seeks to be the self who is aware of the multiple voices of the *religious* others and oneself. The religious polyphonic self is not confused or fragmented by those multiple voices, but, rather, skillfully engages with them in one's own religious practice and formation. The ability required for this identity is, therefore, dialogability. One continues oneself through dialogue with multiple voices within and outside the self. Sterkens writes, "'Polyphony' is the dialogue between the various voices."[151] Thus, the polyphonic self is a dialogical person.

Secondly, Sterkens describes the polyphonic self as one who has the capacity for differentiation and integration, which are the mental processes occurring in dialogue. Sterkens explains that these two processes are one pair and happen in two ways: diachronically and synchronically.[152] Diachronically is differentiation that one encounters in different experiences between one's religion and another religion over time, and it is through integration that one acknowledges each of them as they are and tries to connect them to each other. Synchronically is differentiation that one finds in the differences among one's interpretation ("auto-interpretations)

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[151] Sterkens, *Interreligious Learning*, 94.

[152] Ibid., 78–80.

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of one's religion and the other's religion and the other's interpretation ("allo-interpretations") of one's religion and the other's religion, and it is through integration that one acknowledges these multiple perspectives and connects them through dialogue with each other.[153] Sterkens' definition of differentiation is an ability to discern plural values, norms, and forms in the world, through which one finds the complexity of the world.[154] Integration is an ability to combine those differences "under more abstract umbrella concepts."[155] However, integration does not mean ending at a "super-religion" or a final "consensus."[156] Rather, integration refers to an action to acknowledge and admit differences and a process to connect them to each other. Integration is a process to find "equilibrium" from disequilibrium caused by the complexities.[157] Sterkens argues that the aim of religious education in the multireligious context should be to grow this capacity of differentiation and integration through dialogue.

Sterkens provides an important understanding of the self to the practice of interreligious education. According to him, the self is a construct of multiple voices, which is opposed to the essentialist understanding of the self. For him, the aim of religious education in a religiously pluralistic society is to further assist the self to maintain and strengthen a religious polyphonic identity. He argues that religious education based in the interreligious model—that is, interreligious education—can help this most suitably.[158] It is so because the interreligious model

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[153] Ibid., 118.

[154] Ibid., 87.

[155] Ibid.

[156] Ibid., 88.

[157] Ibid., 89.

[158] Ibid., 75–124.

provides the arena of dialogue (perspective exchange) where one encounters and explores

different religious experiences (differentiation) and includes them as a part of one's own religious

experience (integration).

Judith A. Berling

Judith A. Berling, a professor at the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley, like Sterkens,

particularly focuses on the process of identity formation and transformation. Her original

expertise is Chinese religions and cultures, from which her interest in interreligious education

grew. Her book *Understanding Other Religious Worlds: A Guide for Interreligious Education*,

published in 2004, is one of the few books published in the United States that directly deals with

the theory of interreligious learning and education. In this book, she begins, as Sterkens does,

with a vivid description of the current context—a changed religious landscape and changed

human lived experiences—and how it has impacted her own life. Berling shares,

> The once "remote" religions of my student textbooks now surround
> me, not simply as institutions (temples, mosques, meditation
> centers, gurdwaras) but also as people with whom I meet and
> interact on a daily basis—in schools, in the marketplace, in
> hospitals, at work, and even in my church.[159]

Berling is primarily concerned with the contexts of North America and theological education,

while Sterkens is concerned with those of Europe and primary education. Berling also considers

the World's Parliament of Religions in 1893, globalization, emerging religious diversity after the

Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, and the attack on September 11, 2001, as significant

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[159] Berling, *Understanding Other Religious Worlds*, 6.

social factors that have raised the awareness of the need for interreligious interaction in North America.[160]

Her major contribution is to locate the study of interreligious education at the intersection of religious education and postmodern thoughts that include critical pedagogy (Freire, hooks), postcolonialism (Said), philosophy of religion (Wilfred Smith), to name some. In doing so, she highlights interreligious education as an educational activity that provides the participant with a hermeneutical learning process. This intellectual process takes place as one moves back and forth between one's own religion and the other's religion. Based on her own observations and experiences, she proposes arranging the process of interreligious learning into five steps: (1) Encountering difference / entering other worlds, (2) Initial response from one's own location, (3) Threads of conversation and dialogue, (4) Developing relationships / living out one's new understanding, and (5) Internalizing the process.[161] During this process, two things happen to the participant: an "understanding" of the other religion and a "reappropriation" of one's own religion "in light of new understandings and relationships."[162]

In her theory of the process of interreligious learning, "reappropriation" corresponds to transformation, by which she means a cognitive activity in which one rethinks and adjusts accordingly one's understandings of one's own religion, faith, and identity and those of others'. This is a synonymous with Sterkens' concept of integration, for it is an outcome of integrating the

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[160] Ibid., 7–11.

[161] Ibid., 64–80; Judith A Berling, "The Process of Interreligious Learning," in *Interreligious Learning*, ed. Didier Pollefeyt (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007), 25–53.

[162] Berling, *Understanding Other Religious Worlds*, 64. The exact words from Berling is "Reappropriating Christian tradition in light of new understandings and relationships," for she deals with Christian's interreligious education.

external experiences into one's religious knowledge. The difference between Sterkens and Berling is that Sterkens' term "integration" emphasizes constructivist values, while Berling's reappropriation emphasizes an aspect of adjustment from continuity. Nevertheless, their bottom line is similar in that they both are grounded in a constructivist view of the self, which sees the self as a social, cultural, and historical construct; and, therefore, changing and dynamic. This understanding is rooted in developmental psychology suggested by Piaget who argues that one's cognitive development takes place as one encounters the external world. In the same manner, Berling and Sterkens argue that one's understandings of religions (both mine and others') are constantly constructed as one deeply engages with them. Thus, the meaning of the works of Berling is, along with Sterkens, that she applies a constructivist view of the self to the dimension of religious identity and faith formation in relation to interreligious education.

Observations

Characteristics

So far I have reviewed five studies about interreligious education. They are not exhaustive, but they provide us with a brief picture of some recently undertaken studies. To sum, first, Kagan proves the effectiveness of interreligious education that highlights direct encounter of the other. Kagan argues that this encounter would give an individual a chance to reexamine and adjust one's attitude toward the other. Second, Ziebertz and ven der Van propose an interreligious model in that such an encounter entails mutual perspective exchange, which avoids reductionism of the other and deepens self-reflectivity. Third, Boys and Lee, like Ziebertz and van der Ven, argue that this mutual encounter and equal exchange of perspectives enables an attitude change and self-reflectivity, which they call a textured particularism. Fourth, Sterkens explains the possibility of

an attitude change and perspective exchange by what he calls the "polyphonic self," and proposes the aim of interreligious education as strengthening the polyphonic identity. Lastly, Berling provides a process of interreligious learning, in that the participant experiences "understanding" and "reappropriation."

These studies serve as important resources which enable us to theorize about interreligious education. Although these studies have intrinsic differences in context and method, they have some ideas in common:

(1) *Direct Learning*

Interreligious education aims to learn the other from direct encounter of the other. This direct learning expects the participants to come with honesty and their own religious identity. This method is suggested as a way to meet the other and learn without reduction.

(2) *Mutual Formation and Reflection*

Interreligious education is about perspective exchange, or mutual formation and critical reflection on one another. In some sense, the term "perspective exchange" is misleading. According to Ziebertz and van der Ven, what the term really means is a constructivist sense of formation and reflection, which includes the other's perspective of oneself.

(3) *Transformation*

Interreligious education expects an attitude change, or transformation, to happen within the participants. Transformation includes transformation in practice, knowledge, identity, understanding of the self and the other, and so forth.

(4) *Constructivism*

Interreligious education views a participant from a constructivist perspective. From this

perspective, the self is open, dynamic, and changing, and so is the other; thus, the other is

conceived as the wholly other.

(5) *Grass Roots*

The modern practice of interreligious education considers the "grass roots," or ordinary

people (as opposed to religious leaders and representatives), as primary subjects of

learning and objects of education. Interreligious education includes interactions between

individual religious persons and their lived experiences, which are different from

interactions between institutionalized religions.

(6) *Democracy and Ecology*

Interreligious education is a democratic and ecological education, in terms of which it

encourages each individual to interact with the other and experience transformation. The

values that interreligious education highlights include particularity, equality, mutuality,

relationality, and reflectivity.

(7) *Pilgrimage*

Interreligious education is an invitation to an unknown pilgrimage, or a spiritual journey to the sacred, leaving from the static religious identity. Transformation begins from a challenge to disequilibrium[163] and through "both an inward and outward journey."[164]

These seven characteristics of interreligious education explain how these scholars have attempted to respond to the dual objectives of religious education. The dual objectives introduced by Thompson were to educate individuals about religious particularity and pluralism. For example, the objectives of Buddhist religious education are to facilitate an individual to form a particular yet compatible Buddhist identity with an understanding of other religions. The studies of the scholars reviewed here argue that interreligious education can be an effective model to accomplish these dual objectives. What is further observed is that the scholars have responded to this call with their particular understandings of particularity and pluralism. It is seen that they explain religious particularity from a constructivist perspective, and understand pluralism as openness and engagement.

Particularity

Particularity is explained from a constructivist perspective in the studies of interreligious education. When religious education mentions particularity in general, it used to refer to having a particular religion's identity, or having an identity conformed to a particular religion. In interreligious education, it is seen that particularity is often understood as forming a "particular"

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[163] Boys and Lee, "Catholic-Jewish Colloquium," 426.

[164] Sheryl A Kujawa-Holbrook, *Pilgrimage-the Sacred Art: Journey to the Center of the Heart* (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths Pub., 2013), 44.

religious identity, that is unique and creative. Marianne Moyaert, an Ricoeurian scholar in interreligious dialogue, contends, "Identity is not something that people possess but is a process of becoming that never ends. The identity of people is never complete but is always open for completion."[165] According to her, people are always in process of becoming, and their identities should not be understood as complete. Applying this approach to religious identity, Moyaert further argues, "'Christian identity' is not something that Christians 'have' and can 'preserve, protect, and hold fast' like a kind of deposit of faith."[166] Thus, religious identity is something that one continuously forms and transforms through teachings, dialogues, and integrations of one's own religious texts, histories, customs, and experiences of the world and all those of the others.

This constructivist understanding of the self is already a widely accepted idea. In the field of education and developmental psychology, Piaget argued in favor of educational constructivism with his famous theory of "adaptation."[167] In religious education, Mary Elizabeth Moore once highlighted a constructivist religious identity through the concept of "traditioning." In her model, the participant is a "person in process," who is constantly formed and transformed in relation to the external.[168] The scholars of interreligious education are aligned with this tradition. Boys and Lee reveal their constructivist understanding of the self with "transformation," and Sterkens explains it with his theory of "polyphonic identity." Ziebertz and van der Ven's "perspective exchange" explains the self's constructivist nature, for which and in support of his own theory

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[165] Moyaert, *Fragile Identities towards a Theology of Interreligious Hospitality*, 108.

[166] Ibid., 313.

[167] Jean Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York: International Universities Press, 1952).

[168] Mary Elizabeth Moore, *Education for Continuity & Change: A New Model for Christian Religious Education* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1983), 86–117.

Sterkens introduce William James' "I" and "Me" analogy. In this analogy, a person is a combination of the "I" ("the self-as-knower" in James' term or "auto-interpretation of the self" in Sterkens' term) and the "Me" ("the empirical self" in James' term, or "all-interpretation of the self" in Sterkens' term).[169] Thus, the self is a construct of the perspectives of the self and the other.

In interreligious education, this constructivist perspective explains the participant as an ever-becoming particularity. The participant becomes particular as he or she accepts the other into a part of the self, constantly accepts changes, and is characterized by the process (becoming, *ipse,* or "who") rather than the contents (being, *idem,* or "what").[170]

Pluralism

The foremost task in studying pluralism is to understand its plurality. Firstly, pluralism in interreligious education is characterized as an *ethical, inductive,* and *practical theological* approach. I argue this from Marty's pluralistic vision. He urged, "[R]eligious pluralism may be against the will of God, but it is the human condition."[171] In other words, no matter what is the truth, the other is here; what are we going to do? Since the beginning, the motivation of interreligious education has been *a responsibility for the other and the world* rather than *a passion to search for the truth*. I do not mean that religious educators do not acknowledge metaphysical pluralism. There are generally two metaphysical stances observed among religious educators. One

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[169] Sterkens, *Interreligious Learning*, 77.

[170] Paul Ricœur, *Oneself as Another* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 113–25.

[171] Marty, "This We Can Believe," 37, 40.

is *essentialist pluralism*, and the other is *constructivist pluralism*. I have already mentioned in Chapter 2 that essentialist pluralism affirms one ultimate being or source beyond and behind all religious traditions. In comparison with this pluralism, constructivist pluralism underscores intrinsic differences between religions, for they are constructs of different times, spaces, experiences, and so forth. It is my rough observation that religious educators associate essentialist pluralism with Asian religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism or in Abrahamic interreligious practices which affirm monotheism, while a constructivist perspective on pluralism is seen predominantly in Christian religious educators today. *However, neither of these metaphysical pluralisms is the primary rationale behind interreligious education.*

The primary question that religious educators have been raising is not a *metaphysical* one such as "What is truth?" or "What is real?" Their question is much closer to a *practical* and *practical theological* question such as "What ought to be going on?" and "How might we respond?"[172] Religious educators argue for interreligious education not necessarily because they agree with one ultimate being beyond all religions or innate soteriological differences among religions. Rather, they begin with the reality: The other is here. This is their first proposition. The second proposition is this: So am I. Religious educators' question is this: How might we live together? Or as Patel suggests, "How then, might Religious Education make possible the education of the next King, the next Heschel, the next young interfaith leader? And if we do not actively teach interfaith cooperation, what paradigm of conflict and clash might triumph instead?"[173] What is real and what is not real among the diverse bodies is not their primary

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172 Richard Robert Osmer, *Practical Theology: An Introduction* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2008), 1–12.

173 Patel and Meyer, "Religious Education for Interfaith Leadership," 18.

question. For them, what is real is that the other is here, in front of, around, and even within myself. The major concern of religious educators has been never *meta-physical.* It starts with *physical* concerns, or as Lévinas puts it, *ethical* concerns.

The pluralism that is the foundation of interreligious education is, thus, an *ethical, inductive,* and *practical theological* approach. The pluralism of interreligious education begins with context and human lived experiences. Acknowledging discordance among the irreducible factors within religious realities, educators ask, *How do we educate people so that they become faithful to their own religion and yet open to and responsible for other religious people in the world based on their own religious belief?* The one side of this question is considering formation and transformation of one's religious identity in the context of religious diversity. The other side is concerned with the acquisition of an ability to relate with diversity and difference in the world. The primary question is how education can assist the learners to form an appropriate identity (Sterkens) and equip them with "the knowledge, attitudes and skills needed to interact, understand, and communicate with persons from diverse religious traditions; to function effectively in the midst of religious pluralisms; and to create pluralistic democratic communities that work for the common good" (Kujawa-Holbrook).[174] They do not call for interreligious education because they see the other as enemies to conquer. Neither do they argue for interreligious education because they see the other as someone to analyze through their own lens. They claim the urgency of interreligious education because they have "experienced" the violent and unjust consequences of absolutism, totalitarianism, essentialism, and the logic of the One. They claim this education because of an urgent need of skills, capacities, and wisdoms to enable people to coexist and thrive with the other without damaging the identities of the others.

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[174] Kujawa-Holbrook, *God beyond Borders*, 2.

For this reason, pluralism in interreligious education is an act rather than an idea—namely, pluralism as engagement. This statement clarifies what interreligious education as an education for pluralism pursues: Interreligious education seeks to help and teach the participants to learn engagement and learn *through* engagement. This idea of pluralism as engagement is often borrowed from Diana L. Eck's "active engagement."[175] For her, pluralism is neither an idea of a state—for example, not simply referring to plurality—nor an idea that exists in mind, but an action that connects the members of the plurality. She says, "Pluralism is not a given but must be created."[176] Thus, for her, pluralism is the action and process of connecting "dots" in the world. Pluralism is, and active engagement is, "not a matter of finding common faith that is acceptable to all, watering down one's own faith so it will be palatable to someone of another faith." Eck says "far from it. It is, rather, a matter of engaging the diverse faiths in the challenges of building a society of neighbors rather than strangers."[177] This Eckian pluralism pervades interreligious education. Active engagement is the aim of Kagan's attempt at interreligious education and is what Sterkens expressed as "integration" which is a necessary effort and process to be a healthy polyphonic self. With this pluralistic understanding, interreligious education requires the participants to meet what Lévinas calls the "face of the other," or the real unprocessed alterity.

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[175] Boys and Lee, *Christians and Jews in Dialogue*, 8; Berling, *Understanding Other Religious Worlds*, 8–9.

[176] Diana L. Eck, *A New Religious America: How a "Christian Country" Has Now Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse Nation* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), 70.

[177] Ibid., 370.

Conclusion

Interreligious education is for particularity and pluralism. What it seeks is to provide a way for the participant to be *one among the many* (particularity) and *one with the many* (pluralism), as opposed to *one over the many* (totalitarianism). This mission seeks to transform the essentialist and totalitarian perspective that the religious education has had on self, religion, and learning, into a constructivist and pluralist perspective. Pollefeyt describes the process this way: "Interreligious learning is only possible on the basis of a fundamental respect for the irreducible and unique alterity of the other. Interreligious learning implies the idea that, from the very start, human beings are dialogical and relational in nature (Buber) and that in the dialogical encounter the other is both vulnerable and my teacher (Lévinas)."[178] From the beginning, interreligious education has sought relational and dialogical learning. In this learning, both one and the other come with vulnerability and humility, which does not mean that the education seeks a relativism, or what Kenda Creasy Dean calls a "Cult of Nice."[179] Rather, what it seeks to be is an "orientational" education, in which the participant interacts with the other with a particular religious orientation, especially with the rights of *disagreeing to agree* and *agreeing to disagree.*

The following task of the study of interreligious education is to consider this question: *Are we done?* This is a simple question, but not an easy question to answer instantly. This question asks whether the current theories and models of interreligious education truly fulfill the pluralistic vision of religious education. Interacting with the other, forming a particular religious identity, having a better and deeper understanding of the other. Then are we done with our pluralistic

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[178] Pollefeyt, Preface to *Interreligious Learning*.

[179] Kenda Creasy Dean, *Almost Christian: What the Faith of Our Teenagers Is Telling the American Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 25–44.

project? Are there any problems or forgotten issues in this model? Aren't there any points to be

clarified, improved, or dealt with more carefully? More importantly, can we truly overcome

essentialism and totalitarianism with this model? Will this education truly help the participant

accomplish the pluralistic vision of religious education? These are the questions to be explored in

depth in the following chapter.

4

Education for the We (Multiplicity):

Humans, Community, Love, and Poetics

The mission of interreligious education of the current era is to help the participants live with those who practice different religions. In other words, interreligious education aims to facilitate the participants to embody the life of "living together" between the I and the You. In this education, the I and the You not only learn ways to become the We but also become the We. Embodying "living together," or becoming the We, refers to obtaining a *quality of relationship in which one and the other become a part of one another,* which goes much beyond tolerance and coexistence. An inclusive identity and deepened understanding of the other are helpful but not sufficient for "living together." Such a quality of life can be attained when one opens one's religious world to the other and invites the other to join one's formation and transformation. The same activity is expected to happen the other way around. This process of mutual formation and transformation embodies "living together," which leads the I and the You to become the We—a part of one another—internally and externally.

In the theories introduced in the previous chapter, this idea of "living together" is partially seen (e.g. Sterkens), but not elaborated as sufficiently as it needs to be. Also, as though roughly mentioned here and there, this co-constructive idea of "living together" is eclipsed by other ideas, some of which even weaken or are incompatible with it. One of the hindering ideas is to emphasize the goal of interreligious education as equipping the participants with what I call "interreligious fluency," or preparing them only with *skills* of "living together." It is true that interreligious education provides trainings for "living together," but such a preparation is a

learning of a passive mode of "living together." The second one is to explain interreligious

learning with "the logic of the Many," which asserts utter difference and separation between

things. This is problematic because the logic of the Many is a self-explanation of *separation*

rather than *togetherness*. When this logic appears, a conflict will inevitably arise between the

aims of the education (teaching "living together") and the education's achievements (a particular

separate identity).

The purpose of this chapter is to identify these concerns in depth and provide an

alternative approach to interreligious education that can successfully explain interreligious

education as an education for "living together" or becoming the We. My attempt is to engage with

"the logic of Multiplicity" to overcome what is currently misleading and reconstruct a model of

interreligious education that can more effectively assist the participants' embodiment of "living

together." This new model of interreligious education, which I call "Education for the We,"

suggests interreligious education being understood and implemented as (1) *an education for

humans rather than religions,* (2) *an experiential education rather than a training education,* (3)

an education for love rather than responsibility, and (4) *an education for poetics rather than

dogma.*

In the following, I first revisit the theories of interreligious education and address the logic

of the Many as a problematic strategy. Then, I suggest the logic of Multiplicity as an alternative.

It is followed by examine hindering points so that we can avoid them; elaborate the meanings of

"living together" with the concepts of *symbiosis*, *shikgu,* and *multiplicity* (so we know what to

pursue); and address the characteristics of Education for the We.

Interreligious Education Revisited

In the previous chapter, I introduced Hans-Georg Zieberts and Johannes van der Ven and their theory of the *interreligious* model. Their model characterized interreligious education in comparison with the forms of religious education that were associated with the *monoreligious* model and the *multireligious* model. According to these scholars, the *interreligious* model was an alternative to the *multireligious* model which invited participants to deal with multiple religions with a neutral perspective (or "It-perspective").[180] The *multireligious* model claimed that one could learn about religions most correctly and objectively when one neglected one's religious identity in learning. Thus, the multireligious model requested participants to differentiate oneself from one's religious identity and passion when joining the education. However, interreligious education was opposed to this neutral model, because interreligious model assumed that a religion could not be reduced to any general explanations and neutrality was an illusion. Interreligious education offered a more practical vision: to live together with one's own religious identity. Ziebertz and van der Ven proposed "perspective exchange" as a method, through which one joins the education explicitly with one's religious identity and encourages the other to join with the same condition.

Diana L. Eck's socially-responsible pluralism has also contributed to the key theoretical basis for interreligious education. Her theory of pluralism that fostered "active engagement" and an "encounter of commitments" has corresponded well to Ziebertz and van der Ven's "perspective exchange." By applying Ziebertz and van der Ven's "perspective" and Eck's "commitment," interreligious education could emphasize "particularity." By adopting Ziebertz

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[180] Pollefeyt, *Interreligious Learning*, XII.

and van der Ven's "exchange" and Eck's "engagement," interreligious education could emphasize "pluralism." By all accounts, interreligious education has been introduced as an educational model that encourages the participants to join the education with one's own religious identity and share it with the other. In this education, the participant is expected to form a world-relevant religious identity and learn a way to communicate and cooperate with the other.

However, the ultimate question that this education faces is how the changed identity and the expanded understanding can enable the participant to embody the life of "living together," or whether the new identity and the new understanding will even enable it. Regarding this question, I do not suggest the impossibility of the education, but raise an alert to the need for more thorough explanation.

First of all, the education may be understood as a program that sets the goal of the education as helping to equip individuals with the necessary skills and competence for successful living in a pluralistic society as a religious person. The goal of the education may be understood as the effort to assist the participant to nurture the competence of what I call "interreligious fluency," which will allow one to communicate successfully with the religious other and cross over the boundaries of religions.[181] If that is truly the goal of the education, it should not be a problem. However, if the goal of this education is for "living together," this understanding is problematic, because interreligious fluency is not a guarantee that one will aspire or make the effort to embody the life of "living together." In other words, it is always possible for the participant *not* to choose a life of "living together," even though he or she is equipped with interreligious fluency. Interreligious fluency is a necessary condition, or level of readiness, for

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[181] Michelle LeBaron, *Bridging Cultural Conflicts: A New Approach for a Changing World*, 1st ed (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 110–36. The motive of "interreligious fluency" comes from Michelle LeBaron's "cultural fluency."

living together, but not a sufficient condition for "living together"; it is learning a passive mode of "living together."

This resembles the case of learning a language. Let's say there is an international student in France. Teaching French, so as to make the student fluent in French, does not make the student have capable or desirous of "living together" with French people. A certain level of French language fluency, or even cultural fluency, is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for the student to wish to have a life of "living together" with French people. Rather, the goal of a good education is to give the student a chance to have a successful experience of "living together" with French people. It is certainly a better result if the education provides a safe environment in which the student can meet French people who are willing to be friends with the student rather than to equip with French fluency. It is not the student who has good knowledge about French and French culture that actively pursues an intermingled life and being a friend with French people, but the student who has had good experiences of relationships with French people is the one who hopes to continue to have such a relationship. In this sense, equipping fluency is learning a passive mode of "living together," while the experience enables learning an active mode of "living together."

Interreligious education may be understood in this way if it emphasizes the goal of education as forming a more relevant and inclusive identity. That is certainly one of the effects of interreligious education we all hope to see, but not *the* goal. The sole goal of interreligious education is "living together," which often precedes an inclusive and relevant identity; "living together" often takes place paradoxically. The emphasis on identity appears as an emphasis on formation and transformation and an emphasis on particularity as well. However, this emphasis can be misleading if it sets up a false logic that the changed identities of the I and the You will

embody "living together." What embodies "living together" is an interconnecting process that happens during formation and transformation. As far as identity, transformation, and particularity are concerned, which revolve in the center of the discourse, the education has to explain how participants can avoid the problems of individuation and disconnection since identity often signifies a completed state.

I am not opposed to the transformability of identity or what Ricoeur refers to as "narrative identity,"[182] but I need to emphasize the riskiness that identity may cause: the logic of the Many. By speaking of identity, the education comes to emphasize the state of the participant who eventually becomes an independent and separate entity from the other. In this understanding, interreligious education is an activity that provides the participant with an experience of interaction (pluralism), but ends the participant's learning at the point of the utter difference between the I and the You. This difference is again highlighted in the name of particularity. Particularity matters in this education as a starting point and an ending point, but it is not the particularity that embarks on "living together." Pluralism matters in this education, but only as a process that is to be ended after exercising openness, exchange, and engagement of the particularities. This process provides the participants with a chance to explore the other and brings transformation, but eventually disappears at the end, leaving each other as disconnected particularities in a distance; this is the problem of the logic of the Many.

The logic of the Many is in contrast to the logic of "living together," because it presupposes separation of manyness. I have earlier mentioned the logic of the One in Chapter 1. The logic of the One claims that everything should be replaced with the One because the One

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[182] Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*; Paul Ricœur, *Time and narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 246–48.

alone holds the true essence. This idea has been a cause of countless occasions of violence as it tries to eradicate the otherness of the other. The logic of the Many, on the other hand, highlights un-traversable differences within the many, which affirm many truths. What supports this idea is the philosophy of the other, which has laid an important foundation for interreligious education. Since this philosophy accounts the other as the *wholly* other (not-I) with emphasis on incomprehensibility and responsibility for the other, it causes difficulty in the effort to underscore *togetherness*. Also, religious education's undue interest in *individuals'* formation and transformation is also related to the occurrence of the logic of the Many. This interest has successfully explained the significance of learner-centered education, but deepens its focus on individuality rather than togetherness, or the We.

More importantly, what lies behind this problem of fluency, identity, transformation, and the Many is the tendency toward essentialism, or toward an essentialist mind, which I have briefly explained in Chapter 1. Here, an essentialist mind is represented in the will to "come back." If interreligious education emphasizes the learning process as a journey in which one leaves and comes back home (one's religion), such an expression needs further explanation, whether it means that it is only my identity and understanding that is expected to transform or whether my religion is subject to my transformed identity and understanding. Berling says, "Simply put, for Christians, theological learning begins from and ends with Christian identity, although that identity may be challenged, enriched, and refined between the beginning and the end of the learning process…. The goal of Christian theological learning is Christian identity,"[183] I do not mean that Berling promotes essentialism, but I do think that this statement needs to be clarified. My question is simple: *Is Christian identity* something that I need to "come back to," or

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[183] Berling, *Understanding Other Religious Worlds*, 71.

something that I form? Does my religion limit my transformation and ask me to conform to it? Or, does my transformation also mean a transformation of my religion? Essentialist minds would answer that there is a certain identity that is called Christian identity or Muslim identity and we must go back to that after interreligious learning. Also, essentialist minds would answer that transformation of my identity be allowed to the extent it does not damage the Christian identity or the Muslim identity. Thus, in essentialist minds, the range of identity permitted is determined. Emphasizing fluency is a safe way to say that one does not intend to impact one's own religious identity as one interacts with the other. In essentialist minds, identity, transformation, and particularity would all point to being a better Christian or a better Buddhist. Being a Buddhist Christian or a Christian Buddhist is not an option.

My repeated argument is that this essentialist mindset does not fit to the interreligious education that seeks to educate "living together." I argue so first because this essentialist approach cannot conceptually explain togetherness. The key characteristic of essentialism is *standalone,* which denotes that things can exist alone. Thus, in essentialism, "living together" is neither an imperative nor is it metaphysically supported.

Also, this approach regards interreligious education as an education between religions rather than an education between human beings, for it assumes people from the same religion share essentially the same religious identity. This is problematic because the subjects of "living together" are human beings, not religions, and each human being is a multiplicity; no one shares the same religious identity, as no one shares exactly the same experiences and contexts.

Moreover, the essentialist approach limits a core value of interreligious education: *learning with religious freedom*. In Chapter 2 I addressed the affirmation of religious freedom as a core value of the background of interreligious education. Van der Ven says, "There is no

religious freedom without freedom within religions. This religious freedom also implies the right to change one's own religion."[184] He asserts that interreligious learning is a "risky process" but an "exciting experiment," because, in education, "the religious values…are not sold out *per se*…[b]ut nor can their perennial existence be guaranteed."[185] In the same manner, Najeeba Syeed, an interreligious activist and scholar, asserts, "[I]nstructors…must disarm the notion of a 'safe' classroom and disabuse students of an expectation of a risk-free learning experience."[186]

It is evident that interreligious education has some positive effects on a religious individual. The education affects the formation and transformation of one's religious identity. As one encounters the "face" of the other and experiences the other's religious commitment and direct voice, one is able to experience the religious other as another human being. Sterkens highlights the process of being able to train one's ability of differentiation and integration, which is one of the most important abilities required today. However, it is in question whether these effects would lead the participants to aspire to and embody "living together" in their lives. According to what I have examined so far, the previous studies of interreligious education have not provided successful answers to the question. If interreligious education is especially associated with the logic of the Many, the vision of "living together" seems almost impossible to achieve because what the education aims for ("living together") and what the education achieves (a particular separate identity) are contradictive. A new model of interreligious education that can successfully teach and embody "living together" is much needed, which is possible only when the

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[184] van der Ven, "Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue," 254.

[185] Ibid., 255, 257–58.

[186] Najeeba Syeed, "The Politics of Interreligious Education," *Spotlight on Theological Education*, March 2014, https://www.aarweb.org/publications/spotlight-on-theological-education-march-2014-the-politics-of-interreligious-education.

education clearly divorces itself from essentialist, totalitarian, and dogmatic minds and the logic of the Many.

Living Together

My definition of "living together" is far removed from the state of simple tolerance which refers to the mere coexistence of differences. Nor does "Living together" mean a life in which one *practices* an urged interaction and engagement with the other in order to improve one's learning. Such a practice should be named as an *event* of "living together" rather than a *life* of "living together." In a simplest sense, the life of "living together" means that one lives a life with the other, *inseparably*. This life is continuous accumulation of processes in which one is "stickily" (as described in Anne Joh's *Jeong*) intertwined with the other's life; influences and is influenced, enriches and is enriched by the other's life; and together advance to newness.[187] "Living together" is to create a community in which one grows because of the other and the other grows because of oneself. In this community, one is with the other not only when the other is helpful and useful to oneself, but also when the other falls down. Even when there is neither a significant issue nor a significant moment of joy or sorrow, one is still with the other, as a friend, supporter, competitor, counselor, and *companion* — both in the sense as a life companion and as an "eating buddy."

"Living together" is, as Catherine Keller describes, "symbiosis."[188] "Living together" does not mean simply existing in the adjacent area at the same moment. "Living together" includes

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[187] Wonhee Anne Joh, *Heart of the Cross: A Postcolonial Christology* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 19–48.

[188] Keller, Catherine, "Be a Multiplicity: Ancestral Anticipations," in *Polydoxy: Theology of Multiplicity and Relation*, ed. Laurel C. Schneider and Catherine Keller (New York: Routledge, 2011), 83.

mutual nourishing, mutual relief, and mutual solidarity. "Living together" is possible only when this gathering is the gathering of human beings, rather than that of the jobs of human beings or the classes of human beings, for example. Likewise, "living together interreligiously" is possible only when people think that this gathering is the gathering of human beings who have different religions rather than the gathering of religions to which the participants belong. In interreligious education and many other interreligious practices, we do not relate with the other in order to deal with the other's religion. We deal with the other's religion seriously in order to relate with the other in depth. Our purpose is to live with the other, and the other's religion is important as far as it helps us understand the other. In this religiously pluralistic society where the globe suffers from religious conflicts and clashes, to learn "living together interreligiously" is a *must*, unless we want a zero sum game (kill or be killed!). "Living together interreligiously" is to learn to live with the other human being who is religious just as oneself is a human being who is also religious. Unless we want to become a "parasite" of the other—meaning being benefitted by the other but making no contribution to the other—it is the common destiny of all human beings to carry on this world more peacefully and harmoniously as one species.

Shik-gu: A Community of Eating Together

The concept of *shik-gu* encapsulates very well the concept of "living together." *Shik-gu* is a Korean word that refers to family. The first way to understand this word is by contrast. Unlike *ga-jok* (가족, 家族), a more general and popular Korean word for family, the word *shik-gu* carries a distinctive sense that originates from its etymology. *Shik-gu* (식구) is a combination of two Chinese characters which mean "eating" (食) and "mouth" (口) respectively. In this sense, the

literal meaning of *shik-gu* is often said as "eating mouths" or "mouths to feed," while that of *ga-jok* is interpreted as a "people in the clan."

This particular difference between these two words generate different emphases. *Shik-gu* emphasizes togetherness, while *ga-jok* emphasizes given relationships. In this sense, the child who left home to go to a distant college would be referred to as *ga-jok* rather than *shik-gu.* It would be so because the child does not physically live with—so does not "eat" with—other family members.[189] *Shik-gu* fits better with those who work together for living, or to work together to get things to "eat." In this respect, gangs and companies alike often prefer to call their groups as *shik-gu,* for they work together to obtain what "feeds" them.

Shik-gu underlines a group as one body, and considers other members of the group as parts of "myself." The word *shik-gu* communicates a strong sense of the We based on the sense of "eating together." What ties them together is the "food" that they work together to earn and share. Thus, whoever is part of the group working together to get "things to eat" and is willing to share the earned "food" with the other—that is, whoever is committed to "living together"—can be *shik-gu,* although there is no blood tie.

The concept of *shik-gu* explains "living together" as "eating together." In Korean culture, eating together is an important aspect of culture as it is in every other culture. This is why most Korean churches share a meal after the Sunday service. Koreans, who understand eating together as a significant community practice, would welcome and support Keller who borrows Quaker's

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[189] It does not mean that the child, who left home, is not a family member anymore. It does not mean that one can never call the child as *shik-gu* either. Rather, it means that calling the child *shik-gu* in this situation is unfitting and rare because of its etymological meaning and the emphasis that the meaning generates.

language "the Society of Fellowship" to describe "living together."[190] It is so because, for

Koreans, "living together" means to be *shik-gu,* which is certainly the society of fellowship. The

concept of *shik-gu* speaks about "living together" which means "eating together"—to be the

community of the table, the community of fellowship, or the community of common destiny.

Koreans believe that they form and validate their bond as they eat together, as Deleuze says,

"Eating bread and drinking wine are interminglings of bodies."[191] As they eat together, they share

togetherness.

The concept of *shik-gu* also explains that "living together" is not an event but a way of

life. It is so because, for *shik-gu*, eating together is certainly not an event but a part of life which

repeats everyday. *Shik-gu* highlights ordinarity and repetitivity of "living together." When Keller

speaks about the "conviviality" of "living together," the image first evoked in my mind is a

Western style banquet where joy overflows, and music and dancing fill the hall. However, the

conviviality of the table of *shik-gu* that I experience lies in the ordinarity and repetitivity of

regular meals. Family members sit together and share meals, rain or shine. The atmosphere of the

table is not always fun and loud, but there are stories shared and caring carried out. At this table,

one may bring one's religious or political perspective, or one may not. One may share one's

personal story, or may not. The topic of the conversation can be serious and profound, but does

not need to be so at all times. Nevertheless, if anyone needs to share important news such as a

wedding, a move, or a promotion, the table is the place to do so. At this table, togetherness is

experienced sometimes dynamically and sometimes inertly. No matter which mood pervades, it is

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[190] Keller, Catherine, "Be a Multiplicity: Ancestral Anticipations," 83.

[191] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 81.

because one is with others that one can speak or be silent. Thus, the ordinarity and repetitivity of *Shik-gu* points out that "living together" should be sought as a mode of life through which one's life is sustained.

The concept of *shik-gu* also addresses that "living together" is to make a commitment to one another's *annyeong,* or well-being. In a primitive sense, food-sharing represents life-sharing. Being a food-sharing community means to be a "community of common destiny."[192] To be a "community of common destiny" means that the members decide to stay together and care for one another whatever may come. To join this community means to make a commitment to take care of the other as their own. The key role of *shik-gu* is to check whether the other has eaten or not. It is nothing less than checking the other's *annyeong.* As *shalom* does, *annyeong* means more than peace, harmony and well-being of the mind and the body. *Annyeong* does not necessarily mean a state without stress, but rather a state that has balance. Thus, a life with moderate stress, moderate rest, moderate work, and moderate play would be closer to *annyeong* than a life without a job or a life without stress. Eating is primarily related to one's *annyeong.* When the balance of our life is broken, the first symptom we have is indigestion. If we lose our job, it affects the amount and the quality of food on the table. Thus, the metaphorical aspect of eating together, or being *shik-gu* to each other, is that people are committed to take care of the other as their own and pursue one another's *annyeong* responsibly and cooperatively. To be *shik-gu* is to be a close friend not only who shares meals, but also shares joy and sorrow of life. *Shik-gu* "rejoices with those who rejoice and mourn with those who mourn" (Romans 12:15). To be *shik-gu* means to be a companion who waits at the table every day no matter what happens in their lives. While eating, *shik-gu-deul* (the

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[192] Note that destiny is different from destination. Destiny implies a process, while destination means a result.

members of *shik-gu* or the plural form of *shik-gu*) may speak or may not, but what is clear is that *they are there;* their presence never disappears, for they are the community of common destiny. According to this aspect, *shik-gu* explains that "living together" is to hold oneself accountable for one another.

In Korean dramas, it is one of the most common scenes that the family finds one person not present at the dinner table. The person does not appear at the table either because of a conflict he or she has with other family members or because of a personal problem such as a broken relationship or getting fired. Then, the father or the mother without fail tells the other family members, "Tell her (or him) to come down. No matter what happens, shouldn't s/he eat?" This scene reveals the cultural dynamic of *shik-gu,* which is so opposed to the Western scene in which the father or the mother sends their troubled kid to his or her room from the dining table.[193] Another most common dining scene is that a person in conflict is present at first but soon storms out, yelling "Do you think I can really eat in this situation!" Leaving represents how serious the case is. Since they are *shik-gu* to each other, the story being unfolded afterward is about other *shik-gu-deul* are getting involved in the problem to resolve it. "None of my business" is not a phrase understood by these people. At the end, the resolution of the conflict is revealed in the scene at the table where the person finally comes back and enjoys the meal with the others. This implies that the person recovers his or her *annyeong*, in which the whole community was concerned. No matter what the context of the drama is, the story includes the scenes as to how *shik-gu-deul* responds to and cares for the other *shik-gu,* and the resolution of the problem is symbolically shown as a recovery of eating together. Again, being *shik-gu* is not simply to be a

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[193] Jeff Chung, "Eating is a delicate issue in Korean culture," posted on December 17, 2006, accessed May 20, 2016, http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2006/Dec/17/en/FP612170321.html.

community of eating together, but to be a community that actively works together responsibly for one another's *annyeong*.

Shik-gu and the We

Underlying this concept of *shik-gu* lies its unique way of seeing the other. *Shik-gu* is deeply grounded in the logic of the We (or, "woori" in Korean). Its understanding of the other is not the wholly other, who is "completely separated and independent" other, but the other who is part of myself as I am part of the other. In this sense, there is no such a sense of the independent I. Each *shik-gu* has a share of the other. The other cannot be the other without me, and I cannot be myself without the other. My life is being formed in relation to the other *shik-gu-deul,* and the lives of the other *shik-gu-deul* are affected by my presence. This understanding of the other resembles "ubuntu," a Southern African concept, meaning "A person is a person through other persons" (Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu). The I is not the other, and the other is not the I; they are not separated. This understanding also resonates with Raimon Panikkar who articulates the other as "the counterpart of the I" as well as "belonging to the I (and not as not-I)."[194]

Everything has pros and cons. There are some cases that things go wrong because *shik-gu-deul* (a plural form of *shik-gu*) are too much involved in the other *shik-gu*'s life. In Korean dramas as well as our ordinary life in Korean family, it is also a situation we often encounter that a *shik-gu* is bothered by the other *shik-gu-deul*'s excessive involvement in his or her life issues. Moreover, *shik-gu* is, in one sense, used as a highly exclusive concept as the concept of the We is. Gangs often ask, "Which *shik-gu* (family) are you?" People also say, "Now we are *han shik-gu!*" which means "one family." This is an attempt to make the boundary that creates "in" and "out."

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[194] Raimon Panikkar, *The Intrareligious Dialogue* (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 38.

In this respect, my intention is not to replace the concept of "living together" with the concept of *shik-gu* as it is. Rather, my goal is to explain "living together" with the dynamics in Korean concept of *shik-gu.* First, it helps us understand that living together means to live as one connected body. Second, it helps us learn that "living together" is to take care of the soul of the other. Concerning the other's "eating" is to check a primary condition of the other's *annyeong* and the community's *annyeong.*

From the perspective of *shik-gu,* Jesus and the disciples were *shik-gu* to each other. Jesus' twelve disciples were special not because they received special knowledge or privilege, but because they *lived* with Jesus. They truly ate together. They began their "life together" as they ate together at the wedding at Cana, and they ended their "life together" (in this world) as they ate together at the last supper. Jesus also ate with many others. He fed thousands of anonymous *minjung* regardless of their gender, age, and social status (Mt 10; Mk 6; Lk 9). Jesus' table was inclusive and extensive. He not only called people to his table, but also visited and joined the other's table. He often dropped out of his own group, and joined other people such as tax collectors and sinners (Mt 9; Mk 2; Lk 5), women (Lk 10, Jn 11), and a rich Pharisee (Lk 19). His participation in the table of the other became a target for other Pharisees and their scribes. When Jesus and his disciples were eating with tax collectors and sinners, for example, Pharisees and scribes accused Jesus' group in two things. First, they accused Jesus and his disciples of eating *with* the undesirable others, and, second, they accused Jesus and his disciples of not fasting but of *enjoying eating* so much, while John (the Baptist) and the Pharisees were fasting (Mt 9:14; Mk 2:18; Lk 5:33). From a perspective of *shik-gu,* what was criticized were (a) Jesus' and his disciples' attempt of "living together" and (b) their pursuit of the primary and essential elements of their *annyeong.* Although their critics did not accept it, Jesus and his disciples continued to try

to embody the life of "living together" as they ate with the others and as Jesus himself has become the food of the table where he invites all.

Although living as *shik-gu* suggests a good model of "living together," one caveat is that *shik-gu* should be construed in a larger sense, when we apply *shik-gu* to "living together." Conveying the exclusive character of *shik-gu* is a deviation from my intention. My intention is to present *shik-gu* only to understand the whole world. We are all the members of "the community of common destiny." The fall of one nation severely affects the other nations, and climate change becomes a threat to all nations in the world. All human beings are *shik-gu,* for they are all the "mouths to feed" or "eating mouths" in this planet. They eat the food harvested in the same land, which is called the earth. We have the same destiny in terms of which we live when we eat and we die when we stop eating. We have the same destiny as well in terms of which we need to endeavor to sustain the earth and advance human society.

The detective's last words in the 2003 film "Memories of Murder" reflects the belief that people can create the relationship of "living together" more extensively, even though they do not literally eat together. Memories of Murder was a blockbuster movie in Korea dealing with the true story about the nation's first serial killer. At the end of the movie, the detective, the main character who has been chasing the suspect for a long time with full conviction and hatred, finally almost catches the suspect, but, at the last moment, he hears that the killer's DNA and the suspect's DNA do not match; and, therefore, he has to let him go. Before sending the suspect away, the detective looks exhausted and disappointed. With a despondent look, he finally says to the suspect in a low voice, "…F**k, I don't know… Do you eat well?" This quote is now one of the most popular quotes in Korean movies. The last question, "Do you eat well?", hit the heart of the audience for a long time. Superficially, it sounds like contempt "How can you eat food after

you kill these many people?" In his ambiguous voice tone and look, the director, however, intentionally gives us another feeling that the detective empathizes this suspect. In this way, his quote sounds like saying, "…F**k, I don't know… what's right, what's wrong, where we are and what we are doing… It must be hard for you as well (just like me). Are you even able to eat something? Are you taking care of yourself?"

The detective speaks of the suspect's *eating* at this last moment. The detective is asking about his *annyeong* or well-being, either contemptuously or anxiously. His worrying side reveals an unexpected compassion that goes beyond his suspicion, hatred, and even the matters of crime and justice. What he shows is a pure and holy sympathy toward another human being. It is to approach another human being with the message that, although your life is different from mine, your destiny as a human being is not so much different from mine; we are both struggling with unsolvable problems, distressed by our imperfection and the other's judgement, and agonized with life, disease, violence, suspicion, and our own lies. By addressing the matter of eating, the detective naturally sets up a potential relationship of *shik-gu* with the suspect, although they do not eat together. His look was despondent and disappointed, but what he says was caring for the soul of the suspect. The detective sets up a relationship of and already embodies "living together." The detective acknowledges that there is nothing different between himself and the suspect. The detective agrees that the suspect is another human being struggling with so many things to survive this world. As soon as the detective cares for the other's eating, the relation between the detective and the suspect is radically redefined, from the relation of enemy in which both parties can never coexist, to the relation of *shik-gu* in a larger sense—the community of common destiny. Likewise, the community of "living together" is possible even though we do not eat together. It is made possible when we hold ourselves accountable for the other's eating (survival) and *annyeong*

(well-being)*, for eating, or *annyeong* of the other, precedes ideology, politics, religion, and any other matters.

"Living together" is to live as *shik-gu.* It is to live with the other in a relationship in which one shares one's food with the other, one cares for the other's *annyeong,* and one sees the other as "the counterpart of the I" as well as "belonging to the I (and not as not-I)."[195] "Living together" is to live as the We, rather than as a simple gathering of the *I*s. In this community of the We, "If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is honored, all rejoice together with it" (1 Corinthians 12:26). The question is how we can educate this "living together" through the means of interreligious education. Unfortunately, Education for Particularity and Pluralism tends to assume the context of interreligious education as a simple gathering of individuals who belong to different religions, not as the We. The Education sees the other as the wholly other, who is separated from the I and exists beyond "my" episteme. Engagement—intentional connecting—is highlighted as an important practice, and universality such as civic oneness has been emphasized as a motivation for pluralism. With this approach, the learner would be able to acquire a deepened identity of the self and an enlarged understanding of the other. However, as mentioned in the beginning and as Reinhold Niebuhr asserts, this "moral" self does not guarantee "moral society."[196] The inclusively developed self is a necessary but not sufficient condition for "living together." The sufficient condition for "living together" is to understand the self and the other as the We, and to *love the We*. If the other is the wholly other, it is preferable but optional whether I share my food with the other and whether I responsibly take care of the other's *annyeong*.

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[195] Ibid.

[196] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2013).

However, if the other is part of the I, to share food with and care for the other's *annyeong* is a *must,* for the other is the I; if the other dies, then it is the I that dies, and if the other falls, then it is the I that falls.

Multiplicity

Multiplicity and "Living Together"

Multiplicity explains "living together" in a more philosophical and theological way. Most parts addressed through the concept of *shik-gu* are also illustrated in the concept of multiplicity. Catherine Keller, a leading theologian, introduces multiplicity through the work of Ann Conway, whom she believes to be the first scholar who argued for multiplicity and relationality.[197] According to Keller, Conway was not a well-known scholar because her book was published anonymously. The social context of seventeenth century Europe was not easy for female authors to publish a book with their real names. Nevertheless, her book *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* gained much attention, as it rejected atomism and Cartesian dualism.[198] Conway argued that things are multiplicities that need "the assistance of [their] Fellow-Creatures" for their living and existence.[199] In this sense, a creature "ought to be manifold that it may receive this assistance."[200] This concept was a direct rejection of Cartesian philosophy

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[197] Laurel C. Schneider and Catherine Keller, eds., *Polydoxy: Theology of Multiplicity and Relation* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 81–82.

[198] Although Conway's book was published anonymously, Keller comments that Leibniz referred to Conway's book with her name and with admiration. Leibniz knew her by name because of his friendship with Conway's doctor, Francis Mercury van Helmont.

[199] Schneider and Keller, *Polydoxy*, 82.

[200] Ibid.

and traditional essentialism which had argued that things exist alone without the help of the others. Poststructuralists and process thinkers today affirm multiplicity as a concept that explains the nature of interdependence and the togetherness of things.

Multiplicity explains "living together" basically in three ways: *internal togetherness*, *external togetherness,* and *mutual immanence.* First, Alfred North Whitehead argues that an entity "prehends" the world external to it in its becoming. He articulates this process as, "The many become one."[201] In this entity, are the many together. Without the help of the many, or "Fellow-Creatures," the entity cannot exist. The entity, which is a multiplicity, cannot be explained and understood with only one part of the self. It is injustice to the entity if such a case occurs. This is an explanation of internal togetherness that is the nature of things explainable by the concept of multiplicity.

Second, the entity, which is a multiplicity but also a member of a larger multiplicity, is "located" side by side with other multiplicities without any encompassing design. In this sense, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari describe that things emerge "rhizomatically."[202] This means that things exist "in-between" with having neither a beginning nor an ending, and are irreducible to particularities of the universal.

Third, process thinkers, including Roland Faber, highlight one more thing with the concept of multiplicity: *mutual immanence*. According to Whitehead, each entity emerges as it "prehends" other entities, and it also becomes the datum for other entities. This process explains the interconnectedness between things. Faber articulates this relationship between an entity and the world—the relationship between one and the many, or internal togetherness and external

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[201] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 21.

[202] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 8.

togetherness—as a relationship of "mutual immanence."[203] In this sense, multiplicity is, Faber says, "not a 'state' of things, but an *infinite process of finite events,* the generation of ever-new multiplicities and series of multiplicities of events."[204] In this sense, multiplicity explains that "living together" is neither an occasional event nor a state of completion, but a dynamic and incomplete—in other words, on-going—process.

Multiplicity, Identity, and Religion

According to this perspective, I propose to understand identity as multiplicity. A religious identity is not a particularity that is defined in conjunction with universality, but a multiplicity that never fully belongs to any upper category. One's religious identity is asymmetric, rhizomatic, and irreducible, which cannot be explained with an overarching "shape" or "story." Any categorization of one's religious identity entails a certain extent of reduction and removal, which is injustice to the person. One's religious identity consists of various elements and experiences, which makes it unique and univocal.

From a perspective of multiplicity, no religious identities are the same even though they claim to belong to the same religion. Thus, this perspective alerts us to the fact that it is an illusion if someone claims an education in which five Christians and five Muslims learn together as an education between Christianity and Islam. Such an education is simply an education among ten religious people, of which five people claim to be Christian and five claim to be Muslim. In this education, five people who claim to be Christian learn somewhat about Islam from five people

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[203] Roland Faber, "Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics," in *Beyond Metaphysics?: Explorations in Alfred North Whitehead's Late Thought*, ed. Brian G Henning, Clinton Combs, and Roland Faber (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2010), 103.

[204] Ibid.

who claim to be Muslim, but what they learn is not *the* story of Islam, but five different stories of Islamic faith. What is interesting is that five people who claim to be Christian also learn from one another different stories of Christianity, which may even surprise one another because of the strangeness and unfamiliarity of the other's stories.

According to the logic of Multiplicity, one's religious identity has internal togetherness, exists in between external togetherness, and is constantly interconnected with the other. For example, what constitutes my Christian identity is not only the traditional doctrines I learned when young, such as the doctrines of original sin, total depravity, salvation by faith, and so forth, but also my knowledge and experiences of various cultures, thoughts, societies, people, political and economic situations, other religious teachings, and so forth. My experiences of the Buddhist temple when I was ten years old is a part of my religious identity. So is the memory of incense that I had smelled every year at the ancestral rites at home. This religious identity has nothing in common with any other religious identities, but emerge from and stay in between those identities and continuously interact with them.

The same principle is applied to religion. Religion is not a universal, but a multiplicity as well, which consists of many religious identities. In this case, a religion is a multiplicity of multiplicities. Doctrines and confessions need to be understood inductively rather than deductively. This means that they need to be understood as an outcome of people's religious identities, which inevitably cuts here and there to generalize, rather than the pre-given standard that measures and judges people's religious identities. In multiplicity, religion is, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith maintains, the "cumulative tradition."[205] In Korean Catholic tradition, for

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[205] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind.* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 154–69.

example, the religious identities of those who fought the government, were martyred by Japanese empire, condemned by local superstitions, and took care of orphans and widows during the war are all cumulated. Not only Christian teachings but also social contexts, experiences, events, and many others constitute what can be called a Korean Catholic tradition. This tradition is also located in between other traditions side by side, inseparably, where they mutually and constantly interact with one another.

In multiplicity, especially with the theory of external togetherness, it is difficult to locate the boundary of a religion. Dualism that distinguishes the "in" and the "out" has no place to stand. The theory of multiplicity, especially the theory of internal togetherness, also opens up a space for multiple religious belongings and those who are syncretized "in-between" two or more religions. They are those who have been ignored, uninvited, and ill-portrayed by the assertions such as "Interreligious education is an education between religions," and "the first and most important *prerequisite of interfaith is faith.*"[206] Multiplicity also enables us to see that the contemporary form of a religion is not its final form. As Faber says above, a religion that is a multiplicity will be ever new with "the generation of ever-new multiplicities and series of multiplicities of events."[207] Thus, it is nonsense to describe interreligious education as having a journey after which one returns to a "designated" religious identity, as no one steps in the same river twice (Heraclitus).

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[206] Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island," 123.

[207] Faber, "Immanence and Incompleteness: Whitehead's Late Metaphysics," 103.

Multiplicity and Interreligious Education

The theories of multiplicity, including internal togetherness, external togetherness, and mutual immanence, enable interreligious education to overcome the problem of separation, which is the problem of the Many, and help it achieve "living together" in a unique way.

Multiplicity achieves "living together" through internal togetherness, external togetherness, and mutual immanence. First, in interreligious education based on multiplicity, participants achieve "living together" *internally* as they achieve internal togetherness. Internal togetherness is possible when the education invites and encourages the participants to acknowledge them as multiplicities which are constituted by "the Many" or many religious and non-religious elements which often contradict to each other. Second, participants also achieve "living together" *externally* as they recover external togetherness. External togetherness is possible when the education helps the participants understand themselves as those who exist inseparably in between "the Many," or many other human beings who are multiplicities. Third, participants achieve "living together" in the process of mutual immanence. Mutual immanence is possible when the education encourages the participants to accept the other as a part of the I. Based on these theories, interreligious education is not simply a training education that transforms a self to be more ready to engage with the other through learning with the other, but can be an education that achieves "living together" internally, externally, and interconnectedly, during the education.

As I mentioned above, "living together" that the logic of Multiplicity achieves in interreligious education is not a state of simple tolerance which refers to mere coexistence of differences. Nor does "living together" mean simply existing in the adjacent area at the same moment. "Living together" is to be one connected and organic body, that has no clear shape but

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moves like a chaosmos. In this mode of life, the other lives in me, and I live in the other; and I, who has the other internally, dialogue internally and externally with the other, who has the I in him or her. In this process, the I and the other become the We, which means that the other becomes part of the I, and the I becomes part of the other. "Living together" that interreligious education seeks is far from that wherein one practices an urged interaction and engagement with the other as an event in order for one's mere learning and growth, political correctness, or ethical obligation. It is to choose to be and live as a community of common destiny.

Again, in the simplest sense, the life of "living together" means that one lives a life with the other, *inseparably*. This life is continuous accumulation of processes in which one is intertwined with the other. In this life, one influences and is influenced by the other; one enriches and is enriched by the other; and one and the other together grow and fade; thus, this is to live in symbiosis. "Living together" is also to create a community in which one grows because of the other and the other grows because of myself. In this community, one is with the other not only when the other is helpful and useful to oneself, but also when the other falls down. Even when there is neither a significant issue nor a significant moment of joy or sorrow, one is still with the other, as a friend, supporter, competitor, counselor, and companion. Thus, "living together" is to live as *shik-gu.* It is the aim of interreligious education that embodies "living together" internally, externally, and interconnectedly.

This education helps the participants escape from the fear of essentialism. Essentialism, which appears as a belief that there is *the* ideal image of Christian-ness, Muslim-ness, or Jewish-ness, for instance, is revealed as an illusion in the logic of Multiplicity. According to multiplicity, the Christian-ness, the Muslim-ness, and the Jewish-ness have always changed. Thus, this education denies the assumption that one flourishes most when one reaches "the essence" most

closely or most correctly. Rather, the participants are invited and encouraged to be religious

people who develop relevant religious identities in the current world. Religions will evolve as a

result of their personal integrity.

Totalitarianism, which appears as pressure that one's religious identity has to be identified

with that of other people in the same religion, is weakened as well with multiplicity.

Totalitarianism is a pressure that intimidates the emergence of difference, and it works with

dogmatism that limits one's reasoning and dialogue and requires acceptance of the given answers.

Interreligious education grounded in a perspective of multiplicity rejects totalitarianism and

dogmatism, for each participant is given religious freedom and an endorsement to stand against

the power that dehumanizes and de-religionizes people. It is the mission of interreligious

education that saves people from power and delivers them to love.

The logic of multiplicity, by nature, refuses and confuses the power that the logic of the

One pursues and entails.[208] In religion, the concepts and practices of excommunication, expulsion,

execution, and extermination are all associated with the logic of the One. It is not a coincidence

that all these words start with "ex-" (which means "out"), for what power prefers is to draw the

line and divide people "by identity and counter-identity: who is in and who is out."[209] The line

that the power of the logic of the One likes to draw is not just a straight line, but a circle that

divides "inside" and "outside." This circle, which is a representation of power, automatically

generates a question whether to leave or remain. The logic of the One ejects those who resist

conformity, and squeezes the remnants into the One or unity. In this sense, dualism is a synonym

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[208] Roland Faber, "The Sense of Peace: A Para-Doxology of Divine Multiplicity," in *Polydoxy: Theology of Multiplicity and Relation*, ed. Laurel C Schneider and Catherine Keller (New York: Routledge, 2011), 45.

[209] Ibid., 46.

for the logic of the One, for only two groups remain in the logic of the One: those who are "in" and those who are "out"; ally and enemy; Christians and heathens; right and wrong; or black and white. There is neither internal diversity nor the concept of "in-between." The inside of the circle has one "color," and the outside of the circle is filled with another "color." There are only two colors in the world—thus, dualism. There is no space for other "colors." The border is barren. Since other colors are not shown, they are considered inexistent. Their existence and difference are denied, although they are *there*!

It is multiplicity's nature that destroys and resists power. "Let it be" is its song. It leaves all things as they are, although some of them are contradictory to one another. Faber says that "living together" is "grounded in a togetherness of multiplicity that undermines the Cartesian independence of realms of existence such as those of mind and science, ideas and phenomena, fact and fiction. Instead, multiplicities are always experiments, discordant in the moment of their aesthetic togetherness, and an issuing forth of new discord for new experiments (cf. PR, 113).[210] Its receptive nature disapproves power cohesion. Thus, the diffusion of power is not a *telos,* but a causality. Multiplicity naturally dilutes any overriding power, as it never grants any entity a finalized identity. Multiplicity neither *is* nor *uses* power, but "complicates" power.[211] Multiplicity may not be used as synonymous with non-power. What it provides is a process of disempowering and "the place of the appearance and evanescence of power."[212] Multiplicity simply never colludes with power. It is *indifferent* in overarching, totalizing, unifying, and straightening differences, unlike the logic of the One. Multiplicity endures power, and yet that is not the end; it

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[210] Faber, "Theopoetic Justice: Towards an Ecology of Living Together," 165.

[211] Roland Faber, *The Divine Manifold* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 21.

[212] Ibid.

continues to dissolve power not by overpowering it but by allowing space for another power. Faber asserts that multiplicity that "never becomes identical with power" becomes or holds "ontological tolerance of power."[213] For this reason, interreligious education disapproves of "orthodoxy" (one right opinion) but embraces "paradoxy" (incompatible opinions) and "polydoxy" (many opinions).

Interreligious education that affirms self as a multiplicity would argue that it is nonsense to say that this is an educational activity that protects and strengthens "the essence of Christian belief," for example. It is so because there is no such a thing that can be said as "*the* essence of Christian belief."[214] Some elements may be regarded as essential, but there is no essence, that is fixed, absolute, and external to the subject. Rather, interreligious education would chant this quote from Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "The traditions evolve. Men's [and women's] faith varies. God endures."[215] It would encourage the participants to take a journey in that one leaves the power of uniformity, and joins the love of multiplicity. In this journey, the I and the You become the We.

Education for the We (*Multiplicity*)

Based on the perspective of multiplicity, I propose interreligious education to be *Education for the We*. The foundation of Education for the We is threefold. First, it has the perspective to see the other as not the separated and wholly other, but as part of the I, who is not the same yet we two are mutually connected. The other and the I together constitutes the We. Second, it considers an

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[213] Ibid.

[214] Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, 191.

[215] Ibid., 192.

interreligious community as "the community of common destiny." Although people belong to different religious traditions, they share a common destiny not only as general human beings and but also as religious human beings. The destiny that they share as general human beings is something ecological, political, economic, and physiological. The destiny that they share as religious human beings is that they are human beings who are unable to get away from the matters of life and death. Third, the We is never thought of apart from the divine. Multiplicity is a divine value, and the We is a theological concept. With these foundations, I present four characteristics of Education for the We in comparison with the previous model—Education for Particularity and Pluralism.

Education for Humans

The first characteristic is that Education for the We is for humans, rather than for religions. This is a statement regarding the objective of interreligious education. I have already addressed the idea that Education for the We is for "living together," and the subjects of "living together" are human beings rather than religions. Thus, in order that this Education accomplishes its vision, it should enable humans to encounter one another, rather than let religions encounter one another. interreligious education has often been understood as an activity to learn religions through humans, but it needs to be re-conceptualized as an activity to learn humans through religions. The purpose of interreligious education should be to connect human to human and help them build friendship and community, rather than to connect religion to religion and let them understand each other. In the model of Education for Particularity and Pluralism, the focus is made on religion, as the words "particularity" and "pluralism" make clear. Education for Particularity and Pluralism highlights understanding the particularity of *my religion* and *the other's religion* and

interaction of *those religions* through human beings. However, Abraham J. Heschel says, "Religion is a means, not the end."[216] Interreligious education as Education for the We seeks to create a community of *human beings* who are religiously committed or minded. The confession of Education for the We is, "I am interested in you. This is why I am interested in your religion," while that of Education for Particularity and Pluralism is, "I am interested in your religion. This is why I am interested in you."

For Raimon Panikkar, Education for the We is "dialogical dialogue," while Education for Particularity and Pluralism is "dialectical dialogue." Panikkar distinguishes "dialectical dialogue" and "dialogical dialogue" as follows:

> The dialectical dialogue is a dialogue about objects that, interestingly enough, the English language calls 'subject matters'. The dialogical dialogue, on the other hand, is a dialogue among subjects aiming at being a dialogue about subjects. They want to dialogue not about something, but about themselves: They dialogue themselves. …The dialogical dialogue is not so much about opinions (the famous *endoxa*, ἔνδοξα of Aristotle about which dialectics deal) as about those who have such opinions, and eventually not about you, but about me to you. To dialogue about opinions, doctrines, views, the dialectical dialogue is indispensable. In the dialogical dialogue the partner is not an object or a subject merely putting forth some objective thoughts to be discussed, but a you, a real you and not an it. I must deal with you and not merely with your thought, and of course, vice versa, You yourself are a source of understanding.[217]

For him, the dialectical dialogue is a "dialogue about objects."[218] A simple example of a dialectical dialogue would be the dialogue between Christians and Muslims on a certain subject matter. Also, more broadly, if one considers one's dialogue partner as "it" or dialogues with the

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[216] Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island," 126.

[217] Panikkar, *The Intrareligious Dialogue*, 30.

[218] Ibid.

"it"s of the other, such a dialogue is also a dialectical dialogue. In this sense, the other's religion is the "it"s of the other, as the other's thought, ideology, history, and identity are, and the education that only considers the "it"s of the other (Education for Particularity and Pluralism) is a dialectical education. For Panikkar, unlike the dialectical dialogue which is a dialogue of "it," or what is said, what is expressed, and what is conceptualized, the dialogical dialogue is a dialogue with "a real you" who is more than his or her expressed thoughts and ideas—more than the "it" of him or her. In this manner, Interreligious education that seeks to be an Education for the We is a dialogical education, for what it pursues is to encounter and relate with a human, or "a real you," who is much more than the "it" (religion) of the other.

"Living together" is possible only when interreligious education becomes the gathering of human beings, or the gathering of the We, rather than that of the jobs of human beings or the classes of human beings, so to speak. Likewise, "living together interreligiously" is possible only when people think that this gathering is the gathering of human beings who have different religions rather than the gathering of the religions to which the participants belong. In interreligious education and many other interreligious practices, we do not relate with the other in order to deal with the other's religion. We deal with the other's religion in order to relate with the other in depth. Our purpose is to live with the other, and the other's religion is important as far as it helps us understand the other.

Education for Community (Shik-Gu)

The second characteristic of Education for the We is that this education aims to educate a community rather than a gathering of individuals. Sharing only "what is said" in the context of equal status and equal exchange leaves the gap between the I and the You as the space of

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separation, not as the space of connection. It leaves each individual isolated. Education for

Particularity and Pluralism, which focuses intensely on individuals' formation and exchange is

only an "I" education. It is an *"I" education for "each individual"* at which this model would

eventually aim. The difference from the monoreligious model is that the monoreligious model is

an *"I" education only for "myself"* and the other is not included in the object of education.

Education for Particularity and Pluralism is an "I-I" (subject-subject) education, for it allows all

individuals to return to their own individual identities. "I" may come to be more ethical, humble,

and religiously literate, but it is, again, in question how much this transformed identity can

necessarily help the learner see the other as the related other and generate the energy to embody

and maintain the life of "living together." Education for Particularity and Pluralism invites

individuals to experience the other but sends back to their inner formations where the distance

remains and separation persists.

Interreligious education as Education for the We shifts our focus from the I to the We.

This is a statement about the object of education. This education can be most effective when the

object of education is a community rather than a class. Also, this statement implies the change of

the contents of education: from preparing for "living together" to experiencing "living together."

A goal of Education for the We is to provide the learners with a real experience of "living

together" within a learners' group. No doubt one of the best ways to educate learners about the

life of "living together" is to let them truly experience the life of "living together" at firsthand.

Thus, educating for a community means that this Education lets the participants form a

community in which each one becomes a *shik-gu* to each other and experiences "living together."

As they experience the process of forming an interreligious community, sharing deep friendship,

caring for the other, and meeting "the real you" through your religion, they will experience a dialogical relationship in which they learn to live with the others.

Education for Love

Interreligious education as Education for the We is an education for *love*. I have pointed out that "interreligious fluency" does not guarantee the heart for the life of "living together." What guarantees the heart for the life of "living together" is love—the love for the other. It is only love that makes differences crave being together and being interrelated. With love, "living together" is not a *must* but a *want*. With love, we pursue "living together" not necessarily because it is ethically right nor politically correct, but because it is what we want. For Education for the We, it is not the primary concern to deepen one's identity and expand one's understanding of the other, for the deepened identity and the expanded understanding are not sufficient for "living together." It is not the understanding of the other that stops judgment and violence toward the other. Politics often makes us betray our friends, and our recalcitrance often arises against ethics; but, love never betrays. It rather sacrifices oneself. It is love that ties oneself with the other as *shik-gu,* cares for *annyeong* of the other, and sustains *symbiosis* unconditionally. Thus, the primary focus of Education for the We is not *who I am* (identity) and *who you are* (understanding)*, but *how we are related* (relationship)*.

Love neither unifies nor separates one another, but combines and differentiates one another; it is love that engenders multiplicity. In other words, it is love that creates and sustains the We. Love exists in between the I and the You. The We is fulfilled when love is inserted in between the I and the You and holds them together; but never unifies them. Buber's I-Thou is not necessarily the We. The We is *I-Love-Thou*. According to the theology of multiplicity, this love is

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divine, which Roland Faber calls *polyphilia*, or "the divine love of multiplicity."[219] Polyphilia is the divine love that never replaces Thou with the I, which would result in *I-Love-I* (the logic of the One). It is also the love that never disappears between the I and the You, which would result in *I / You* or *I*-and-*You* (the logic of the Many). Polyphilia is what enables the We and what receives the We. This is the love of "all-receptive, all-relational, all-sympathetic, and all-healing reconciliation."[220] Interreligious education as Education for the We is an education for this love: *polyphilia*.

Polyphilia enables multiplicity as it loves one and the other equally. In the context of interreligious education, it is polyphilia if one can love the religious other as one loves oneself. It is also polyphilia if one can see the other's religious nature, commitment, and practice as one sees those of oneself. One who has polyphilia loves the other as much as one loves oneself, and is critical of oneself as much as one is critical of the other. To learn polyphilia means to learn to be a multiplicity. With this love, one can become a multiplicity as one invites many others into oneself and help them to stay together. With this love, one can understand the other as a multiplicity as one sees the other to invite oneself to the other and help them stay together. With this love, one and the other become the We—a multiplicity of multiplicities. With this love, one and the other, or the I and the You, are no longer the other to each other, but parts of one another; they are one body—a multiplicity. When one experiences this love and experiences oneself to be a part of the other, one can practice this love as one invites the other into oneself.

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[219] Faber, *The Divine Manifold*, 48.

[220] Ibid.

Education for (Theo)Poetics

Interreligious education as Education for the We is an education for *poetics*. It is so first because

the Education is for human beings who are poetic. By poetic, I mean that a person is

incomprehensible, irreducible, asymmetric, irregular, porous, and *novel*—that is, a multiplicity.

These characteristics make the person partially known and describable, and partially unknown

and indescribable, both of which make the person poetic. The partially known and describable

part of the self makes the person poetic, as it evokes our *imagination* and *creative interpretation*

of the incoherent and non-hierarchically organized self. The partially unknown and indescribable

part of the self makes the person poetic as well, as it evokes our *imagination* and *creative*

interpretation for what is not yet actualized and embodied. Simply put, the person is more than

the "*it*"s of the self, as we have discussed in the dialogical education; the person is more than that

by which he or she is known and described. The process of searching the unrevealed meanings of

a self is the poetics of a human being, with which interreligious education would be concerned. In

particular, interreligious education as Education for the We is an education that acknowledges that

both the I and the You are invited to this poetics of the self and the other as active and

collaborative meaning makers of one another.

Interreligious education as Education for the We is an education for poetics, also because

the We, which is a multiplicity, is poetic. As aforementioned, between the I and the You, love

happens, and this love enables a multiplicity. This conceptual space between the I and the You

was not sufficiently appreciated in Education for Particularity and Pluralism. Education for

Particularity and Pluralism was a prosaic education, for it focused almost exclusively on the

exchange of *logos—*the "incarnated" aspects of the other's religion such as doctrines, scriptures,

histories, and cultures. The highlight of Education for Particularity and Pluralism was that the

learner directly encounters the other religion and learns the other religion from direct interactions with its very members. Compared to the previous model in which the learner learns the other religion through the learner's own religious people, the method of Education for Particularity and Pluralism was radical. However, this method, so-called "perspective exchange," was dull, unimaginative, and present-oriented, for it focused on "it"*s* of individuals. Interreligious education as Education for the We gives attention to the space between the I and the You, where the love resides. The space may be visibly empty, but invisibly full. The space is full of possibilities and imaginations—that is, *poiesis* (the momentum to make new things)—that enfolds and unfolds the multiplicity. With this space, or the divine love in between the I and the You, the We is always greater than the sum of the I and the You: *poetic.* This poetics of the We leads the community of interreligious education to a common journey that is creative, dynamic, and future-oriented.

Interreligious education as Education for the We is not simply an education for poetics but also for *theopoetics*. It means that God is also a member of the We. According to Roland Faber, this divine love, which connects and holds, enfolds and unfolds the I and the You, is not only the creative but also compassionate and, therefore, salvific divine who "appears… as its surprising creator (the ground of its novelty), its compassionate companion (the ground of its interwoven nature), and its saving radiance (the ground of its harmony)."[221] This is the God that Whitehead calls the "poet of the world," where the term *theopoetics* comes.[222] Faber interprets Whitehead's "poet" to mean neither "the writer" of poems, "the maker" like Plato's crafts-god or the potter in

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[221] Roland Faber, *God as Poet of the World: Exploring Process Theologies* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 15.

[222] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 346.

the Bible, nor "the creator" who creates things *ex nihilo* in the traditional Christian understanding.[223] Neither is God creativity, which Faber calls the difference as "theopoetic difference."[224] Rather, God is the poet of the world because of God's "overpowering rationality of … conceptual harmonization."[225] This character of God is eventually *salvific,* for it is "all-receptive, all-relational, all-sympathetic, and all-healing reconciliation."[226] Whitehead confirms, "He [God] does not create the world, he saves it; or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world."[227] Interreligious education as Education for the We, that sees the other as the part of the I, is grounded in the logic of Multiplicity, and accepts polyphilia as the foundational reason of its being and becoming, affirms this God as part of the We as well. I-God-Thou is the trinity of the We. This God is *shik-gu* to the I and the You, who not just eats with the I and the You, but becomes the food for the I and the You and provides it eternally for the eternal *annyeong* of the I and the You. As Whitehead says, this God is truly "the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands."[228] With God the poet of the world, or God the great companion (*shik-gu*) of the We, "living together" become possible.

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[223] Faber, *The Divine Manifold*, 466–48.

[224] Ibid., 48.

[225] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 346; Faber, *The Divine Manifold*, 47.

[226] Faber, *The Divine Manifold*, 48.

[227] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 346.

[228] Ibid., 351.

Conclusion

My core question in this chapter has been *How effective is interreligious education as Education for Particularity and Pluralism in helping the learner truly embody the life of "living together"?* It is in question whether the goal of this model is to help the learner become equipped with the necessary skills for this religiously pluralistic society or to educate the learner to truly yearn for and embody the life of "living together." Thus far I have diagnosed Education for Particularity and Plurality as good at educating "interreligious fluency" and preparation for "living together," but is limited to learning a passive mode of "living together."

The model of interreligious education grounded in the logic of Multiplicity can overcome the essentialist problem in the model of Education for Particularity and Pluralism, and will lead to an education that effectively helps the participant embody the life of "living together." The vision of interreligious education as Education for the We (Multiplicity) is to provide an educational model that aids the learners form and transform their interreligious *community*, which goes beyond individual's interreligious learning.

I do not mean that the double effect that Education for Particularity and Pluralism claims are now invalid. Learning directly of, from, and with the religious other would help one deepen one's religious identity and enlarge one's understanding of the other. However, as far as the education is grounded in the logic of the Many—a metaphysical understanding of things mutually exclusive—and portrays the other as the wholly other, interreligious education is far from casting and aiding the pluralistic vision of "living together." Interreligious education has much greater potentials. It can move beyond the dichotomy of I and Thou, and the matter of identity and understanding. With the logic of the We, interreligious education can be an educational practice that can more effectively educate learners to be active members of society "living together."

"Living together" is to live in symbiosis—two (or more) entities inseparable and mutually nourishing. "Living together" is to be the We, or *shik-gu* in which people eat together, stay together, and care for the *annyeong* of one another, whether good or bad, rain or shine. This is to be a community of common destiny and a multiplicity of multiplicities. "Living together" is to be one body that shares life and death, and joy and sorrow. In this body, we see each other as a part of the I—not as a subordinated part of the I, but as a part of the We. This is the foundation of Education for the We. This education brings human beings back to the center of the education, and pushes identity and understanding back to a secondary consideration. It overcomes the logic of the Many, and suggests understanding interreligious education as a theological activity.

The next mission of this research is to explain this theoretical reflection with practices. In the following chapter, I will elaborate how this model can be embodied in our practices.

5

Towards Theopoetic Learning:

The Pedagogy of the We (Multiplicity)

Interreligious education as Education for the We can be done in many different ways. The facilitator of the Education may choose a method or methods to assist the contemporary religious and non-religious people to embody the life of "living together" across the boundary of religion. The purpose of this chapter is to concretize the pedagogy of Education for the We and consider how such a pedagogy can be applied in practice. First, I unpack the pedagogy of Education for the We, or simply *the pedagogy of the We*, into four sub-pedagogies in response to four characteristics of Education for the We described in the previous chapter. They are the pedagogies of *homo religiosus*, interreligious community, planetary multiplicity, and trinitarian theopoetics. This is followed by the review of three major interreligious practices, namely dialogue, collaboration, and visitation (which I suggest to call Immersion). In the review, I suggest ways in which those methods can be effective learning tools for Education for the We. My argument with this chapter is that the pedagogy based on the theory of multiplicity provides us with a decisive guidance of interreligious education that assists the participants to learn and embody "living together" in their lives.

Pedagogy of the We

In the previous chapter, I have addressed four characteristics of interreligious education as Education for the We. They are that Education for the We is (1) for human beings (not primarily for religion), (2) for community (not primarily for individual learning), (3) for love (not primarily

for dialectics), and (4) for poetics (not primarily for "givenness"). These four characteristics are the four pedagogical visions of the Education. I use the term "pedagogy" in its broadest sense. This includes philosophy, theory, and methodology of teaching. In this way, the visions I present here are meant to be applied for the participants' most effective learning of "living together."

Homo Religiosus

The first characteristic of interreligious education as Education for the We is that this Education is for human beings, not for religion *per se*. I have already argued in the previous chapter that it is important that the focus of the Education should be made on human beings because it is the human beings that should live together. The existence of a religion external to its members and a religious believer who is completely confined and defined by its religion are both illusions. For this reason, the effort required for living together between religions should not be assumed the same as the effort required for living together between people of religions, although it may assist in a certain sense. Only education for human beings can teach human beings "living together."

When interreligious education puts its focus on human beings, and when the participants perceive one another as human beings, they will first find a sense of commonality in the fact that they are all religious human beings, or *Homo religiosus*. Religious human beings do not mean those who belong to a religion or religions. Religious human beings are those who have religious sensitivity which often appear as questions about transcendence and the meanings of life and of death. Thus, finding a commonality as religious human beings does not mean finding a commonality or a similarity between the religions of the participants. Rather, this means, again, to see the other's religious nature, which is intrinsically the same as that of oneself, and draws human beings to questions and explorations of transcendence and the meanings of life and death.

The intrinsic religious nature of human beings is famously explained by Friedrich Schleiermacher as "intuition," "feeling" and "absolute dependence upon God."[229] Max Scheler also articulates that *homo religiosus* is the one who has the divine in one's heart and actions.[230] More relevantly, Abraham J. Heschel expresses that human beings are different in "the ways of achieving fear and trembling," but the same that they all have "the fear and trembling" about God.[231] In this respect, the religious nature of human beings is not something necessarily identified in one's particular religion. This is rather something that can be better found when one detaches oneself from one's own religion.

Thus, the pedagogical vision that this characteristic suggests is that the Education should primarily focus on letting the participants meet one another as human beings, especially as *Homo religiosus*, rather than as a mere pathway, or a means, to learn and understand the religion of the other. This experience will enable the participants not only to connect one another with a sense of companionship, empathy, and togetherness, but also to find oneself within the other and the other from oneself.

This pedagogy of encountering *homo religiosus* helps the participants embody "living together." First, they come to learn from the ways that the other deals with his or her religious fear and trembling. Second, once they meet one another as bare religious human beings and find that they are all struggling with similar life questions in different ways, the participants come to

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[229] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, ed. Richard Crouter, 2nd ed., Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22.

[230] Lindsay Jones, Mircea Eliade, and Charles J Adams, *Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 6 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 4109.

[231] Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island," 122.

have sympathy and empathy for one another and hope *annyeong* for one another. Third, as I

mentioned above, the participants come to discover the voice of one another within themselves,

which affirms both the self and the other to be interconnected multiplicities.

Interreligious Community

The second characteristic of interreligious education as Education for the We is that it intends to

deal with the participants as a single interreligious community not simply as a gathering of

multiple individuals or an encounter between two or more religions. This characteristic has been

suggested based on a criticism that the best way to learn "living together" is to experience "living

together." Thus, the pedagogy that this characteristic suggests is to set the goal of the Education

as the participants forming an interreligious community through the curriculum. To realize this

pedagogy, the participants are, therefore, expected to join the education with a commitment to be

a part of an interreligious community. No matter what method is attempted, the participants are

expected to partake in the formation of an interreligious community with the other participants,

which by nature requires a practice of "living together" during the education.

This is to move one step forward from the goal of Education for Particularity and

Pluralism, which is to deepen one's understanding of one's own religion and the other's religion.

The focus moves from understanding to living. Education for Particularity and Pluralism has no

intention for the participants to be a community together necessarily. The model of Education for

Particularity and Pluralism assumes education as creating a learning environment between two (or

more) religious communities. The primary goal of this educational model is to give the

participants an opportunity to gain skills, knowledge, attitude, and language through which they

can interact better with the religious other who they will meet in their daily lives. For them, the

religious other is not necessarily the other participants of the education, but most likely those who they will meet outside the education. Considering the other participants as the first neighbors with whom to create a relationship of "living together" is, therefore, a fundamental difference that this second pedagogical vision makes.

One caveat is that it takes a considerable amount of time for the participants to come together to form a community and practice interreligious living in it. It is extremely difficult to fulfill this vision in a curriculum that consists of several sessions or a semester-long program. Such relatively short-term curriculums would generate important interreligious learning in one sense, but it would be an open question if the education can successfully lead the participants to form a community and experience "living together."

Boys and Lee's Catholic-Jewish Colloquium gives us a clue that the length of the time of the entire education may matter for building a sense of community. One of the participants of their interreligious education reportedly said, "I feel comfort in the knowledge that difficult questions need not go unanswered, as long as phones and faxes work… I feel I am a member of a permanent team dedicated to linking our two communities for the betterment of both."[232] It seems that they were successful for some of them in making the participants have a sense of a community, although they did not have such an intention. Their project lasted more than two years and eight months, although they only met once in a while. It is inconclusive what exactly affected the person to have such a sense of community, but I see that their long-term education must have been one of the significant factors for the person to build trust, friendship, and a sense of community with the other participants.

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[232] Boys and Lee, "Catholic-Jewish Colloquium," 430.

For the same reason, the curriculum of Claremont School of Theology (CST) looks adequate for Education for the We. CST has intentionally become an interreligious community as it invites other religious groups, such as Muslims, Jews, and Sikhs, as core members of the school. The aim of this model is simple: to give the students, who usually stay on campus two years or more, an opportunity to form an interreligious community and experience "living together" firsthand, and its interreligious environment has truly provided the students a real experience of "living together."

"Interreligious" is a buzz word today. However, interreligious education as Education for the We refuses any interreligious educational attempts that may attract people with the word "interreligious" but end as mere events that do not provide an experience of "living together." Such events would certainly generate a certain type of interreligious learning, but it would be limited to teach the students "living together" by experience; for one can only learn to ride a bicycle when one actually rides it.

Planetary Multiplicity

The third characteristic of interreligious education as Education for the We is that this Education is for love. Love is a prerequisite for togetherness. It is an energy that impulses one to aspire to be with the other and sustain the relationship without correcting the other. If anything insists on being one with the other with eradication of difference, it is no longer with love, and never accomplishes togetherness which is the core nature of community; it only commits violence. I have introduced the love, which enables togetherness with difference, as *polyphilia* in the previous chapter. Polyphilia, or the love of multiplicity, is a prerequisite for "living together," and what Education for the We emphatically hopes to value and transmit.

Educating love is, however, a conundrum, for love is a reality that is hard to objectify and emerge. In consideration of such a difficulty, Education for the We suggests a pedagogical method that has been practiced to teach love for the longest time and acknowledged as the most effective one over history: *teaching by example*. Teaching by example is highly effective not only to children but also to adults. Teaching love by example is especially what has been most popularly used in a family setting. Children have learned to love through their parents or other family members who gave them care, and have passed it down to their children in the same way over generations. The hope of Education for the We is that the participants of the Education will be able to learn ways in which they embody polyphilia during the course of the education and in their daily lives.

A particular way I suggest teaching polyphilia by example is by perceiving and treating each participant as a *multiplicity*. This means to regard the participants as unique and particular singularities that contain differences that cannot be reduced. Viewing the participant as a multiplicity also means that the Education does not identify the participant with his or her religion or ideology, but respects the participant as a complex, dynamic, and incomprehensible being. It does not mean that the Education completely disregards the participant's religious affiliation, but it means that the Education regards identifying someone with his or her religion as injustice and unfairness. One cannot be subordinated to and subcategorized under a religion, but only constructs it. Thus, no one can be identified with a particular religion or even with a fellow practitioner of the religion. His or her religion is a part of the participant and what possibly connects the participant with other fellow members of the religion; but, the participant is more than his or her religion.

Treating a participant as a multiplicity is, in one sense, decentralization of religion from the person. More precisely, it is to help one, who is multiplicity and hybridity, decentralize oneself from the logic of the One of the religion and liberating one from coercion to see the world with the mono perspective. This pedagogy carries such an important mission for embodying "living together," for what obstructs us from "living together" is the logic of the One that draws the line and confines our space within it. Some people cherish that line, for it gives a sense of security; but, it is "that line" that has been killing and dividing human beings and precludes "living together" in the name of religion, truth, and God.

To specify and emphasize this decentralization of the religion's logic of the One with multiplicity, I must give a distinguishable name for this pedagogy: "affirming planetary multiplicity." I use the planetary basically in the sense that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak proposes. Based on a postcolonial perspective, she criticizes the globe as "a differentiated political space" that is virtual, and proposes to use "the planet" instead.[233] She goes on to say, "The globe is on our computers. No one lives there. It allows us to think that we can aim to control it. The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan."[234] She proposes this reconstructive concept because she believes that "Planet-thought opens up to embrace inexhaustible taxonomy of such names, including but not identical with the whole human universals"; and, it also helps that "the alterity remains underived from us."[235] By the same token, I believe that religion, in a sense, draws a virtual line which hinders us from seeing and

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[233] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Death of a Discipline*, Wellek Library Lectures at the University of California, Irvine (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 72.

[234] Ibid.

[235] Ibid., 73.

meeting with one another as we are and precludes us from "living together"; and, therefore, I argue that the pedagogy of the Education should be able to help the participants meet one another as "planetary multiplicities." Again, this does not mean the eradication of religion from a person, but the liberation of the person from the injustice of the logic of the One.

One way to affirm the participants as planetary multiplicities is to imagine interreligious education as the education between religious persons, not as the education between religions. Interreligious education is inter-religious persons' education, not inter-religions' education. Thus, the participants need not be divided by their religion during the curriculum. Again, this attempt does not aim to eliminate religion from this Education, but refuses to accept religion as *the* standard to categorize the participants. When a participant identifies him or her as a Buddhist, for example, the Education must ask, "How are you a Buddhist and what else?", not necessarily, "What kind of a Buddhist are you?" There is no such religion that can be reduced to one kind, and there is no such a person who is aligned with a religion with unerring accuracy. It is a myth that someone has a perfect alignment with one's own religion, unless one *is* a religion. In the same way, it is a myth that a religion has a mono idea to which one needs to be aligned. A religion is a multiplicity, and so is a practitioner of the religion.

Trinitarian Theopoetics

The fourth characteristic of interreligious education as Education for the We is that this Education is for poetics. By poetics, interreligious education underscores the symbiotic characteristic of "living together." The participants enrich one another with mutual imagination and interpretation. In this manner, it is requisite that the Education provides an intellectual and spiritual space for imagination and interpretation for one another.

The work of imagination and interpretation is a process to participate in the other's formation and transformation. Education for the We encourages one to participate in the other's formation and transformation with one's own imagination and interpretation, and it encourages the other vice versa. In doing so, the participants experience that one becomes a part of the other, and the other becomes a part of the one. Furthermore, the participants experience that one and the other become the We (a multiplicity of multiplicities) through mutual influencing and intertwining. This is the mode of "symbiotic" living, and eventually the mode of "living together," which we hope the participants to embody in their lives.

Imagination and interpretation of the other is in contrast to the claim of Education for Particularity and Pluralism. Education for Particularity and Pluralism argues that one comes to know better about one's own religion and the other's religion through interreligious education. The participant's role is to understand the religion more correctly and more clearly. In this idea, the core of the religion is often described as immutable or as transformable only by the insider's self-reflection and self-transcendence. This learning process may require imagination and interpretation for the self, but not for the other - that is, no poetics of the other.

Interreligious poetics that evokes imagination and interpretation of the other, is eventually theopoetic in terms of which God joins our poetic process with God's own imagination and receives the process with God's own interpretation. In this statement, I am thinking of Whitehead and his argument for the "dipolar" nature of God: the "primordial nature" and the "consequent nature."[236] I think that God's imagination for us matches an aspect of God's primordial nature with which God is "the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire."[237] In this respect, I understand

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[236] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 343–45.

[237] Ibid., 344.

that God's imagination, vision, or "initial aims" initiate us to join one another with imagination and interpretation. I also imagine that God's reception and interpretation of us matches God's consequent nature wherein "God's objectification of the world" takes place with God's "subjective aim" and "subjective form."[238] To sum, God shares our interreligious poetic process of imagination and interpretation, interconnecting and intertwining. It is in this way that the I, the You, and God together embody "living together."

The pedagogy honoring this trinitarian relationship among the I, the You, and God is to help the participants understand the process of interreligious learning as a sacred and religious journey. This journey is not of clarity and certainty. As Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore articulates for religious education, this is a journey in which "[t]eachers and learners are all seekers-walking up to the abyss, touching the unknown, playing with new ideas, seeking explanations and theories, and remembering that the venture will never end."[239] Yet, this is a holy journey not because we are moving closer to the divine, but because we are *with* the divine.

These four sub-pedagogies of the We explain multiple points regarding Education for the We. First, it explains the perspective of the Education on the participants. For the Education, the participants are multiplicities which consist of multiple elements and their interactions, which cannot be exhaustively explained by their religion. Second, it sets out a goal of the Education: giving an experience of "living together" by creating an interreligious community among the participants. Three, its goal of forming an interreligious community and realizing "living together" tells that Education for the We lies on Deweyan experiential learning theory. Lastly, the

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[238] Ibid., 345.

[239] Mary Elizabeth Moore, "Imagination at the Center," *Process Studies* 34, no. 2 (2005): 195.

pedagogy of the We explains "living together" as a tripartite activity among the I, the You, and the divine. In this activity, the Education seeks not only individual transformation, but also communal transformation.

Practices of Theopoetic Education

Education for "living together" can be attempted in many different ways. The pedagogy of the We may yield new learning methods, but what truly matters is "how" rather than "what." Interreligious practices currently conducted in the society or between religious communities are still meaningful and can be methods to embody Education for the We. It is possible especially when the methods are designed and conducted based on the pedagogy of the We. In what follows, I introduce three widely used interreligious learning practices: dialogue, collaboration, and visitation. There are certainly more interreligious learning practices, but my hope is that the review of these three practices gives an idea on how to transform our interreligious practices so that those practices can assist the participants to learn and embody the life of "living together" and make the world better.

One thing to be clearly stated is that it is different to say that interreligious collaboration, for instance, has a learning effect and to say that interreligious collaboration is effective to teach "living together." In the former approach, interreligious learning is a by-product, but in the latter approach, interreligious learning is a goal of activity. Three interreligious practices I will introduce will be reviewed here from a perspective of the latter approach. From now on, we deal with these practices as the pedagogical methods to teach "living together," not as an interreligious activity *per se*. In other words, the question I will deal with is not "how do we do interreligious

dialogue?", but "how can we transform interreligious dialogue to make it an effective learning tool for "living together"?"

Dialogue

To educate "living together," a theological school, a religious community, or any institute that hopes to implement interreligious education may take interreligious dialogue as their method of education. Interreligious dialogue has been one of the most popular and widely conducted practices for interreligious learning and engagement. David R. Brockman says, "Since the last century, initiatives in interreligious dialogue and cooperation have been launched on many fronts, and we are beginning to see the fruits of these various initiatives."[240] Interreligious dialogue began as a dialogue between the elite representatives of religions, but is now encouraged to take place at the "grassroots" level.

In debate, people insist their idea and try to persuade the other. Leonard Swidler, however, asserts, "Dialogue is not debate."[241] In the preface of *Interfaith Dialogue at the Grass Roots,* he also says that dialogue is a "two-way communication between persons who hold significantly differing views on a subject."[242] For Swidler, this activity of communication leads the participants to "learn, change and grow."[243] In other words, interreligious dialogue is an interreligious learning practice. One thing of which educators must be aware is that dialogue does not necessarily seek a

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[240] Brockman and Habito, *The Gospel among Religions*, 6.

[241] Leonard Swidler, "Death or Dialogue: From the Age of Monologue to the Age of Dialogue," *Grand Valley Review* 6, no. 2 (January 1, 1991): 59.

[242] Mays, *Interfaith Dialogue at the Grass Roots*, 11.

[243] Swidler, "Death or Dialogue," 66.

common agreement, as friends do not necessarily agree on everything. Rather, it is one of the learning goals of interreligious dialogue that the participants learn how to disagree. In the same manner, Michelle LeBaron contends that what dialogue needs is not "passion for outcomes" but "agreed process boundaries." She says that dialogue "can proceed parallel to advocacy," but for "effective dialogue" and "extensive preparation, careful structuring, and well-trained facilitators are essential." In this manner, LeBaron defines a dialogue as "a focused conversation about an issue or situation with agreed process boundaries to which people bring a spirit of inquiry," not as a conversation for an agreed conclusion.[244]

For Humans

As described above, there are two kinds of interreligious dialogue in terms of participants. One is a dialogue among representatives of religions, and the other is a dialogue among ordinary practitioners of various religions. The former is the dialogue of elites, and the latter is the dialogue of the grass roots. Interreligious dialogue as a method of interreligious education for living together prefers the latter, the dialogue of the grass roots. It is so because the grass roots model fits better with its first pedagogical vision - the encounter of *homo religiosus*. The former model of dialogue is closer to a dialogue between religions. Also, leaving the participants as mere audiences watching their leaders' conversation is dehumanization, as it limits intellectual and spiritual subjectivity of the participants. Thus, although it is admissible that a dialogue between Pope and Dalai Lama, for example, may affect the lives of adherents of both religious groups, the dialogue as a method of Education for the We will choose the model of the grass roots dialogue to assist all participants to learn of "living together."

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[244] LeBaron, *Bridging Cultural Conflicts*, 257.

The dialogue among the grass roots does not naturally fulfill the pedagogy of the encounter of *homo religiosus*. The dialogue between participants becomes an encounter of *homo religiosus* when the participants avoid a temptation to represent the perspectives of their own religion. The participants are also recommended to avoid focusing on doctrines, confessions, or information of religions - that is, the "it"s of religions. Otherwise, the nature of the dialogue becomes informative and rationalized, which is a "dialectical dialogue" that Panikkar warns to avoid. In this kind of dialogue, symbols remain, but humans disappear. Panikkar has already advised to overcome this dialogue of dehumanization with a "dialogical dialogue." In the mode of dialogical dialogue, the Education expects the participants to encounter one another and share their stories regarding their religiosity and spirituality. This dialogue requires neither a counterargument nor a conclusion.

In this mode of dialogue, hearing the other's religious desires, passions, commitments, and questions gives one insights, reflections, courage, and hope. The one also finds that those resonate with his or her religious desires, passions, commitments, and questions, although the one's religion is different from that of the other. From there, one finds a sense of community, empathy, and companionship with the other. Lastly, the more the participants speak about their own stories related to their religions, the more the complexity and diversity of the other's religion is revealed and the more deeply the relationship is formed among the participants. Such an increased complexity and diversity is neither inconvenience nor embarrassment, but a sign of liberation and differentiation from the logic of the One; this is humanization. Strictly speaking, interreligious dialogue based on Education for the We needs to be understood as an inter-religious persons' dialogue, as opposed to an inter-religions' dialogue.

For Community

The second pedagogical vision of Education for the We asks interreligious dialogue to set its goal as the participants creating an interreligious community wherein they experience a real life of "living together." This pedagogy gives one more reason why interreligious dialogue as a method of Education for the We should avoid dialectical dialogue. In dialectical dialogue, agendas matter, while the life of dialoguers is ignored. It is possible only in the dialogical dialogue to bring the life of the dialoguers on the table and build up a sense of community as they share their lives.

As I explained with the concept of *shikgu*, "living together" includes to stay together and be a companion to one another with compassion and empathy, rain or shine. Interreligious dialogue as a method to educate "living together" is, therefore, expected to extend its practice to hear the struggles and frustrations of the others and seek wisdom together. It is nothing but to live the life of "living together" through interreligious dialogue if the participants can share and hear one another's own issues, which actively include the issues not related to the opponents but that are serious in their lives and minds, and construct comfort and wisdom together. Interreligious dialogue that shares life and heart and seeks collective wisdom is already a form of "living together" that creates a sense of togetherness.

For Love

The pedagogical vision described above for teaching love is to teach polyphilia (the love of multiplicity) by example. In that section, I also propose one particular example to apply this pedagogy: to affirm the participants as planetary multiplicities. Thus, the question we need to deal with: *What does it mean to deal with the participant as a planetary multiplicity in the practice of interreligious dialogue and how would it look like?*

First of all, to deal with the individual participants as multiplicities respectively means that the Education does not assume that the participants are completely "coherent" selves. Although they may have their own "intensified" ideas, ideologies, and identities, the Education does not embarrass the participants when their "incoherent" aspects are revealed. Rather, the Education encourages them to value their "incoherence" as important parts of themselves. In the same manner, to deal with the participants as *planetary* multiplicities implies that they may have some "incoherence" or "dissonance" with the alleged teachings of their religion. In Education for the We, such irregulars are, however, not the signs of disqualification for dialogue. Contrarily, they are the signs of qualification for dialogue, because dialogue is triggered when there is something more to learn by explanation and conversation. In the interreligious dialogue based on the model of Education for the We, such irregulars of the self, or the natures of the self being a multiplicity, are to be dealt as the signs of one's internal diversity, the depth of one's complexity, and, the elements that provoke a dialogue. With this pedagogical assumption, the participants do not need to pretend either to have something that they do not have or pretend not to have something that they have.

In this dialogue, the participants are fully respected as they are, during which I hope that they experience love. They will experience acceptance even when they express ideas and questions that are in contrast to the generally known teachings of their own religious tradition. This is an education of liberation, which invites religious people to a dialogue without guilty and fear even when they think that they are not perfectly aligned with their religion in every aspect. It is an impossible vision that interreligious dialogue should be a dialogue between "religions." This interreligious dialogue help the participants liberate themselves from the obsession to unite oneself to the religions, which is the logic of the One. It does not mean that the dialogue intends

to promote the participants to leave their religions. It means that the dialogue gives an opportunity of deconstruction and reconstruction of one's commitment to and understanding of the religion, and to see one another as companion despites they belong to different religions. This pedagogy approves the participants to dialogue with the other who is not perfectly representing the other's religion. For living together, it rather seeks to find one another a multiplicity, and establish a sense of companionship.

<div align="center">For Poetics</div>

It is a traditional concept of interreligious dialogue that one speaks about one's religion and the other listens to it, and the same activity happens in reverse. Interreligious dialogue as a method of Education for the We, however, invites one to speak about the other, and the other listens to what the one speaks about the other. In this case, the dialogue allows the one to speak about the other by using imagination and creative interpretation of the other. Pomnyun, who is a well-known Buddhist monk in Korea, is often invited to deliver a message in a Catholic church. When he delivers a message, his message includes his interpretation of the biblical narratives, by which the Christian audience gets highly inspired and enlightened. From his message, the audience finds a new meaning of the text and living as the follower of Jesus. What he does is an example of listening to the religious other speaking about the self with imagination and interpretation, which eventually embodies symbiotic "living together."

The completion of a poem is when the reader fills between the lines of the poem with imagination and interpretation. Likewise, inviting the other to myself and sharing my space with the other, the I is being completed. This poetic process leads the I to experience formation and transformation and to create new knowledge of the self. John B. Cobb writes, "This does not mean that the faith of Israel was syncretistic, but it does mean that Israel learned from and was

repeatedly transformed by the culture and religious achievements of other peoples."[245] This

"cross-boundary" dialogue engenders a relational epistemology, which resonates with what

Swidler articulates as "a dialogic view of truth."[246] The I, the You, and the We are not "given,"

but being formed through this ongoing mutual imagination and interpretation. Also, this dialogue

achieves internal "living together," as the I invites the other into the part of the I and vice versa.

Collaboration

Interreligious collaboration is one of the fast emerging interreligious practices today. As the word

"collaboration" implies, interreligious collaboration is that which people from different religious

traditions "work together" for a common goal or a common agenda. For example, many people

fought in solidarity against environmental racism and injustice at Standing Rock in North Dakota

in 2016, and some of them were explicit on their interreligious solidarity and collaboration in the

protest. For them, the Standing Rock Protest was an interreligious collaboration as they pursued

the same work (protest) for the same good (environmental/racial justice). The examples of

interreligious collaboration are extended to, but is not limited to, activities such as vigil, protest,

community garden, food drive, music concert, peace walk, etc. The purposes of those activities

are various. They are for social justice related to race and gender equality, awareness for religious

violence and peace building, friendship among local religious groups, and so forth.

Interreligious collaboration is a more active and goal-oriented form of interreligious

cooperation. Abraham J. Heschel once described interreligious cooperation as an effort that is

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[245] John B Cobb and Ward McAfee, *The Dialogue Comes of Age: Christian Encounters with Other Traditions* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 24–25.

[246] Swidler, "Death or Dialogue," 64.

"neither to flatter nor to refute one another, but to help one another; to share insight and learning, to cooperate in academic ventures on the highest scholarly level, and what is even more important to search in the wilderness for wellsprings of devotion, for treasures of stillness, for the power of love and care for man [and woman]."[247] At the bottom line, the definition of interreligious collaboration is not much different from this definition of interreligious cooperation. However, in addition to this, interreligious collaboration further requires to have a more specific goal and more concrete participation that usually involves physical presence and interaction than interreligious cooperation does.

It is a success of collaboration as a method of Education for the We that participants come to have a sense of family and come to hold accountable to the other participants. It is a success if they learn that they are the We who will always stand together for justice and peacebuilding for one another or for others in the society.

For Humans

Interreligious collaboration has a positive condition to realize the pedagogy of encountering *homo religiosus* and embody Education for the We. The primary concern for interreligious collaboration is to work together for a common good. In this concern, two things are highlighted: the action (working together) and the purpose (for a common good), and on the contrary, the attention to religion becomes relatively feeble in comparison with other interreligious activities. Religion is highlighted only as a supporting warrant for their members' participation. Interreligious collaboration requires people working side by side, shoulder to shoulder, letting them to meet one another as another human being who loves justice and seeks peace as one does. The participants

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[247] Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island," 133.

of collaboration are not recognized as those who represent their religions. They are seen as the religious human beings who are committed to a collaborative project in response to their religious commitment and consciousness.

A caveat for interreligious collaboration as a method of Education for the We is that the purpose of the Education (learning for "living together") may be weakened if the method places more weight on the goal of the collaboration (the common good) than the action of the collaboration (working together). Such a situation highlights "what" they are doing more than "with whom" they are doing their collaboration. In this situation, an agenda shines, yet humans become dim. Thus, when interreligious collaboration is attempted as a method of interreligious education for the We, it is recommended that the facilitator guide the participants not to lose their attention to the other participants and help them wonder who they (the other participants) are and what made them join the collaboration.

As the participants meet another religious human beings who are committed to the issue of justice and peace, they will experience that they mutually give emotional comfort, support, and embracing, which is the mode of the life of "living together." In this way, interreligious collaboration can perform a role as a method of Education for the We.

For Community

Interreligious collaboration that provides an arena in which the participants find other religious human beings who are committed to the matter of justice and peace will not only teach the participants to see religious others as their partners of "living together" but also provides a real experience of "living together" already.

Interreligious collaboration can be such an effective method to build a sense of community among the participants and give them a real experience of "living together." During this activity,

the participants band together for a common issue, and lively interact with one another in solidarity. By nature, interreligious collaboration seeks the wellbeing of the We, for they work together for the issue that commonly troubles, hurts, or concerns them in one way or the other.

One question to be reminded when interreligious education takes interreligious collaboration as its sole teaching method is whether this method can teach "living together" in a situation without a common agenda. Interreligious collaboration teaches the participants that people from different religious traditions can work together and make the world better, but it lacks in teaching how to embody "living together" in a situation that has no common agenda or even in a situation that has a controversial or disagreeing agenda. One way to solve this question is that interreligious collaboration gives attention not only to common issues that are social or political, but also to the inner issues of one another. Then, this method will be able to teach not only "living together" for social justice and peace building, but also for "living together" for one another; and, it will be also able to lead the participants to create a more sustainable interreligious community.

<center>For Love</center>

If groups of different religions work together for one of the participating religious groups, then polyphilia will be already being practiced and learned. It will be so because the definition of polyphilia is to love the other as oneself. When local Christians, Jews, Sikhs, and Hindus in New Jersey stood together to support the local Muslim community, which had been denied to build its own house of worship for a decade, their coalition was already a sign of the polyphilia that they had and a practice of the love of planetary multiplicity. They heard their particular neighbor's anguish as their own and responded together to the injustice that incurred the neighbor's suffering.

In the case that religious people ally for a non-religious issue in which no participants of

the collaboration is directly involved, such as Standing Rock, it may be asked whether

interreligious collaboration can effectively educate the participants to embody "living together"

with one another. For example, when religious people join together to protest the impeachment of

President Geun-hye Park in South Korea, their primary focus is on the issue for which they gather

and protest. Thus, although their interreligious collaboration is based on their compassion and

empathy for the society, the nation, and the democracy of Korea, learning to love the other

participants from different religions can be secondary.

This nature of interreligious collaboration should be well concerned when interreligious

education chooses collaboration as its teaching pedagogy. If the issue for which the participants

collaborate is not specifically related to a religion, but simply for social justice and peace

building, then the educator should be able to provide a moment in which the participants put the

issue aside and give attention to one another and how each other has come to join collaboration. If

collaboration deals with the issues directly related to the religion(s) of the participants, such an

effort may be somewhat reduced.

For Poetics

Interreligious collaboration can be an effective method of Education for the We as it creates a

collaborative work though which the participants become part of one another and have a

religiously transcendental experience.

Paul D. Numrich introduces several interreligious cases in the United States in his book

The Faith Next Door, and the interfaith service of Worldwide Community Sunday in Lake Street

Church in Illinois is a good example that epitomizes interreligious collaboration that harbors

trinitarian theopoetics. Numrich reports that people from other local religious groups such as

Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and others, participate in this worship (not simply attend) and share their own scripture readings, dances, etc.[248] (Numrich, 80) That is, the others become literally a part of the Christian worship service. With these elements, the church opens the Communion table to all - literally, to all - as the pastor believes that exclusion from the table is "a direct contradiction" to Jesus.[249]

I think that we can call this service an interreligious collaboration for Christian worship service. I believe that a similar practice can be attempted in other religious practices. In this worship, the congregation could celebrate the radical love of Jesus in a special way with the help of many friends who have different religions. The participants from other religions could also experience the beauty of planetary love and friendship in a transcendental way that they have never experienced. It is obvious that this service must have been impossible if either part of the participants of the service was not present. It is not only the imagination and interpretation of the church and its pastor but those of the Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim, and other friends that has enabled this theopoetic experience.

Interreligious collaboration can be many different forms and appearances. No matter what project is attempted, if interreligious collaboration is to be used as a method to teach "living together," the facilitator shall consider how to engage the participants with one another theopoetically.

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[248] Numrich, *The Faith next Door*, 80.

[249] Ibid., 82.

Immersion

Visiting the sacred space of the other and having a firsthand experience of the other is increasingly attempted today. It is believed that this is an effective educational activity by which the participants can learn and understand the other in depth. This method provides the participants with an opportunity not only of firsthand witnessing but also of being fully "immersed" in the real spaces and practices of the other religion. Thus, I call this method "Immersion." With a capitalized "I," *Immersion* as an interreligious learning method is distinguished from an ordinary meaning and use of the word "immersion."

In Immersion, the participants are completely surrounded by the real elements of the other religion, and they directly see, hear, smell, touch, and taste them. Also, they experience insider's perspective. In particular, the participants can experience how this religious group sees the world, portrays the other religious groups, and explains external issues to the insiders. This method gives a momentary yet strong experience, as if one experiences the foreign country much more powerfully by traveling rather than simply reading the books and meeting people from that country.

For Humans

First, the pedagogy of encountering *homo religiosus* requires Immersion as a method of Education for the We to be an Immersion in people of the other religion. In other words, it is suggested that Immersion is not regarded simply as an immersion in buildings, smells, systems, and rituals, although they are all incredibly meaningful and still encouraged to take place. To experience being connected with the other, Education for the We recommends Immersion to be an Immersion in people of the other religion, which also means to be an Immersion in the stories, depths, and complexities of the people and their religion.

Immersion differs from interreligious dialogue in terms of which this practice intends to have an unequal encounter with the other. What Immersion as a teaching method aims is to place the visitors in a situation of being a minority and the hosts in a situation of being a majority. Immersion in people of the other religion is, thus, to give the host community a chance to speak their stories from a vantage point, which provides them better security, confidence, safety, and comfort. This method is highly helpful when the host community is a minority religious group or even an oppressed group in a society. Taking a vantage point and share their stories from it would give them a time to share their deepest voices as well as generosity and hospitality that they could never fully share in a context of being a minority; and, this chance would give the visitors from the major religious community a chance to see the hidden side of the people of the other religion.

Immersion can bring a religious minority group to a religious majority group as well. In this case, it is recommended that the host group needs to be more conscious about possible unfairness and unintentional discomfort and educational injustice that might occur to the visitors. Immersion in this situation still become an effective teaching method for "living together" as it provides the visitors with an experience of the depths and complexities of the hosting community from the stories of the people of the hosting community. Immersion as a method of interreligious education helps the participants deconstruct their reductionist view toward religious others and discover the sacredness and profundity of the religious others, which brings them a sense of kinship. If Immersion can create a learning of this paradox, "The other is different from me but not really different from me," it is a successful teaching method for "living together."

For Community

The second pedagogy of the We is to make the participants create a sense of an interreligious community. For this pedagogy, Immersion should be also able to provide the visitors a chance to

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speak. Although Immersion intentionally seeks to be an asymmetric encounter with the other and the visitors to be a minority in that encounter, it does not mean that Immersion intends the visitors to be muted, receptive, and passive. Hearing from people of the host community is important but it does not suffices the goal of the Education for the We. Immersion is neither having a simple tour to a exotic place nor only listening to the stories of the other as a simple visitor; it should also neither be one way education nor dichotomize the participants into subject and object. Immersion should maintain mutuality so that it can grow a sense of community among one another.

For Love

Third, it is challenging for those who are the practitioners of the religion of the hosting community to be revealed as planetary multiplicities. Since they are already in their own religious space and surrounded by the people of the religion, their presence is apt to be submerged into the space and the name of the religion. However, it is a failure of Immersion as a method of Education for the We if the Muslim participants become immersed in the space and the religion, and, therefore, become nameless. Immersion as a method of Education for the We must be understood as being immersed in the people of the other religion, or, more precisely, the stories of the other people who identify their religious affiliation with the same religion.

Immersed in the stories of the others, the visitors can encounter the depth and complexity of the religion rather than mere description of their religions and practices. Too often visiting the other's sacred space become a tour since it does not include a time in which the participants can meet the people of the religion. Too often meeting the people from the religion become meeting "tour guides" since the hosts, who are mostly the representatives of the place, share mere information about the religion and their place. Only a visit that includes a time to meet with ordinary people from the place and attempts to engage with them with a deep conversation in that

the hosts and the visitors share their contextual and existential issues, will open up deep and mutual engagement and make that immersion the curriculum for living together. Even if the participants have a short conversation, which is usually the case, the narrative pedagogy will enable to treat the participants as planetary multiplicities and will evoke compassion and empathy for one another.

For Poetics

In the usual practice of Immersion, it reveals the other poetically as it provides the participants with so many non-verbal encounters such as with sounds, smells, textures, and atmospheres. The encounter with these non-verbal elements shows complexity and incomprehensibility of the hosting religion. However, as I have introduced above, Immersion as a method of Education for the We values a verbal conversation. Thus, in this sense, Immersion becomes a good method to teach "living together" when the participants, both the hosts and visitors, experience transcendence from a conversation with one another. The difference from the practice of interreligious dialogue is its special context which intends an asymmetric encounter.

Conclusion

As aforementioned, there are many more interreligious practices in the world, and the suggested ways above are not the only ways to do interreligious dialogue, collaboration, and Immersion. The purpose of the review of those practices was to explore the ways in which we apply the pedagogy of the We into the current interreligious practices. This attempt has certainly shown the need of transformation of those practices. Some changes were radical, and some changes were general. When the facilitator wants to use another method, I hope these three examples of

transformation to provide the guiding light and the source of wisdom. I also want to enunciate that the facilitator does not need to think that he or she has to choose only one method when designing the curriculum of interreligious learning. Two, three, or more methods, can be included together in one long curriculum. The facilitator can also include people from two religions, three religions, or more as participants. The strength of Education for the We is not to see people from one religion as one group of people. Thus, it does not matter how many religions are present among the participants. These matters should be decided based on the context of the education and wisely determined by the facilitator.

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